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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

)

F. C. STANGL III,

) Case No. 920221-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

)

Priority No. 16

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Wade has appealed a decision of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in favor of Stangl. The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Should the trial court's judgment be upheld in all

respects because of Wade's default?
2.

Was prejudicial bias shown by the trial judge?

3.

Did the trial court err in allowing evidence at trial

regarding an oral agreement or an oral modification of the written
agreement?
4.

Was the trial court's finding that the parties agreed to

allocate taxes based on the respective amount of land owned by each
party clearly erroneous?
STGL\105.wr
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5.

Did the trial court err in resolving this dispute on a

basis other than the doctrine of equitable conversion?
6.

Is Stangl entitled to attorneys' fees and costs incurred

in connection with this appeal?
Standards of Review
Issues 1, 3, 5 and 6 involve questions of law or procedure.
This Court is not required to give any particular deference to the
district court's conclusions in connection with these issues, but
must instead review them for correctness,

Gravson Roper Ltd.

Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Town of
Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Issue 4 involves a determination of whether certain factual
findings by the trial court are "clearly erroneous."

Such a

determination is a question of law for this Court, which must
decide if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence
or if they support a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.

Southern Title Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Bethers, 761

P.2d

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

951, 954

themselves

However, the findings

involve questions of fact and they must be given

deferential review, Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership, 782 P.2d at
470, such that this Court's review of such findings is "strictly
limited."

Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P. 2d 279,

283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
With regard to Issue 2, the courts of this state apparently
have

not

specified

the

standard

of

review

prejudicial bias by a trial court judge.
STGL\105.wr
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for

establishing

Generally, however, a

party asserting bias on the part of a trial judge must establish
that the judge had a substantial bent of mind against him or her.
The record must establish such bias clearly, and mere speculative
statements and conclusions are insufficient to satisfy the burden
of proof.

People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND 8TATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c):
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading
to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory
negligence,
discharge
in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter
constituting
an
avoidance
or
affirmative defense.
When a party has
mistakenly
designated
a
defense
as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense,
the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been
a proper designation.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h):
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives
all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion as hereinbefore
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of
failure to state a legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one
is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
STGL\105.wr
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matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
The objection or defense, if made at the
trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that
may have been received.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b):
(b) Amendments
to
conform
to
the
evidence.
When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings.
Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.
If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action
or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a):
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that
STGL\105.wr
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the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court.
It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(3):
(3) A judge should take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures against a
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may become aware.
However,
this provision shall not apply to information
which is generated and communicated under the
policies
of
the
Judicial
Performance
Evaluation Program.
Rules of Profession Conduct, Rule 8.4:
Rule 8.4.

Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another:
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

STGL\105.wr
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(e) State
or
imply
an ability
to
influence improperly a government agency or
official; or
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial
officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other
law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1978, Stangl sold Wade part of a piece of real property
owned by Stangl.

The sale was pursuant to a written installment

land contract, with payments to be made by Wade over a period of
approximately

seven

years.

The

agreement

was

ambiguous

with

respect to responsibility for property taxes, in that it provided
for apportionment during the year of the closing (1978) but not for
the rest of the seven-year executory period.
After the closing, the taxing authority failed to segregate
the two parcels and continued to assess Stangl for the entire
consolidated parcel.

The parties agreed that payment of the joint

tax assessment would be allocated based on the proportionate amount
of land owned by each party.

The parties operated under this

agreement for the first four years, after which Wade ceased to pay
any of the taxes on the property.

To prevent loss of the property

through a tax sale, Stangl thereafter paid both parties' share of
the taxes.
Wade eventually finished making his installment payments, but
refused to reimburse Stangl for the several years worth of property
taxes paid by Stangl on Wade's behalf.

Wade brought this action in

1987 to compel conveyance of his property.
STGL\105.wr

Stangl counterclaimed

that Wade should be required to pay his share of the taxes before
any conveyance was required.

Since that time, over 166 pleadings

have been filed in this action.

Judgment against Wade has been

entered four times, three times by summary or default judgments
(that have been vacated for one reason or another) and most
recently after a trial on the merits.
The trial court found the parties' written contract to be
ambiguous with respect to tax liability for the last six years of
the

executory

period.

It

found

that

the

parties' conduct

(particularly the fact that Wade voluntarily paid his taxes in
accordance with the agreed upon basis for the first four years)
demonstrated an intent to allocate the taxes based on the relative
amount of acreage owned by each party.

It also found that the

parties had orally agreed to so allocate the taxes or had orally
agreed to modify the written contract in order to so allocate the
taxes.
Wade disagrees with these findings. He believes that, despite
his actions to the contrary for the first four years, the tax
allocation should be based on the value of the parcels and not the
size of the parcels.

Wade, therefore, has filed this appeal

alleging that the trial court erred in reaching its conclusions.
RELEVANT FACT8
As a preliminary matter, Stangl objects to all of Wade's
factual assertions that were not part of the evidence introduced at
trial.

Exhibits A, B, E, I and K to Wade's brief are documents

that were neither introduced into evidence at trial nor considered
STGL\105.wr

by the judge in reaching his conclusions. These exhibits, together
with all arguments based on or supported by these exhibits, must be
disregarded by this Court*

Pilcher v. State, 663 P. 2d 450, 453

(Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of
fact will not be considered here.") Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744 P. 2d
1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Matters not admitted in evidence
before the trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to this
Court.").
1.

Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May

16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres
of real property for the price of $2 06,100.

The balance of the

purchase

79

price

installments.

payable

to

Stangl

in

equal

monthly

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit A,

Finding No. 2)
2.

was

[Hereafter "Finding No.

"]

The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") contained

6.87 acres and was part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl
containing 9.63 acres. Stangl retained ownership of the remaining
2.76 acres.
3.

(Finding No. 3)

The parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit F)

does not expressly specify how the property tax liability is to be
allocated during the seven-year executory period following the year
of the closing, but it does state that taxes for the year 1978 are
to be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance
with the latest tax and assessment bills."

See Wade's Exhibit F,

§§ 6, 7.3. Consequently, the trial court found the contract to be
STGL\105.wr
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ambiguous with respect to the payment of property taxes,

(Finding

Nos. 7 and 9; Trial Transcript, Exhibit D, at pp. 122, 124)
[Hereafter "Tr. pp.
4.

"]

The taxing authority failed to segregate the two parcels

of property for assessment purposes.

Stangl was taxed for the

entire 9.63-acre consolidated tract because no conveyance of title
to Wade's Property had taken place, nor was any conveyance yet
required under the terms of the installment land contract (which
had a 6%-year executory period).
5.

(Finding No 6[A]1)

For the first four years of the executory period the

parties voluntarily allocated the tax assessment between them
according to the relative amount of area owned by each of them.
Thereafter, Wade refused to pay any of the taxes on the jointly
assessed property.
6.

(Finding No. 6[B]; Tr. pp. 89-90)

The primary reason for the parties' agreement to allocate

the taxes based on the amount of area owned by each party was that
both parties would pay less under that method than they would pay
if their parcels were separately assessed and taxed. This was also
the primary reason for Wade's continued payment of his share of the
taxes on that basis over a four-year period.

(Finding No. 7; Tr.

pp. 12-14)
7.

In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax

liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate

*Note that two of the trial court's findings were mistakenly
numbered as "6." For purposes of clarification, such findings are
hereafter referred to as 6[A] and 6[B], respectively.
STGLUOS.vr
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amount

of

land

prospectively

own€»d

by

resolvesd the

each

party.

issue of tax

This

oral

liability

agreement
allocation

between the parties. This oral agreement was either a separate and
subsequent

agreement

by

the

parties

concerning

property

tax

allocation, or was an oral clarification or modification of the
ambiguous written agreement. The oral agreement also reflected the
prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to
property tax apportionment.
8.

(Finding No. 7)

Even if there was no subsequent oral agreement concerning

tax apportionment, the* parties' intent at the time of execution of
the written agreement and thereafter was that the taxes should be
apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned by each
party.
9.

(Finding No. 8)
Under either of these alternative findings, the parties

conclusively agreed that the property taxes would be allocated
according to the amount of land owned by each party.

(Finding No.

9)
10.

In order to avoid loss of the property through a tax

sale, Stangl paid the property taxes assessed against the entire
consolidated tract and is entitled to reimbursement from Wade for
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes, together with prejudgment
interest thereon at the legal rate.

The amount of said taxes and

interest has been stipulated to by the parties.

(Finding Nos. 10,

11)
11.

It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the

property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his
STGL\105.vr
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installment payments and continue until the time the parties'
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e.,
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or the trial court if Wade
had no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself
in the lawsuit he initiated.
12.

(Finding No. 13)

Stangl's Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21,

1988, has never been answered. Therefore, Wade is in default. The
Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with prejudice,
reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and interest
thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys' fees and costs.
is entitled to such relief.
13.

Stangl

(Finding No. 15)

The issue before the trial court was not the proper basis

for taxation of a person's property, but allocation of taxation
between multiple owners of a jointly assessed property.

That the

government assesses taxes based on the value of a property does not
mean that jointly assessed owners must use the same theory for
dividing the taxes.

(Tr. p. 12 2)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

For the reasons explained herein, Stangl requests that the
trial court's judgment be affirmed in all respects and that he be
awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this
appeal.
STGL\105.wr
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None of the arguments raised by Wade are meritorious.

The

trial court relied on several alternative grounds for its ruling.
Wade

is

required

to» show

reversible

error

in

each

of

the

alternative grounds in order to prevail, and he has not done so.
This entire appeal can and should be dismissed because Wade
has never answered the counterclaim against him and is therefore in
default, as the trial court so found.

The trial court expressly

found that Stangl is entitled to the relief awarded to him because
of Wade's default. This finding eliminates the need to address the
issues raised by Wade in his appeal.
To the extent that the merits of Wade's appeal are relevant,
Wade's allegation of judicial bias can and should be summarily
dismissed.

Previous decisions of this Court prohibit Wade from

claiming prejudicial error on appeal because he failed to object to
the trial court's alleged expressions of bias.

The details of

Wade's claim of judicial bias, to the extent they are relevant,
fail to establish judicial bias and amount to little more than an
argument that the judge must have been biased because he ruled
against Wade.
The trial court did not err in allowing evidence at trial of
an oral agreement becciuse Waide failed to object to such evidence.
It is irrelevant that the evidence of an oral agreement was
introduced for the first time at trial because Wade both impliedly
and expressly consented to the trial of that issue.

Wade had a

full and fair opportunity to argue the merits of the issue, and it
is too late now for him to complain on appeal that the issue never
STGLUOS.vr
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should have been raised.

The court ruled correctly in rejecting

Wade's attempt to raise the defenses of statute of frauds and
statute of limitations because they were waived through Wade's
failure to answer the counterclaim against him.

In addition, the

judge properly deemed it unfair to allow these defenses to be
raised midway through the trial for the first time by a party who
never bothered to file an answer.
Regardless of the evidence concerning oral agreements, the
court also properly found that the parties' intent with respect to
the written agreement was to apportion the taxes based on the
amount of area owned by each party.

In reaching this factual

finding, the court relied on the testimony of both parties, the
credibility of the parties' testimony, documentary evidence, the
parties' conduct at and after the time of the written agreement
(particularly Wade's voluntary payment of his share of the taxes
based on the acreage apportionment method for the first four years
after the agreement was signed) , and testimony that the parties had
previously handled property tax apportionment the same way in a
similar prior transaction.
Wade has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this
finding, and has instead focused on what little factual support
exists for his belief as to how the court should have found while
neglecting all other evidence considered by the court.

Wade's

failure to marshal the evidence is, by itself, a sufficient basis
for affirming the trial court's judgment.

However, even when the

evidence in favor of the court's judgment is marshalled, it is
STGL\105.vr
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clear that there is at least a reasonable basis to support the
court's findings.
In

addition,

the

doctrine

of

practical

construction

conclusively establishes, based on the parties' subsequent conduct,
that there was a mutual intent to apportion tax liability in
accordance with the amount of area owned by each party. Therefore,
Wade was obligated to pay his share of the taxes in the manner
determined by the court regardless of the propriety of the court's
finding of a subsequent oral agreement.
Wade's argument that the trial court was bound by a prior
supreme court order to allocate tax liability based solely on the
doctrine of equitable conversion

is inapplicable because that

theory was not argued by the parties at trial.
obligations were the issues tried to the court.

Contractual

No objection was

raised by Wade concerning the scope or basis of the legal argument.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure negates Wade's
present assertion that the parties were precluded from raising the
theories that the court relied

on in reaching

its decision.

Similarly, Wade never raised this issue below and he cannot raise
it now for the first time on appeal.
Even if Wade's argument could be heard on appeal, there is no
merit to it because when an appellate court vacates a summary
judgment without directing judgment, the effect of that action is
to simply leave the cause standing as it did before the summary
judgment was entered.

That is precisely what happened in this
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case, and the parties thereafter proceeded to properly resolve the
matter by a trial on the merits.
Because Stangl prevailed at the trial below and was awarded
attorneys' fees in accordance with the parties7 stipulation, he is
also

entitled

to

the

same

if he

prevails

on

this appeal.

Therefore, if Stangl prevails in this matter he should be awarded
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT'8 JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD IN ALL
RESPECTS BECAU8E WADE WAS FOUND TO BE IN DEFAULT
Before addressing the merits of the various errors alleged in
Wade's opening brief, it must be pointed out that this entire
appeal can and should be dismissed because Wade has never filed a
responsive pleading to the allegations against him and is therefore
in default, as the trial court so found.
Although
counterclaim

Wade

initiated

and Wade

has

this

never

action,

answered

Stangl

that

15. The Counterclaim against Wade, filed
December 21, 1988, has never been answered.
Technically, therefore, Wade is in default.
The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's
Complaint with prejudice, reimbursement of
Wade's share of the property taxes and
interest thereon at the legal rate, and
attorneys fees and costs. Stangl is entitled
to such relief.
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a

counterclaim.

Accordingly, the trial court found that:

(Findings No. 15)

filed

Wade's share of the property taxes, interest thereon, and
applicable attorneys' fees were determined by the trial court and
identified

in the court's findings and in its Judgment dated

November 1, 1991 (see Exhibit B) . Wade did not challenge at trial,
nor has he challenged (nor can be challenge) in this appeal, the
trial court's finding that Stangl is entitled to this relief on the
separate basis of Wade's default.

Therefore, in accordance with

the trial court's findings, the judgment against Wade should be
affirmed in all respects because of Wade's failure to reply to the
counterclaim against him.2
II.
NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS WAS SHOWN BY
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE
Wade's

allegation

of

judicial

bias

should

be

summarily

dismissed, as this Court has previously recognized. Wade failed to
object to the trial court's alleged expressions of bias.
therefore may not claim prejudicial error on appeal.

He

Ebbert v.

Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
As to the merits of Wad€»'s allegation, Wade tries to create
judicial bias from the facts that:

(1) the trial judge recused

himself from ruling on a motion to set aside an earlier judgment,
(2)

the

judge

commented

at

trial

that

he

had

experienced

difficulties with Wade's prior counsel, (3) the judge allegedly
2

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the amendment of pleadings when issues not raised
therein are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, is
not applicable because Wade has no responsive pleading to deem
amended.
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made incorrect decisions during the course of the trial, and (4)
the judge considered Wade's contemporaneous fraud conviction in
discrediting Wade's testimony at trial. Wade's allegations amount
to little more than an argument that the judge must have been
biased because Wade lost at trial.
As explained below, none of Wade's assertions demonstrate
judicial bias.

The courts of this state apparently have not

specified the standard of proof for establishing prejudicial bias
by a trial court judge. Generally, however, a party asserting bias
on the part of a trial judge must establish that the judge had a
substantial bent of mind against him or her.

The record must

establish such bias clearly, and mere speculative statements and
conclusions are insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof.
People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988).
With regard to Wade's first ground (Judge Murphy's recusal),
it should be noted that over 166 pleadings have been filed in this
action since its commencement in 1987. Judgement against Wade has
been

entered

four times, three times by summary

or default

judgments (that have been vacated for one reason or another) and
once after a trial on the merits. The last non-trial judgment was
entered on December 12, 1990, after both Mr. Wade and his counsel
of record failed to appear at a final pretrial conference before
Judge Murphy.

The written pretrial notice and Judge Murphy's

comments during a previous telephonic scheduling conference made it
clear that failure to appear at the pretrial conference would
result in default.

Wade and his counsel nevertheless failed to
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appear.

A default judgement against Wade was entered two months

later.
Wade

failed

to file an appeal of this

applicable deadline.

judgment

by the

Instead, he subsequently filed a motion to

extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.

Affidavits from

Wade and his counsel were submitted in support of this motion. In
those affidavits Wade's counsel attempted to explain why no one had
appeared as ordered at the pretrial conference.

For various

reasons explained more fully in Judge Murphy's Summary Decision and
Order dated January 22, 1991, Judge Murphy concluded that Wade's
counsel had essentially

lied to the court and had apparently

backdated certain pleadings.

As required by the Code of Judicial

Conduct,3 Judge Murphy reported this conduct to the Utah State
Bar.4

Wade thereafter

obtained

new counsel, who

immediately

brought a motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A hearing on the motion to set aside judgment was held on
March 1, 1991.

At the beginning of the hearing Judge Murphy

announced, sua sponte, that, even though Mr. Wade had new counsel,
3

Canon 3(B)(3) states:
"A judge should take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware."
4

The actions by Wade's counsel clearly constituted misconduct
under Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Thus,
contrary to Wade's allegation, Judge Murphy's action had nothing to
do with being "affronted" by Mr. Schwenke's assertion of bias. In
fact, while the judge in his Summary Decision and Order questioned
the conduct of three of Wade's previous counsel (Jamis Johnson,
Bruce Udall and Paul Schwenke) , it is clear that Mr. Udall, and not
Mr. Schwenke, was the primary focus of the judge's concerns.
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he (Judge Murphy) was recusing himself with regard to a ruling on
the 60(b) motion, but not from the rest of the case. Judge Murphy
referred to his previous difficulties with Mr. Wade's counsel and
his having referred their misconduct to the Bar.

Judge Murphy

explained that, regardless of what his decision might have been on
the Rule 60(b) motion, he felt that both sides might have concerns
about his

ruling

(i.e., that Wade might

feel he was at a

disadvantage in connection with the 60(b) motion because of his
previous counsel's misdeeds, and that Stangl might have concerns
that

the

court

was

bending

over

backwards

difficulties experienced with prior counsel).

to

overcome

the

(Tr. pp. 2-3) Thus,

the judge made it clear that his recusal was limited to a single
motion and was for the benefit of both parties.
Accordingly, the motion to set aside judgment was argued to
Judge Rokich, who ultimately set aside the judgment upon various
conditions to be met by Mr. Wade.

The parties then prepared for

trial.
At the beginning of the trial, both parties expressly agreed
that Judge Murphy should and would serve as the trial judge. (Tr.
p. 3)
events.

This agreement was made with full knowledge of all prior
Wade thereby waived any right he might have had to

complain about judicial bias by Judge Murphy prior to and during
the course of the trial.5
5f,

A litigant who proceeds to a trial or hearing before a judge
despite knowing of a reason for potential disqualification of the
judge waives the objection and cannot challenge the court's
(continued...)
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Regarding Wade's second ground, it is true that the court
experienced difficulties with Wade's prior counsel. However, Judge
Murphy was under an obligation to do exactly as he did in referring
the matter to the Bar/ and such action by the court cannot be the
basis of an allegation of judicial bias.

State v. Mata. 789 P.2d

1122, 1125-26 (Haw. 1990); State v. Case, 676 P.2d 241, 243-44
(N.M. 1984).
Furthermore, those difficulties had nothing to do with the
merits of Wade's case at trial.

Prior to the trial, Judge Murphy

had never even seen Mr. Wade.

Wade was represented by new and

competent counsel at trial. Before the trial began, Wade expressly
agreed that Judge Murphy should preside.

There is simply no

evidence that the misconduct of Wade's previous counsel led to
prejudice against Wad€» at the subsequent trial.
Likewise, with regard to Wade's third ground, the fact that a
party disapproves of the outcome of the trial or the rulings made
by the judge during the course of the trial does not constitute a
showing of judicial bias.

The correctness of Judge Murphy's

decisions is addressed in the points below.
5

But even if errors of

(. ..continued)
qualifications on appeal." Buckley v. Snapper Power Equip. Co. .
813 P.2d 125, 129 (Wash. App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court is in
agreement:
"A Party who has a reasonable basis for moving to
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first obtaining a
favorable ruling and then complain only if the result is
unfavorable. Not only is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence
a belief that the judge is not in fact biased."
Madsen v.
Prudential Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah
1988) .
6

See supra note 3.
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law are made by the trial judge, those errors cannot amount to
judicial bias.

State v. Case, 676 P.2d 241, 244 (N.M. 1984) (bias

cannot be based on unfavorable rulings); Riva Ridge Apartments v.
Robert G. Fisher Co., Inc., 745 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. App. 1987)
("The

rulings of

a judge, even if erroneous, numerous, and

continuous [, ] are not sufficient in themselves to show bias or
prejudice.").

If such were not the case, nearly every trial court

judgment could be appealed by the losing party on the basis of
alleged judicial bias.
As

for

the

trial

court's

consideration

of

Wade's

contemporaneous fraud conviction in assessing his credibility as a
witness (Wade's final ground), it is perfectly appropriate for a
judge

to

consider

such

evidence

in

deciding

which

of

two

conflicting witnesses to believe.

Wade himself brought up his

fraud

of

conviction

in

the

course

explaining

intentionally failed to produce relevant documents.
92)

why

he

had

(Tr. pp. 90-

No objection was ever raised by Wade in connection with this

testimony.

Wade's fraud conviction was only one of the reasons

cited by the court for its decision to disbelieve Wade's testimony.
(Tr. p. 125)

And it was not just the fact that Wade had been

convicted of fraud, but also the way Wade blamed his conduct on
everyone else's actions, which the court judged to be indicative of
a noncredible witness.

(Tr. pp. 125-26)

Wade apparently perceives bias in Judge Murphy's act of
explaining the reasons for his ruling, particularly the explanation
concerning fraud.

The Utah Supreme Court, however, has clearly
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established that such an explanation by the judge does not indicate
bias.

"The fact that a judge may have an opinion as to the merits

of the cause . . . does not make him biased or prejudiced." Haslam
v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948).

"The fact that a judge

on summation states that he does not believe a witness . . . does
not show bias.

Similar remarks have been made thousands of times

by English and American judges and they are quite in order if the
judge desires to state his reasons
conclusion."

for coming to a certain

Id. at 525. Similarly:

Although litigants are entitled to a judge who
will hear both sides and decide an issue on
the merits of the law and the evidence
presented, they are not entitled to a judge
whose mind is a clean slate.
Each judge
brings to the bench the experiences of life,
both personal and professional. A lifetime of
experiences that have generated a number of
general attitudes cannot be left in chambers
when a judge takes the bench.
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538, 546
(Utah 1988).7
Faced with conflicting evidence, the court simply chose for
various reasons to credit Stangl's testimony and to discredit
Wade's testimony.

"The opinion of the trial judge, after hearing

the testimony, that the testimony of witnesses favorable to the
defendant was not worthy of belief is not evidence of prejudice."
7

Accord Smith v. District Court, 629 P. 2d 1055, 1057 (Colo.
1981) ("Prejudice must be distinguished from the sort of personal
opinions that as a matter of course arise during a judge's hearing
of a cause. The general rule of law is that what a judge learns in
his judicial capacity is a proper basis for judicial observations,
and that the use of such information is not the kind of matter that
results in disqualification.").
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State v. Little, 431 P.2d 810, 813 (Or. 1967).

There is nothing to

suggest that the court discredited Wade's testimony because of
judicial bias.
M

A trial judge is presumed to be free of bias or prejudice."

State v. McCall. 770 P.2d 1165, 1175-76 (Ariz. 1989).
is on Wade to show bias by the court.

The burden

Wade has not done so, and

his allegation of judicial bias is without merit.
III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT OR AN ORAL MODIFICATION
OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT
Wade argues that the court erred in allowing evidence of an
oral agreement regarding tax allocation and evidence of an oral
modification of the parties' written agreement. Wade's argument is
without merit, and even if there is merit to the argument it does
not matter because the court also found the parties' agreement to
be based on grounds other than an oral agreement or an oral
modification of the written agreement.

(See Point IV, infra.)

For at least three reasons, there is no basis for Wade's
argument that the court erred in allowing evidence of an oral
agreement or an oral modification of the written agreement.
A,

Wade Failed to Object to Such Evidence.

The entire issue can and should be dismissed because Wade
failed to object at trial to the evidence regarding an oral
agreement, and he cannot raise the matter now for the first time on
appeal.

Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah 1944).
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At trial, Stangl testified without objection:

that at the

time of the closing in 1978 the parties prorated the taxes based on
the respective square footage owned by each party; that each of the
parties paid their respective share of the taxes on that basis;
that after the taxing authority failed to segregate the two parcels
the parties orally agreed in 1980 to modify the written agreement
and continue paying the taxes on that basis in order to avoid a
higher tax assessment for each of them; that Wade did in fact pay
on that basis for the first four years pursuant to the oral
agreement; and that when the two parcels were finally taxed
separately the taxes did in fact increase for each party.

(Tr. pp.

10-16) The court found this testimony to be credible and to be the
basis of a subsequent oral contract or, alternatively, a subsequent
oral amendment to the written agreement (Finding No. 7)

It was

only after all this testimony came in that Wade's counsel objected
on the basis of the statute of frauds and statue of limitations.
(Tr. p. 17)
A party cannot complain on appeal about evidence that was
received during the trial without objection.
783.

Huber, 145 P. 2d at

It is too late for Wade to complain about admission of the

evidence supporting the finding of a subsequent oral agreement.
B•

It is Irrelevant that Evidence of An Oral Agreement Was

Introduced for the First Time at Trial,
Wade argues that the issue of an oral agreement or an oral
modification of the written agreement was never raised in the
pleadings prior to the trial and accordingly should not have been
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allowed at trial.

In doing so, Wade attempts to circumvent the

provisions of Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule states:

"When issues not raised by the pleadings are

tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated

in all respects as if they had been raised

in the

pleadings."
This Court has explained that under Rule 15(b) issues not
raised by the pleadings may be tried by the express or implied
consent of the parties and shall be treated as if raised in the
pleadings.

Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) . "If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the parties, the
court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings
amended, even if the theory was not originally pleaded or set forth
in the pleadings or the pretrial order."

Id.

This issue was fully tried by the parties.

Wade's counsel

failed to object to the evidence regarding oral contracts until
after it had come in, even though the evidence clearly related to
oral agreements made by the parties subsequent to the written
contract.

(Tr. pp. 10-16) Wade never did object to the nature of

the evidence regarding oral contracts, nor did he ever object on
the basis that an oral contract had not been pleaded.

He objected

only to the admissibility of the evidence under the statute of
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frauds and the statute of limitations

(Tr. p. 17) ,8 and that

objection was raised well after the evidence had already come in.
Even then, Wade's counsel conceded that the evidence regarding
oral agreements should be excluded only if the defenses (statute of
frauds and statute of limitations) had been raised previously,.
Specifically, after raising the objection Wade's counsel explained:;
MR. NELSON: I have no problem with Mr.
Crockett proceeding. I simply wanted to raise
those issues.
If they have been raised
appropriately previously, then I will go into
them later.
(Tr. p. 20; emphasis added)

The defenses had not been raised

previously and Mr. Nelson did not go into them later, although the
court invited him to do so.9

(Tr. p. 20, lines 8-12)

The Colman decision expressly states that implied consent to
try an issue may be found where evidence is introduced without
objection.

Colman, 743 P. 2d at 785.

The evidence that Wade

complains about came in without objection, and was thus tried with
Wade's implied consent.

Furthermore, Wade's counsel expressly

stated that he had no problem with proceeding to continue taking
evidence regarding oral agreements, and that if the defenses had
8

The lack of merit of the objection to the admissibility of the
evidence on these bases is addressed in the next section of this
brief.
Similarly, Wade's counsel stated:
MR. NELSON: I don't know if Mr. Schwenke
pled it [an affirmative defense] or not. If
he did, I would like to raise it at this
point.
(Tr. p. 20; emphasis added)
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been raised previously he would go into them later,

(Tr. p. 20)

The defenses had not been raised previously, and Wade's counsel
never spoke of them again throughout the rest of the trial. Wade's
counsel, however, did continue to elicit testimony regarding oral
agreements.

(E.g., Tr. pp. 64-67) Wade's delayed objection was at

best conditional, and the basis for his objection was never
subsequently established (or even attempted to be established).
Wade elicited additional testimony regarding oral contracts, rested
his case, provided a closing argument that included a discussion of
oral agreements, and allowed the court to render its decision,
without ever mentioning the issue again.

Thus, the evidence that

Wade complains about was also tried with his express consent.
It is true that, under Colman, the pleadings cannot be deemed
amended unless "the opposing party had a fair opportunity to
defend."

743 P.2d at 785. Wade, however, had a fair opportunity

to defend the evidence of an oral agreement. Wade and Stangl were
the only witnesses to testify at trial.

They were also the only

persons present when the oral agreements were made.

(Tr. pp. 12,

64, 66, 67) Wade's counsel had full opportunity to and did examine
Stangl regarding the oral agreements.

(Tr. pp. 54-56)

Wade

himself testified regarding each of the three relevant discussions
he had with Stangl, and testified repeatedly that there never was
any oral agreement.

(Tr. pp. 64-67)

In closing argument, Wade's

counsel argued that there was no oral agreement.

(Tr. pp. 114-15)

In the end, the judge simply chose to credit Stangl's testimony
over Wade's testimony.
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The issue of an oral agreement was fully and intentionally
argued by both parties.

Any allegation that evidence of an oral

agreement was inadmissible because it was not previously raised in
the pleadings is barred by Rule 15(b).
C.
Not

In Any Event, the Evidence Regarding Oral Agreements was

Precluded

by

the

Statute

of

Frauds

or

the

Statute

of

Limitations.
In any event, the court ruled correctly in rejecting Wade's
attempt to raise the defenses of statute of frauds and statute of
limitations for the first time during the trial and after the
crucial evidence had already come in.

Both the statute of frauds

and the statute of limitations are affirmative defenses that must
be pleaded in the answer or they are waived.

Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)

and 12(h); Phillips v. JCM Development Corp. , 666 P. 2d 876, 884
(Utah 1983) (statute of frauds); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland
Irrigation Co. . 664 P.2d

1188, 1190

(Utah 1983)

(statute of

limitations).
Wade could not possibly have raised these defenses in answer
to Stangl's counterclaim because, in the two years and ten months
prior

to

trial,

counterclaim.

Wade

never

filed

any

answer

to

Stangl's

The judge properly exercised his discretion to deem

it unfair to allow these technical defenses to be raised midway
through the trial for the first time by a party who never bothered
to file an answer and who failed to object to the evidence until
after the fact.

Indeed, Wade's counsel was in agreement with this

ruling at the time of trial.

Wade's counsel conceded that the
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defenses were applicable only if they had been raised previously
(Tr. p. 20) , which they had not.

The court did not abuse its

discretion in rejecting the untimely proffer of these defenses,10
(Tr. pp. 19-20)
IV.
REGARDLESS OF THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING ORAL AGREEMENTS,
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THE
PARTIES/ INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN
AGREEMENT WAS TO APPORTION THE TAXES BASED
ON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY EACH PARTY,
Regardless of the evidence concerning oral agreements, the
trial

court

specifically

found

that,

even

if

there

were

no

subsequent oral agreements concerning tax apportionment, certain
documents

and

the parties' subsequent

conduct

demonstrated

an

intent that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective
amount of land owned by each party.

(Finding No. 8)

The court

found this evidence to be important and determinative in resolving
the ambiguity concerning future tax apportionment in connection
with the written agreement.

(Finding No. 9)

Wade, on the other

hand, argues that this finding is clearly erroneous.
Findings are "clearly erroneous" only if they are against the
clear weight of the evidence or if they support a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.

Southern Title Guaranty

Co., Inc. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

10

The

Stangl has elected not to lengthen this brief with a
discussion of the merits of these defenses or their applicability
when applied to the facts of this case. Stangl will be prepared to
address the merits and applicability of these defenses at oral
argument if the Court deems that information relevant.
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trial

court's

findings

are

entitled

to

a

presumption

of

correctness, and on appeal the evidence is surveyed in the light
most favorable to the findings.

If there is a reasonable basis in

the evidence to support the findings, they will not be overturned.
This is the standard whether the evidence is based on oral or
documentary evidence.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); College Irrigation

Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Co. . 780 P.2d 1241,
1244 (Utah 1989).
Recognizing the significance of the trial court's factual
findings with regard to the parties' intent, Wade acknowledges, as
he must, that intent under a contract is normally a question for
the trier of fact, but argues (based on a 1909 North Carolina
decision) that the interpretation of documentary evidence passing
between the parties is a question of law.

From this argument Wade

concludes that this Court is not required to defer to the trial
court's findings of fact.
Of the many fallcicies of this argument,11 the most important
is that the trial court considered and evaluated much more than a
few pieces of documentary evidence passing between the parties. It
also considered the demeanor and credibility of the two parties as
they both explained the circumstances behind the documents.
u

It

For example, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) expressly
states:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
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also considered the parties' motives for doing as they did.

It

also considered the parties' conduct at and after the time of the
written agreement.

It also considered Wade's four-year history of

paying the taxes in accordance with the documentary evidence.

It

also considered testimony that the parties had previously handled
property

tax

transaction.

apportionment

the

same way

in a similar prior

(Tr. pp. 35-36) In short, the trial court considered

a wide range of information in making its factual determinations;
it did not simply interpret documents, in a vacuum, as Wade seems
to imply.
Wade is required to marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual
determinations, the evidence (including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom) is insufficient to support the court's findings.
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989); College Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d at 1244; Harline v.
Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986).

Wade has not marshalled

the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Instead, he
has focused on what little factual support exists for his position,
and has neglected all other evidence considered by the trial court.
Wade's failure to marshall the evidence is, by itself, a
sufficient basis for affirming the trial court's judgment. College
Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d at 1244; Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d
69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 950 n.4 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1990) .

However,, even when the evidence in favor of the

court's judgment is marshalled it shows that there is at least a
reasonable basis to support the court's finding of an intent to
apportion tax liability in accordance with the amount of area owned
by each party.
Wade's only real argument is that one of the court's findings
regarding the parties' original intent12 conflicts with another
finding that the parties meant for their taxes to be apportioned
based on the respective amount of land owned by each party.13
12

The court found that:
6 [A] . The parties intended and assumed
that they would be separately taxed on their
respective parcels following the year of the
closing
(1978) .
The
county
taxing
authorities, however, continued to assess and
tax
Stangl
for
the
entire
9.63-acre
consolidated tract and did not individually
tax the parties' separate parcels because no
conveyance of Wade's Property had taken place,
nor was any conveyance yet required under the
terms of the installment land contract (which
had a 6%-year executory period).

(Finding No. 6[A]; emphasis added)
13

The court found that:
8.
The letters and other documents
contained in Exhibit P of the parties'
Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or
someone on Wade's behalf. Even if there was
no subsequent oral agreement concerning tax
apportionment, the documents in Exhibit P of
the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at
the time of execution of the written agreement
and thereafter that the taxes should be
apportioned based on the respective amount of
land owned by each party.

(Finding No. 8; emphasis added)
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However, these two findings do not negate or contradict each other.
Wade is required to show that all of the evidence in support of the
findings, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
fails to support

the court's

findings.

Partnership, 782 P. 2d at 470.

Grayson Roper Ltd.

It is obvious from the record and

from the court's findings that the parties expected to have to
prorate property taxes only for 1978, but that if necessary they
would continue the same procedure until the parcels were separately
assessed.

The parties' subsequent conduct and their explanations

at trial demonstrated to the court that they ended up doing just
that when the taxing authority failed to separately assess the two
parcels and the parties affirmed that the continuation of a nonsegregated

assessment

would

be

cheaper

for

both

of

them.

Accordingly, Wade voluntarily paid his share of the taxes for the
years 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, as documented by a series of
letters explaining the basis of the tax apportionment.

(Finding

Nos. 6[A]-9)
In his brief Wade argues that one party cannot foist upon the
other a contractual intent and then bind the other party by his
silence.

Stangl agrees with that statement of the law.

Wade,

however, was not silent. In addition to the documentary evidence,
there were ongoing communications about the matter (Tr. pp. 10-16,
54-56,

64-67),

which

led

to

an

oral

modification of the written agreement.

agreement

or

an oral

(Finding No. 7) There were

also Wade's affirmative acts of paying on that basis for the first
four years.

(Finding No. 6[B])

Wade, in fact, admitted that he
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knew exactly what he was doing in continuing to pay his share of
the taxes based on the proportionate amount of land owned by each
party.

At trial, Wade testified as follows:
Q.

In each of those four years your property
taxes were calculated on an allocated
basis, based on the square footage; is
that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right. And in fact you paid it on
that basis? You knew you were paying it
on that basis, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the letters you received from the
Stangls or Mrs. Stangl indicated that you
were pciying on that allocated square foot
basis, did they not?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So there
believed
anything
basis; is

A.

Yes.

(Tr. pp. 89-90)

was never a time that you
you were being charged on
other than a square footage
that also correct?

Furthermore, as the court also found, Wade had a

strong pecuniary reason for agreeing and doing as he did:
arrangement

saved

Wade

money.

After

hearing

The*

both parties'

testimony, the court concluded that the primary reason for Wade's
agreement to the acreage apportionment method of allocation was
that it would result in lower taxes to him (and to Stangl) than
would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and separately
assessed and taxed.

(Finding No. 7)
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In short, this is not a

situation where Wade had no involvement and where his concurrence
is evidenced by nothing more than silence•
The trial court's findings, which were based on the evidence
marshalled above, are adequately supported by the record. They are
also supported by the doctrine of practical construction.

The

parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit F) does not
expressly specify how the property tax liability is to be allocated
during the seven-year executory period

following the year of

closing, but it does state that the taxes for the year 1978 are to
be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance
with the latest tax and assessment bills."

(Wade's Exhibit F, flfl

6, 7.3; emphasis added)
The parties intentionally prorated the taxes based on the
proportionate amount of acreage owned by each party for the first
four years of the executory period.

(Finding No. 6[B])

Under the

doctrine of practical construction, this conduct resolves any
dispute as to the appropriateness of the acreage apportionment
method of allocating the property taxes.
construction

is predicated

"This rule of practical

on the common

sense

concept that

'actions speak louder than words.'" Bullouah v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20,
2 3 (Utah 1965).

In Bullough, the losing party argued that the

terms of a written contract were unambiguous and that extrinsic
evidence could not therefore be used to alter or change the
contract.

Id. at 22.

The supreme court responded:

"This is

generally true, but there are exceptions; one of which is that when
STGL\105.wr
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the parties place their own construction on it and so perform, the
court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true
intention was." Id,14
As in Builough. Wade's prior actions speak louder than his
present argument. The court found that Wade intentionally paid his
share of the taxes based on the proportionate amount of acreage he
owned in order to benefit from a lower tax assessment.

(Finding

l4

The trial court specifically found the parties' written
agreement to be ambiguous with respect to the payment of property
taxes because the contract expressly addressed tax liability only
for the year 1978 and did not specify how tax liability would be
apportioned for the rest of the seven-year executory period. (Tr.
pp. 122, 124; Finding Nos. 7 and 9)
Even if the contract was not ambiguous on its face, the
parties' subsequent actions created the ambiguity necessary for the
doctrine of practical construction to be applicable. In Bullouah.
the Utah Supreme Court stated that
even if it be assumed that the words standing
alone might mean one thing to the members of
this
court,
where
the
parties
have
demonstrated by their actions and performance
that to them th€> contract meant something
quite different, the meaning and intent of the
parties should be enforced.
In such a
situation the parties by their actions have
created the "ambiguity11 required to bring the
rule into operation.
If this were not the
rule the courts would be enforcing one
contract when both parties have demonstrated
that thev meant and intended the contract to
be guite different.
400 P. 2d at 23 (quoting Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 356
P.2d 171 (Cal. I960)) (emphasis added); accord Bullfrog Marina,
Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972).
Furthermore, no objection was ever raised at trial to the
court's determination that the contract was ambiguous with regard
to taxes or to the admission of parol evidence to resolve the
ambiguity.
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Nos. 6[B] and 7)
(Tr. pp. 89-90)

Wade admitted that he knew what he was doing.
After weighing

all the evidence the court

specifically found that, although the parties may have assumed that
they would be taxed separately after 1978 (and for that reason
failed to specify apportionment procedures beyond 1978), their
intent at the time of the execution of the written agreement and
thereafter was that the taxes should be apportioned based on the
respective amount of land owned by each party.

(Finding No. 8)

This finding is separately justified by the doctrine of practical
construction. This finding and Wade's conduct preclude his present
argument that he had no such intent.15
This court defers to the trial court when it comes to weighing
the evidence.
1981).

Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P. 2d 162, 165 (Utah

Appellate review begins with the trial court's findings of

fact, not with an appellant's view of the way the trial court
should have found. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 69, 7 3 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

Where, as here, an ambiguous contract is involved and

the court bases its construction on extrinsic evidence of intent,

15

In addition to Builough, other Utah cases have similarly and
consistently applied the doctrine of practical construction. See
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981)
("Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate
by their actions that to them the contract meant something quite
different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."); Zeese v.
Estate of Sieael, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975) ("Under the doctrine
of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and the
parties place their own construction on their agreement and so
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what
their true intention was.
The parties, by their action and
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent;
the contract should be so enforced by the courts.").
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the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and appellate
review is "strictly limited,,11

Craig Food Industries, Inc. v.,

Weihina, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is at least
the necessary "reasonable support" in favor of the judgment below,
notwithstanding Wade's attempt to selectively point to evidence
that was considered but rejected by the finder of fact.

Because

the court's findings with regard to intent are supported by
reasonable evidence, they are not clearly erroneous.
The trial court specifically indicated that this finding was
an alternative

basis

for

its determination

that the parties

conclusively agreed to apportion the property taxes based on the
amount of land owned by each party.

(Finding Nos. 8 and 9) There-

fore, Wade was obligated to pay his share of the taxes in the
manner determined by the court regardless of the propriety of the
court's finding of a subsequent oral agreement.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT LIMITED TO RELIANCE ON THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
IN RESOLVING THIS DISPUTE
Wade argues that the trial court was bound by a prior supreme
court order to allocate tax liability based solely on the doctrine
of equitable conversion.
By way of background, it should be noted that the only reason
the doctrine of equitable conversion was ever raised in the prior
pleadings is because Wade originally denied any responsibility
whatsoever for property taxes during the seven-year executory
period.

(See Exhibit C, Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's First
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Request for Admissions and First Set of Interrogatories, Response
to Interrogatory No. 2 (Trial Exhibit BB) ; Tr. pp. 93-95)

In a

previous motion for summary judgment this doctrine was argued in
order to establish Wade's responsibility for the taxes after 1978
(which years are not addressed in the written agreement) as a
matter of law because Wade denied any obligation (contractual or
otherwise) to pay any taxes on his property.

It was several years

later before Wade finally admitted any tax liability.
Equitable conversion, however, was not the theory argued by
the parties at trial.

Contractual obligations (both written and

oral) were the issues tried to the court. No objection was raised
by Wade concerning the scope or basis of the legal arguments.

As

discussed in Point III.B above, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure negates Wade's present assertion that the parties
were precluded from raising the matters that the trial court relied
on in reaching its decision.
Similarly, Wade never raised this issue below and he cannot
raise it now for the first time on appeal. Kohler v. Garden City.
639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981); State v. Rodriguez. 200 Utah Adv.
Rep. 64, 65 n.l (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1992).

This is true even

if the issue is deemed to be a matter of law.

Zions First Nat'l

Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654, 657 (Utah
1988). Wade cannot complain now that the theories he intentionally
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argued at trial were improper, or that theories he failed to argue
at trial should now be debated on appeal.16
As for Wade's assertion that he should not have to pay any
taxes after 1985 when he finished making his installment payments
(Wade's brief pp. 27-28), the trial court specifically found:
13. It is appropriate that acreage
apportionment of the property taxes extend
beyond the time when Wade completed his
installment payments and continue until the
time the parties' parcels were severed and
separately assessed and taxed (i.e., through
the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's
failure, despite an appropriate discovery
request, to produce or identify relevant
l6

Even had the matter been raised below, it would have lacked
any merit. The supreme court's order, dated October 5, 1989,
vacated an earlier summary judgment against Wade. The one-page
order stated that "material facts are in dispute" and that summary
judgment was therefore not appropriate.
The court's brief
explanatory comments did not amount to findings of fact or
conclusions of law and did not resolve the existing factual and
legal disputes. Instead, the case was remanded to the trial court
for the taking of evidence and for further proceedings as
appropriate in light of that evidence. The parties thereafter
proceeded to resolve the matter by a full trial on the merits.
The supreme court's brief dicta regarding contractual
obligations and Wade's concession that he is obligated to pay taxes
under the doctrine of equitable conversion do not constitute a
binding decision on the merits of this case. The order—which was
not an opinion from an appeal but was an order in response to a
motion (for summary disposition)—is nothing more than a ruling
that a factual dispute exists precluding summary judgment.
Hornbook law provides that: "On appeal from a summary judgment for
the plaintiff, the only question for appellate review is whether
the allegations of the defendant's answer were such as to raise a
material or genuine issue of fact." 5 Am Jur.2d Appeal and Error
§ 853 (1962). When an appellate court vacates a summary judgment
without directing judgment, the effect of that action is to leave
the cause standing as it did before the summary judgment was
entered. Hutchins v. State, 603 P.2d 995, 999 (Idaho 1979).
The court acted properly in proceeding—with Wade's approval—
to resolve this dispute by a full trial on the merits.
STGLUOS.vr
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documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2)
Wade's failure to communicate in a reasonable
and timely manner with his attorney or
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or
this Court if Wade had no attorney); and (3)
Wade's overall failure to involve himself in
the lawsuit he initiated.
(Finding No. 13)
Wade has not even attempted to marshal 1 the evidence in
support of this finding, and his assertion should be dismissed for
that

reason.

College

Irrigation

Co..

780

P. 2d

at

1244.

Furthermore, the similar assertion that Stangl "caused 'a delay in
conveyance' which excused Wade's payment of taxes" was never raised
below and cannot be raised now on appeal.

Kohler v. Garden City,

639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981).
Finally,

with

regard

to Wade's

last

argument

that

tax

allocation can be based only on value, the trial court correctly
determined that the issue to be resolved was not the proper basis
for taxation by the government, but was the allocation of taxation
between multiple owners of a jointly assessed property.
122)

(Tr. p.

The court specifically explained that, while the government

assesses taxes based on the value of a property, jointly assessed
owners are not required to follow the same theory for dividing the
taxes.

(Id.)

Even Wade admits in his brief that jointly assessed owners can
mutually agree to any method of allocation they deem appropriate.
Here, on several alternative grounds, the trial court specifically
found that the parties had mutually agreed to allocate the taxes
based on the area owned by each party.
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(Finding Nos. 7-9)

Wade

has neither marshalled the evidence in support of these findings
nor shown them to be clearly erroneous.
therefore fail.

His argument must

College Irrigation Co., 780 P. 2d at 1244.
VI.

STANGL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND CQ8TS
INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THI8 APPEAL
At trial, the parties stipulated that the successful party
would be entitled to attorneys' fees.

(Tr. p. 4) No objection to

the award of attorneys7 fees was raised by Wade below, and the
issue of attorneys' fees is not (and cannot be) raised by Wade in
this appeal.

Stangl prevailed at trial and, accordingly, was

awarded attorneys' fees and costs by the trial court.
A party who was awarded attorneys' fees and costs below is
also entitled to the same if that party prevails on appeal. Mgmt.
Services Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah
1980); Brown v. Richards, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 41 (Utah Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 1992); Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 998
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) . Therefore, if Stangl prevails in this matter
he

should

be awarded

attorneys' fees and

costs

incurred

in

connection with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stangl respectfully requests that
the trial court's judgment be affirmed in all respects and that he
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be awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with
this appeal.17
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ] ^ day of December, 1992.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Daniel A
Attorneys for De

Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVICE

ii

This is to certify that on this
day of December, 1992,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing document were handdelivered to:
James I. Watts, Esq.
124 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

17

Wade has asked this Court to order Stangl to convey Wade's
property to him.
It should be noted that the trial court has
already made such a finding (Finding Nos. 10 and 20) and entered
such an order in its Judgment dated November 1, 1991 (Exhibit B ) .
Stangl is expressly required in the Judgment to convey Wade's
property as soon as Wade pays his designated share of the taxes,
interest and attorneys' fees. Upon full payment of these amounts
Stangl is ready, willing and able to convey Wade's property to him
as directed in the Judgment.
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Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. C-87-357
judge Michael R. Murphy

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of
October, 1991.

Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was

represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson.

Defendant

F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the following:
STGL\082.wc
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both

plaintiff

(hereafter

"Wade")

and

defendant

(hereafter "Stangl") are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The
contract or contracts involved in this dispute were entered into
by the parties in Salt Lake County, Utah.

The real estate which

was the subject of this dispute is located within Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2.

Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May

16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres
of real property for the price of $206,100.
purchase

price

installments.

was

payable

to

Stangl

in

The balance of the
79

equal

monthly

While the contract references an attached Exhibit

A describing the property purchased by Wade, no such exhibit was
ever attached to the contract.
3.

The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") consisted

of a parcel of land located at approximately 9200 South, 700 East,
Sandy City, Utah.

The 6.87 acres comprising Wade's Property were

part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl containing 9.6 3
acres.

Stangl retained ownership of the remaining 2.76 acres. As

depicted on the County Recorder's plat attached hereto as Exhibit
A, Wade's Property is generally situated behind Stangl's retained
property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a 50foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive rightof-way for access to Stangl's property.
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Wade's Property, which

00813

includes the underlying fee to the right-of-way tract and totals
6.87 acres, is described more particularly in Exhibit B hereto.
4.

Pursuant to the written 1978 contract, Wade eventually

paid Stangl the agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100.
5.
H

Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that

[r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the

closing."

The parties did in fact prorate the 1978 taxes based on

(1) the number of days of the year each party owned the property,
and (2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared
to the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract.
6.

The parties

intended

and assumed

that they would be

separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year of
the

closing

continued

to

consolidated

(1978) .
assess
tract

The
and

and

county
tax

did

taxing

Stangl

not

authorities,

for

the

individually

entire
tax

however,
9.63-acre

the parties1

separate parcels because no conveyance of Wade's Property had taken
place, nor was any conveyance yet required under the terms of the
installment land contract (which had a 6%-year executory period).
6.

During

the

years

1979,

1980

and

1981,

the

parties

continued their practice of apportioning the property taxes based
on the square footage or acreage owned by each party as compared
to

the

total

amount

of

land

within

the

consolidated

tract.

Beginning with the year 1982, Wade failed and refused to pay any
amount for taxes on the subject property and has at all times since

STGL\082.vc

-3-

0G814

failed and refused to pay any amount toward the appurtenant
property taxes.
7.

In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax

liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate
amount

of

land

prospectively

owned

resolved

between the parties.

by

each

party.

This

the issue of tax

oral

liability

agreement
allocation

The primary reason for the parties1 oral

agreement was that doing so would result in lower taxes for each
party than would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and
separately assessed and taxed. This 1980 oral agreement was either
a separate and subsequent agreement by the parties concerning
property

tax

allocation,

or

was

an

oral

clarification

or

modification of the 1978 written contract which was ambiguous in
that it addressed only the taxes for 1978 (the first year of a 6%year executory contract).

The oral agreement also reflected the

prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to
property tax apportionment.
8.

The letters and other documents contained in Exhibit P

of the parties' Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or
someone on Wade's behalf.

Even if there was no subsequent oral

agreement concerning tax apportionment, the documents in Exhibit
P of the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at the time of
execution of the written agreement and thereafter that the taxes
should be apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned
by each party.
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9.

Therefore, either (1) the 1980 oral agreement was an

amendment to the earlier written contract or was a subsequent
contract which in either case prospectively resolved the issue of
property tax apportionment (which oral agreement was not subject
to the Statute of Frauds because it involved no transfer of an
interest in land but only effected a resolution of property tax
responsibility), or (2) the documents contained in Exhibit P of the
parties' Stipulation reflect the intent of the parties1 written
agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the area owned
by each party, and such evidence of intent is important and
determinative in resolving the ambiguity concerning future tax
apportionment in the written contract.

Under either of these

alternative findings, the parties conclusively agreed that the
property taxes would be allocated according to the amount of land
owned by each party. The Court did not rely on evidence submitted
by Stangl that the taxes did in fact increase for each party when
the

parties' parcels were

finally

segregated

and

separately

assessed in 1991.
10.

Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract

of land was never separately assessed to establish individual taxes
for Wade's 6.87 acres and Stangl's retained 2.76 acres.

Instead,

Stangl has been taxed each year for the consolidated property as
a single, undivided parcel. In order to avoid loss of the property
through a tax sale, Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed
against the entire consolidated tract each year since 1978 except
STGL\082.vc
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for the years 1990 and 1991, which taxes have not yet been paid.
Stangl has agreed and is responsible to pay the full amount of said
1990 taxes on the consolidated property provided that Wade first
satisfies in full the judgment entered by this Court, which
judgment includes apportionment of the 1990 taxes. Beginning with
the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed and the
parties will be individually responsible for payment of the taxes
assessed against their respective parcels for each year from and
after 1991.
11.

Stangl

has

been

paid

in

full

by

Wade

for Wade's

proportionate share of the 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 taxes.

Wade

is, however, liable to Stangl for Wade's proportionate share of the
taxes for 1982 through 1990, together with prejudgment interest
thereon at the legal rate. The amount of said 1982-1990 taxes and
interest was stipulated by the parties to be $74,652, as indicated
in Exhibit

C hereto.

Exhibit

C accurately

sets

forth the

apportioned property taxes for the tax years 1982 through 1990
based on the acreage owned by each party and the equal division of
acreage beneath the right-of-way.

For the 1991 tax year, the two

parcels will for the first time be taxed separately.

Therefore,

no apportioned amount is included in Exhibit C for the year 1991.
Exhibit C also accurately sets forth the prejudgment interest on
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) . As reflected by Exhibit C, the total amount
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of taxes and prejudgment

interest owed by Wade to Stangl is

$74,652.
12.

In August

of

1989, Stangl

engaged

Strategis Asset

Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes
assessed

to

the

consolidated

property

for

1989.

Strategis

succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02,
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties.
action was
$5,087.50.

33.3% of the reduction

Strategis' fee for such

amount

of

$15,277.78, or

This amount is properly considered a tax-related

expense inuring to the benefit of both parties and was therefore
properly added to the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between
the parties along with the tax for that year as shown in Exhibit C.
13.

It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the

property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his
installment payments and continue until the time the parties'
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e.,
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or this Court if Wade had
no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself in
the lawsuit he initiated.
14.

The Court generally

discredited
STGL\082.vc
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credited
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Stangl's testimony and
of,

inter

alia, Wade's

00813

admitted fraudulent activities that took place contemporaneously
with this lawsuit.

Wade's insistence that he at all times relied

entirely on Stangl in connection with all relevant issues is
indicative to the Court of fraudulent conduct and of an attempt by
Wade to alter or withhold the truth.
15.

The Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21, 1988,

has never been answered.

Technically, therefore, Wade is in

default. The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with
prejudice, reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and
interest thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys fees and costs.
Stangl is entitled to such relief.
Paragraph 15 of the parties1

16.

1978 written agreement

provides that, in the event of a default under the agreement, the
prevailing party shall recover from the losing party reasonable
attorneys fees and costs. There is no requirement in the agreement
for notice of said default in order for the right to attorneys fees
to attach.

Even if notice of default was required to receive

attorneys fees, trial Exhibit CC reflects that Wade was given
notice of his default.
share

of the property

Because Wade failed thereafter to pay his
taxes, said default

was never

cured.

Stangl*s 1988 Counterclaim, of which the Court takes judicial
notice,

is further notice to Wade of his default under the

contract.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the trial the parties

stipulated that their dispute focused on said written agreement and
that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees.
STGL\082.vc

Stangl
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is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to reasonable
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration*
17.

F.C. Stangl Construction Company check No. 55499, payable

to Stanley L. Wade in the amount of $52,776.00, was hand-delivered
to A. Paul Schwenke, the attorney of record and the attorney in
actuality for Wade, on behalf of and as agent for Wade.

A

withdrawal of counsel A. Paul Schwenke, purportedly executed on
March 7, 1989, was never filed with the Court and was not served
on opposing counsel despite a certificate of service to the
contrary.
continued

Even if the withdrawal had been filed, Mr. Schwenke
to

represent

Wade

by,

for

example,

prosecuting a

successful Motion for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme
Court in July 1989 and by filing a Certificate of Readiness for
Trial with this Court on May 24, 1990.

The Court takes judicial

notice of the fact that Mr. Schwenke continued to file numerous
pleadings on Wade's behalf, the first one (a notice to submit for
decision) dated only six days after the purported withdrawal of
counsel. The only withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Schwenke was filed
with the Court on January 9, 1991.
acknowledged

on March 25, 1990

Wade's sworn affidavit,

(trial Exhibit Y) , expressly

references an accompanying affidavit prepared by Wade's attorney,
Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Schwenke1s affidavit itemizes costs and services
rendered
STGL\082.vc

on Wade's behalf

over a period

-9-

exceeding

one year

following Schwenke's purported withdrawal from the case on March
7, 1989. Wade's affidavit convinces the Court that Wade was aware
of Mr. Schwenke's ongoing representation.

In light of the above,

the unfiled withdrawal of counsel does not constitute a withdrawal
from the case by Mr. Schwenke.

The agency relationship between

Wade and Schwenke therefore continued to abide until January 9,
1991, when Schwenke formally withdraw as counsel.
18.

Alternatively, even if Mr. Schwenke did inform Wade that

he was withdrawing as counsel, Wade failed to adhere to his
obligation to timely communicate the withdrawal to this Court
and/or to opposing counsel. Instead, Wade knowingly neglected this
action from the date of Schwenke's purported withdrawal in March
1989 until Wade engaged his present counsel in February 1991.
Wade's

complete

failure

to attend

in any way

to a pending

proceeding justifies and excuses any and all good faith actions
taken by opposing counsel during Wade's neglect of this matter.
19.

Accordingly, A. Paul Schwenke was, at the time said check

was tendered to him, Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality
and by appearance.

The subsequent alteration of the check is

deemed to be the act of Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any
offset or credit with respect to said check or with respect to the
funds represented by said check.

Stangl is deemed to have repaid

in full the sum he was obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this
Court's Order of November 21, 1989.

STGL\082.vc
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20.

Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by

the Court against Wade, Stangl is to convey to Wade the property
described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way
described above, in accordance with the terms of the parties'
written agreement.
21.

The Court wishes to note that Bruce J. Nelson, Wade's

present counsel, was not associated in any way with Wade's prior
counsel and had no involvement whatsoever with the fraudulent and
unethical activities alleged by Wade to have taken place earlier
in the course of this dispute.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has proper jurisdiction over the parties and

the subject matter hereof.
2.

Stangl

is entitled to a judgment

from Wade, which

judgment should be entered in accordance with the Findings and
Conclusions herein.
3.

As explained in the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

property taxes attributable to the consolidated tract of land
containing the parties' respective parcels should properly be
allocated between the parties according to the proportionate amount
of area owned by each party, as set forth in Exhibit C.
4.

Because of Wade's breach of the parties' written and/or

oral agreement or agreements, Wade is liable to Stangl for Wade's
STGL\082.wc

-11-

proportionate share of the property taxes for the years 1982
through 1990, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the
legal rate, which sums amount to a total of $74,652.00. Stangl is,
therefore, pursuant to his Counterclaim filed on December 21, 1988,
entitled to a judgment in his favor of $74,652.00, plus postjudgment interest at the legal rate, plus whatever amount of
attorneys

fees

and

costs

the

Court

submission of evidence of same.

deems

appropriate

upon

Additionally, Wade's Complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice.
5.

As the prevailing party, Stangl is entitled to reasonable

attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
6.

At the time Stangl1 s check No. 55499 in the amount of

$52,776.00 was tendered to A. Paul Schwenke, Mr. Schwenke was
Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality and by appearance.
The subsequent alteration of the check is deemed to be the act of
Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any offset or credit with respect
to said check or with respect to the funds represented by said
check.

Stangl is deemed to have repaid in full the sum he was

obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this Court's Order of
November 21, 1989.
7.

Stangl is responsible to pay the full amount of the 1990

:axes on the consolidated property, provided that Wade first

TGL\082.vc

-12-
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satisfies in full the judgment to be entered by this Court, which
judgment will include apportionment of the 1990 taxes.
8.

Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties' properties

will be separately taxed and the parties will be individually
responsible

for payment

of the taxes assessed

against their

respective parcels for each year from and after 1991.
9.

Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by

the Court against Wade, Stangl shall be obligated to convey to Wade
the property described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive
right-of-way described in said Exhibit.
MADE AND ENTERED this 3/

day of

(OrTn/^A .

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

/KJL^K
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Judge, State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on th*c» )|4Uday of October, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to:
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

£ ^ MQ~*~
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Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

Third

JUL,,,;,-;!

Diolnct

NOV 1 1991

Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STANLEY L. WADE,
JUDGMENT

a^qyifl
ihe>-9i-saux.

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C-87-357
Judge Michael R. Murphy

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of
October, 1991.

Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was

represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson.

Defendant

F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, having heard
arguments of counsel, having entered its Findings of Fact and
STGL\083.vc
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Conclusions of Law, having received appropriate affidavits in
support

of

attorneys' fees, and

being

fully

advised

in the

premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in

accordance with the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

The amount of said judgment is as follows:
Plaintiff's proportionate share of property
taxes for 1982-1990

$54,835

Pre-judgment interest thereon at the legal
rate

$19,817

Attorneys' fees and costs

$2^foJ7.
TOTAL

<?o ^JS^

$/^>Cjf 7. 7 0

l

Defendant is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the legal
rate and costs incurred in satisfaction of said judgment.
3.

Upon full satisfaction of this judgment by plaintiff,

defendant shall (1) pay the full amount of the 1990 taxes on the
parties' consolidated property, and (2) convey to plaintiff the
property described in Exhibit B to the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way
described in said Exhibit.
4.

Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties shall be

individually

responsible

for

payment

of

the

property

taxes

separately assessed against their respective parcels of land.

STGL\083.wc
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^

,is \*&
DATED this
t *~

'•n

u
day
o >_[
f / ^ - A
day of
^-

, 1991

BY THE COURT:

TUU^c "L > ,
HONORABLE MICHAELi R.
R. MURPHY
MURPHY~T/
District Judge, State of Utan

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this ^ ^ _ ^ d a y of October, 1991,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was handdelivered to:
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sk

?7V^

OOf.32
STGL\083.vc

~_

TabC

I

A. Paul Schwenke
Bruce J. Udall #3302
Attorney for Plaintiff
SCHWENKE & UDALL
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-5528

PU/NT/FF'S
EXHIBIT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY L. WADE,
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS
TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
AND FIRST SET
INTERROGATORIES
\
Civil No. C87-357

Plaintiff,
vs.

F.C. STANGL III
Judge Michael Murphy
Defendants.
COMES

NOW, Plaintiff, Stanley

L. Wade, by and

through

counsel, and answers the Defendant's Request For Admissions and
Interrogatories pursuant to rules 30 and 36 of the Utah Rules Of
Civil Procedures.
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO 1.

Admit that plaintiff Wade claims ownership of

the property that is the subject matter of this litigation and
has so claimed such ownership from May 16, 1978 to the present.
RESPONSE TO #1:
REQUEST NO 2.

Admit
Admit the defendant paid the property taxes

on the subject property by paying taxes on a larger parcel that
included plaintiff's claimed property.
RESPONSE TO #2: Plaintiff has insufficient knowledge to
admit or deny this request and for this reason deny the same.
REQUEST NO. 3.

Admit that plaintiff has paid no property

tax on the property

in which plaintiff claims ownership for any

of the time period between May 16, 1978 and the present.
RESPONSE

TO #3:

Admit

that the responsible

party

for

property taxes during the contractual period was the defendant
and not the plaintiff.
REQUEST NO. 4.

Admit that Defendant Stangl paid the taxes

on the 9.632 total acre parcel of which Wade owned 6.87 acres and
Stangl owned 2.762 acres.
RESPONSE TO #4: Plaintiff is without sufficient information
to admit or deny this request in that only defendant Stangl knows
whether he paid

taxes and for this reason plaintiff deny the

same.
REQUEST NO. 5.

Admit that Wade is liable for 71.32 of all

taxes paid by Stangl on the 9*632 acre parcel

located

at 9225

South 700 East in Sandy, Utah.
RESPONSE TO #5: Plaintiff objects to this request as calling
for a legal conclusion without any basis in fact or law, and
notwithstanding

this objection and in no manner be construed as

waiving this objection, plaintiff denies all of the allegations
of request #5.
REQUEST NO. 6.

Admit that Stangl has provided Stanley Wade

with various notices of taxes paid by Stangl on the property and
has demanded that Wade pay his proportionate share.
RESPONSE TO #6:

Deny.

REQUEST NO. 7.

Admit that Wade owes Stangl 71.32%, along

with interest as provided by law for the property
Stangl on the property.

tax paid by

REPSONSE

TO #7: Plaintiff

objections under #5
DATED this

incorporated

by reference his

and for the same reasons deny this request.

/£- day of March, 1988.

A.£/au<L^Schwenke, Esq.
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

If you denied any of Defendant's First

Requests for Admissions set forth specifically for each denial:
a.

The complete factual basis upon which your denial

b.

Identify any witnesses who have knowledge relating

is based;

to the facts specified in subparagraph (a) and individually, with
regard to each such witness, specify the knowledge held by that
witness; and
c.

Identify all documents that disclose, relate, or

you believe supports your denial.

Specify the manner in which

each such document supports your denial.
RESPONSE TO #1:
#2 was denied

Plaintiff admited request for admission #1;

because

plaintiff

has no knowledge

whether

defendant paid any taxes; #3 was admited; #4 was denied because
only defendant can know if paid
because

it calls

taxes; #5 and

for a legal conclusion; and

#7 was denied
#6 was denied

because it just did not happen.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

2:

Do

you

contend

that

you

are

responsible to pay any of the taxes for the years 1978 through
1987 on the property that is the subject matter of the lawsuit?

RESPONSE
responsible

TO

#2:

Plaintiff

for property

contends

taxes during

that

he

the contract

is not
period.

Plaintiff admits being responsible for taxes after the contract
period which

taxes can not be discern

so

long

as defendant

continues to wrongfully withhold delivering of a warranty deed to
plainti ff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

If you answer was in the affirmative

to Interrogatory No. 2 above, specify:
a.

The amount you contend you owe;

b.

The entity to which you owe such amount;

c.

The

complete

methodology

you

utilized

for

determining the amount you owe in taxes; and
d.

If your answer was in the negative to Interrogatory

No. 2 above, please specify the factual basis upon which you base
your contention that you have no obligation to pay any taxes on
the subject property.

Identify any witnesses who have knowledge

that relates to your contention and individually with regard to
each, specify the knowledge held by such individual.
RESPONSE TO #3: Plaintiff do not owe any property taxes so long
as defendant wrongfully refuses to deliver a warranty pursuant to
the

c o n t r a c t , so that

the county assessor

would

plaintiffs's property and assess the tax for it. ^ ^
DATED this

of March, 1988./^

/

/7

segragate
~-^
^

A./ Paul Schwenke, Esq.
OATH
Stanley L. Wade after being first duly sworn states that the
facts contain in the responses to interrogatories herein are true

and exact to the best of his knowledge and belief.

dik^As z/ 7/MU

Stanley'L. Wade
SUBSCRIBED

RN TO BEFORE ME THIS

/ J ^ day of March,

1988.

^ .

f*=£fo*->~+-A^i_ >

30TARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g in S a l t Lake County
MvOpommission

expires:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant,

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

October 4, 1991
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge
A P P E A R A N C E S :

For the Plaintiff:

Bruce J. Nelson
Attorney at Law
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

For the Defendant:

Stephen G. Crockett
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger
136 South Main Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL x
SliiicD SHORTHAND REPORTER
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH '

1

Salt Lake City, Utah

2

October 4, 1991

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

This is Wade v. Stangl,

4

C87-347. Mr, Bruce Nelson here on behalf of the

5

plaintiff, and Mr. Crockett here on behalf of the

6

defendant.

And is the plaintiff present with you?

7

MR. NELSON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CROCKETT:

10

Yes, he is, Your Honor.
All right.
Mr. Stangl is present.

Mr. Dan Jensen is also present on behalf of Mr. Stangl.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

One thing that I

12

don't think the record may be entirely clear about at

13

this time, and that is, that I recused myself on a

14

specific issue in this case, and not in the case in its

15

entirety.

16

The specific issue being whether or not there

17

should be relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).

18

reason why I recused myself was that the issues on that

19

motion, I felt, might appear to be or could in fact be

20

intrinsically intertwined with prior counsel for the

21

plaintiff, and I had referred to the Utah State Bar

22

some difficulties that I had with prior counsel for the

23

plaintiff.

24

Mr. Nelson, but some other successor counsel before Mr.

25

Nelson came along, had some difficulties also.

And successor counsel —

The

and I don't mean

And I
2

1

also just felt that those issues were so related that

2

it may affect my judgment on the for relief from

3

judgment, or at least appear to affect that. And

4

really, regardless of what that decision had been, I

5

felt that either side may have had some concerns. For

6

example, Mr. Crockett's client could have had some

7

concerns that I was bending over backwards to overcome

8

some of the difficulties I'd had with prior counsel,

9

and therefore viewed the issues in a more liberal way

10
11

toward the plaintiff.
Anyway, that is all over now.

I don't have

12

any problem proceeding with the remainder of the case,

13

and I need to see if either of you have any problems.

14
15

MR. NELSON:

we have no problem with your continuing, Your Honor.

16
17

MR. CROCKETT:

20

On behalf of the

defendant, we have no problem, Your Honor.

18
19

On behalf of the plaintiff,

THE COURT: All right.
stipulation.

I have read the

Go ahead.
MR. CROCKETT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

21

Maybe we ought to put on the record some things we did

22

in chambers before, so that we have a record of what we

23

are going to be trying today, and what we are not. I

24

think the issue is going to be the methodology for

25

determining the property taxes on the property in
3

1
2

question.
We are reserving issues as to attorney's fees

3

for the court to later decide by affidavit or however

4

the parties determine is most appropriate.

5

There will also be somewhat of a dispute on a

6

check for $52,776.00.

7

that apportionment is not an appropriate method, the

8

court will decide how to proceed from here.

9

Finally, if the court decides

It may be that plaintiff's counsel has

10

indicated you ought to appoint a special master. I

11

suppose we'll deal with that once we get past step one,

12

and see what is required for step two.

13

THE COURT:

All right.

On the issue of

14

attorney's fees, as I understand it, that if it's

15

appropriate, just the legal issue whether or not

16

attorney's fees are appropriate for either side will be

17

presented today, but the amount of those fees will be

18

set aside for another time.

19

MR. NELSON:

That's correct.

But

20

perhaps we could dispense with some of that argument.

21

The contract between the parties calls for attorney's

22

fees for the successful party, and I think we are both

23

claiming the right to entitlement to attorney's fees in

24

the event of success, based on that contract.

25

MR. CROCKETT:

I think that's correct.
4

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CROCKETT:

3

going to dispense with an opening statement.

4

heard the issues, and I think it would be simpler to

5

call Mr. Stangl, if that's all right.

6

THE COURT:

7

Go ahead.
Okay.

Your Honor, I'm
You have

All right.

FRANZ STANGL

8

having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on

9

his oath as follows:

10
11
12
13

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROCKETT:
Q

Would you please state your full name

for the record, please.

14

A

Franz Courtney Stangl III.

15

Q

And you go by the name "Shoe" Stangl, is

16

that correct?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Okay.

19

Mr. Stangl, you are somewhat hard

of hearing; is that also correct?

20

A

Yes, sir.

21

Q

If you don't hear me on something, tell

22

me, and I'll be happy to speak up.

I know from past

23

association that sometimes in conversation we pass in

24

the night.

25

not sure, tell me and I'll be happy to speak up.

So if you don't hear something, or you're

5

1

A

Thank you.

2

Q

Mr. Stangl, would you briefly describe

3

your business background.

4

about now is going back to the 1978 - 1975 time frame,

5

and the nature of your business activities.

6

A

Yes, sir.

What I'm really concerned

When I first moved to Utah

7

in 1960 I started in the real estate business, and I

8

continued in the real estate business.

9

1970's, 1970 to the present I have been a real estate

10

And during the

developer.

11

That is to say that I buy land, build

12

buildings on that land, rent those buildings to other

13

people, and manage those properties.

14

complete real estate developer, and have been since

15

1970.

16
17
18

Q

Okay.

So that I'm a

In 1970 did you sell some raw

land to Mr. Wade?
A

In mid-1970 I sold a parcel to Mr. Wade.

19

It was up on about 23rd East and 70th South.

20

1978 I sold a second parcel to Mr. Wade, and that was

21

out at about 9925 South 700 East, in Sandy.

22
23

Q

And in

And it's that second parcel that's the

subject of this dispute; is that correct, sir?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

What is the size of the original parcel
6

1

that you sold to Mr. Wade?

2

A

In Sandy?

3

Q

Yes.

4

East.

The one on 7th

Is that the one in Sandy?

5
6

Excuse me, no.

A

The one on 7th East is in Sandy, yes.

My recollection is 6.87 acres.

7

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, we have

8

stipulated, and I think the record ought to reflect, we

9

have filed a stipulation with the court that contains

10

certain exhibits.

11

exception of specific reservations in the stipulation,

12

each of those exhibits may be admitted into evidence.

13

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson.

14

MR. NELSON:

15

MR. CROCKETT:

16

That's correct, Your Honor.
So we would offer

Exhibits "A" through "Q" simply to save time.

17
18

It's my understanding that with the

THE COURT:

"A" through HQ" are received

under the conditions set forth in the stipulation.

19

MR. CROCKETT:

20

Q

Thank you.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Stangl, let me

21

hand you a copy of that.

This is Exhibit "A".

This is

22

the agreement you entered into with Mr. Wade; is that

23

correct?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

Now, Exhibit "A" references certain
7

1

attachments which are not attached to Exhibit "A". Do

2

you know if those attachments were ever prepared?

3

A

They were not prepared at the same time

4

the agreement was prepared.

5

"we" I should say me —

6

prepare a survey in anticipation of completing that.

7

But they weren't attached at the time the agreement was

8

done.

9
10
11

Q

And we later -- when I say

later asked a surveyor to

Would you look at Exhibits "B" and "C",

and can you tell me what those are, sir?
A

"B" is a legal description prepared by

12

Bush & Gudgell on the 6.8 parcel, which is the

13

description that I asked them to prepare to describe

14

the parcel that I was selling to Stan Wade.

15

Exhibit "C" is a pictorial map to show on

16

this map the same shape of the parcel that's described

17

on Exhibit "B", as well as two other parcels, Exhibit

18

"lA" and M 1B M , that are the other parcels that I kept,

19

that I didn't sell to Stan Wade.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q

During the course of this hearing the

Firestone parcel may be referenced.
A

Which one is that?

M

1A", in the left hand side of Exhibit

"C M , as I'm looking at it.
Q

Is it your testimony that the parcel you

sold Mr. Wade would be the 6.87 acre parcel on the
8

1

right side of Exhibit " C \ along with the right of way.

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And Exhibit "IB".

4
5

THE COURT:

8
9
10

Isn't it along the left hand

side?

6
7

That's correct.

MR. CROCKETT:

Yes.

The right of way on

the top portion of that.
Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

What is currently on

parcel IB, sir?
A

On IB I have built a building that is

11

called Hancock Fabrics.

12

the drawing as you are looking at it.

13

It's toward the upper side of

And all of the land in IB is improved with

14

asphalt, except an area that's to the south of the

15

Hancock building.

16

area that has not yet been built on.

17

expectation to build a building on that, as well.

18

Q

That's about 11,000 square feet of

Okay.

But it's my

Is there anything on the portion

19

of the extreme left of Exhibit HC"?

20

the remainder.

Not Parcel 1A, but

21

A

Is there anything on —

22

Q

Anything built?

23

A

On --

24

Q

On this "L" shaped parcel?

25

A

That isn't included in the description
9

1

here.

2

that I built last year.

3

Warehouse.

4

There's a building that's built on this now,

Q

Thank you.

It's called Wallpaper

Sir, would you look at

5

paragraph 6 of this Exhibit "A".

6

provides --

7

A

8
9

Wait a minute.

Now, paragraph 6

I'm sorry.

I was on the

stipulation. Yes.
Q

Paragraph 6 provides real property taxes

10

for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the closing.

11

Did you do that?

12

A

Yes, sir.

13

Q

Did you participate in the closing?

14

A

Yes.

I wasn't here in Salt Lake at the

15

time that all happened, but I was a party to the sale

16

of this property.

17

Q

Right.

18

A

So I participated.

19

Q

And one of the signatories.

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And the proration at closing, was that

22

done on a time or a square foot tax basis, or some

23

other basis.

24

A

Both.

The time and the square footage.

25

Q

What do you mean by time?
10

1

A

If the property closed mid-year, half of

2

the taxes for the year would be owed by the seller, and

3

the other half would be owed by the buyer.

4

demonstrate.

5

parcel, and the buyer bought six acres of it, and the

6

seller sold four acres of it, the seller would be

7

charged with 40% of the tax amount.

8

would be charged with 60% of the tax amount based upon

9

the entire assessment for the entire property.

Just to

And if the property was a ten acre

And the buyer

10

is, the values or the cost of the taxes would be

11

apportioned that way.

12

Q

13

That

You have reviewed the record, and that

was in fact what occurred in 1978; is that correct?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

All right. After 1978, what was the

16

original anticipation that would happen with regard to

17

payment of taxes for the parcels?

18

A

We thought that the taxing authorities

19

would bill each of us for our respective taxes, and we

20

would each pay our respective taxes for our parcel.

21

Q

Did that in fact happen?

22

A

It did not.

23

Q

What happened

24

A

The taxing authority, Salt Lake County,

25

instead?

issued one tax assessment for the entire property,
11

1

covering both the Wade parcel and the parcel that I

2

kept.

3

And we then each paid our respective portions

4

of that, based on the quantity of area that each of us

5

had versus the amount that was billed by the County.

6

Q

Did you have a discussion with Mr, Wade

7

about the apportionment of paying taxes?

And when I

8

use the term apportionment, what I mean is breaking it

9

out by square footage and each paying your

10

proportionate share.

11

A

I did.

12

Q

When did this discussion take place,

14

A

Some time in about 19 -- during 1980.

15

Q

Who was present?

16

A

Stan Wade and me.

17

Q

Where did it take place?

18

A

In my office.

19

Q

To the best of your recollection, would

13

20
21

sir?

you take us throucjh that decision.
A

Yes.

Who said what?

There were two or three issues we

22

were talking about.

But the issue as related to taxes,

23

we had had the property in front of us, and the

24

assessor had not divided the assessment for our

25

properties.

And we had one assessment.

We had a bill
12

1
2

that needed to be paid.
We discussed the common sense of taking the

3

prorata share, the 60/40 relationship, to use round

4

numbers. Actually, it was 6.87 acres versus two point

5

whatever I kept.

6

and I would also pay the other end of the fraction so

7

that the 100% was a formula.

8
9

So he would pay a fraction of that,

We also discussed that it made sense to do
that, because if we did divide the property, that each

10

of us would pay a higher tax, and there was no sense

11

penalizing either one of us since the taxing authority

12

had already chosen the method to assess us that they

13

had, and we would just participate and each pay our

14

prorated share of the amount they billed us.

15
16
17

Q

What do you mean, that you would each

pay a higher tax?
A

That if we separated the properties and

18

the properties became less than ten acres, each then

19

would be reassessed, and the assessment for a smaller

20

parcel is generally higher per square foot than the

21

assessment for an entire parcel per square foot.

22

So that each of us would have an increased

23

assessment.

24

would also get an increased tax to pay.

25

Q

If we got an increased assessment, we

Did you discuss that with Mr. Wade?
13

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

All right-

3

In 1991 the properties were

broken out; is that correct?

4

A

Yes, sir.

5

Q

Now, I realize this is some ten years

6

after the fact of the agreement and ten years after the

7

discussion, but in 1991 when they were broken out, were

8

each of the parcels taxed at a higher amount than

9

before they were split up?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

What did the taxes on the Wade parcel go

12
13

from and to?

Do you understand my question?
MR. NELSON:

Before he answers, I have

14

to object to this line of questioning.

The fact that

15

they had a conversation in 1980, and allegedly made an

16

agreement, and that's the reason they made the

17

agreement was subsequently borne out eleven years

18

later, I just don't think that's relevant to what the

19

agreement was in 1980.

20

So I object on the basis of relevancy to any

21

discussion about what the taxes are in 1991 to justify

22

the 1980 agreement.

23

MR. CROCKETT:

I think it goes to

24

weight, rather than admissibility.

But it simply is an

25

indication that the reasoning they discussed for this
14

1

agreement they are going to dispute was correct, and in

2

fact that did happen.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NELSON: No.

5

THE COURT:

6

Anything else?

The objection is overruled.

I do think it goes to the weight.

7

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Maybe we can do this

8

by stipulation, rather than Mr. Stangl trying to

9

interpret the tax notices. We have looked at those,

10

and let me proffer that in 19 — where we have it

11

written down in 1991, the parcel sold to Mr. Wade went

12

from $8,640 in 1990 to $13,812 in 1991. The

13

differential — would you stipulate that's what the

14

records would show if we put them in?

15

MR. NELSON:

I'm afraid you are

16

comparing apples and oranges.

17

separated until 1991. You are comparing the large

18

parcel assessment in 1990 to just Mr. Wade's portion in

19

'91.

20

MR. CROCKETT:

The properties weren't

No, we are comparing the

21

apportionment in 1990 to what Mr. Wade's parcel was

22

obligated in terms of taxes versus what was actually

23

assessed in 1991 after the breakout.

24
25

THE COURT:

It assumes the apportionment

theory.
15

1
2

MR. NELSON:

and if you stick to that, yes, I —

3
4

Based on that assumption,

THE COURT:

I understand you don't agree

with apportionment.

5

MR. NELSON:

6

MR. CROCKETT:

7

Q

Thank you.
Okay.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Stangl, I cut you

8

off there.

9

anything, that you had with Mr. Wade at that point in

10
11

What was said in that conversation, if

time?
A

We felt with the location of the right

12

of way, where it would be against the north side of the

13

property, or through the center of my property in the

14

front, and with the improvements to be added to that

15

right of way in the future.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

Did you conclude

17

your discussions with an amendment to the contract that

18

you had in 1978 with Mr. Wade?

19

A

Yes, sir.

20

Q

Did you ever, to your knowledge, make

21

that position known to Mr. Wade, that you viewed that

22

as amending the contract.

23
24
25

A

I think through letters from my office

to him, yes.
MR. CROCKETT:

Okay.

Your Honor, we
16

1

would call your attention to Exhibit "P", and the court

2

will note that there are several letters included in

3

Exhibit "P".

4

—

5

Mr. Wade.

It is a packet of letters that went from

or that was put in the mail to go from Mr. Stangl to

6

There is no stipulation he actually received

7

it, but the stipulation -- if called to testify, the

8

testimony would be that these letters were placed in

9

the mail and sent to Mr. Wade in the ordinary course of

10

Mr. Stangl's business; is that correct?

11

MR. NELSON:

That's correct.

12

MR. CROCKETT:

13

MR. NELSON:

All right.

For purposes of the record,

14

may I just indicate that there may be a statute of

15

frauds or statute of limitations issue here.

16

mean to waive that by not objecting to all the

17

questions.

18

where this line of questioning goes, if I may.

19

I don't

I would like to reserve that until we see

THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. Let's

20

get to the statute of frauds issues right away. Are

21

you saying that the written agreement is clear and

22

unequivocal as to taxes?

23

MR. NELSON:

The agreement certainly

24

doesn't say anything about taxes, other than the 1978

25

taxes would be prorated.

Mr. Stangl just indicated he
17

1

believed that they amended the contract.

2

position that any amendment to the contract would have

3

to be in writing.

4

MR. CROCKETT:

It's my

The contract doesn't

5

provide that, number one.

6

a statute of frauds problem.

7

pled in this case.

8

what obligations on taxes, and does not go to

9

transferability of property, which would require a

There's never been one

I think that is going to who owes

10

statute of fraud.

11

hasn't been asserted.

12

And I don't believe we have

I think that's possibly why it

MR. NELSON:

I'm not sure there has been

13

a reply to the counterclaim in the file. As I was

14

reviewing the file last night, I noticed there are some

15

allegations in one of the pleadings, maybe a court

16

order based upon the fact there is no reply to the

17

counterclaim which has been filed.

18

whether it was raised, or not.

19

now, if it hasn't been raised before.

20

you can amend the contract without writing.

21

THE COURT:

So I don't know

I would like it raised
I don't believe

Let me ask this:

Assuming

22

you are correct, how then does one go about resolving

23

the primary issue in this case, and that is, the

24

allocation of taxes?

25

MR. NELSON:

The contract.
18

1
2

THE COURT:

The contract doesn't say

anything,

3

MR. NELSON:

Then I guess you go by what

4

the standard is in the industry, in the valley.

5

you go by statute, Your Honor, which requires property

6

taxes to be based upon its fair market value.

7

apply that statute to this contract, I think it's clear

8

how you do it.

9
10

MR. CROCKETT:

And

When you

You are going to hear

some evidence on that.

11

THE COURT:

Doesn't the statute of fraud

12

void or make voidable a contract if it is subject to

13

the statute of frauds, and the statute of frauds is not

14

adhered to?

15

frauds problem?

16
17

Isn't that the relief under the statute of

MR. CROCKETT:

Void or voidable if it's

subject to the statute?

18

THE COURT: Right.

19

MR. CROCKETT:

20

THE COURT:

I agree.

Well, I'm going to take Mr.

21

Crockett's representation at face value, unless you can

22

point out to me something different.

23

the statute of frauds has not been pleaded and there is

24

an affirmative obligation to plead that. And

25

therefore, it would be inapplicable as being waived.

And that is, that

19

1

And there would be prejudice to allow it to be brought

2

in at this time because the defendants do not have any

3

notice that that would be a factor in resolving the

4

underlying issue of how you allocate taxes.

5

MR, NELSON:

6

Schwenke pled it or not.

7

raise it at this point.

8
9

THE COURT:

I don't know if Mr.
If he did, I would like to

Then what you are going to

have to do, since there are two volumes here, if you

10

believe that there are papers in there indicating that

11

he did timely raise it, you are going to have to bring

12

it to my attention for the purposes of the record.

13

But beyond that, it is my understanding that

14

the statute of frauds is for the purpose of determining

15

whether a transaction in its entirety is void or

16

voidable.

17

And if there is failure to adhere to the

18

statute of limitations under circumstances where it is

19

applicable, then the person raising that has to bite

20

the bullet on whether or not they want the transaction

21

voided.

22

MR.. NELSON:

I have no problem with Mr.

23

Crockett proceeding.

24

issues.

25

previously, then I will go into them later.

26

I simply wanted to raise those

If they have been raised appropriately

THE COURT:

Then the statute of

1

limitations issue is resolved as I indicated, and that

2

is, alternatively on the waiver ground or on the ground

3

that it's inapplicable.

4

statute of limitations issue.

5

And now you also raised the

MR. NELSON:

I'm sorry.

I just

6

understood you to address the statute of limitations

7

issue, but I believe the response is the same to the

8

statute of limitations and the statute of frauds.

9

THE COURT:

It certainly would be on the

10

pleading aspect, but I don't understand as to the

11

applicability.

12

MR. NELSON:

He testified that in 1980

13

they made an agreement to apportion taxes based on

14

square footage.

He brought his counterclaim in 1987.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NELSON:

I see.
It is my position that, if

17

raised previously, is that he is too late to raise

18

those issues.

19

THE COURT:

I could rule on the waiver

20

issue and on that now, and that ruling is consistent

21

with what I indicated on the statute of limitations.

22

However, as to the merits of that, I don't think that I

23

could rule on that until there is further evidence, if

24

any, as to whether or not that statute —

25

using the wrong term here — was either tolled or

and I may be

21

1

waived by the actions of the party.

2

MR. CROCKETT:

I think that you will

3

find that as the testimony unfolds Mr. Wade's taxes

4

during the early portion of this and the statute of

5

limitations doesn't come into play.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CROCKETT:

8

that.

9

the time frame.

All right.
It's only subsequent to

But let's get that evidence out and you will see

10

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Stangl, you

11

indicated that you made -- or to your knowledge it was

12

made known to Mr. Wade that you viewed this as an

13

amendment to the agreement.

14

Stangl, and I'll cite to the court Exhibit "P-10",

15

which were the letters that went from Mrs. Stangl to

16

Mr. Wade.

17
18
19
20

You cited a letter to Mr.

Now, Mrs. Stangl has subsequently passed
away, has she not?
A

That's correct.
MR. CROCKETT:

And in these letters,

21

Your Honor, I would point out, just to give you an

22

example, on the letter dated December 8, 1980, part of

23

Exhibit "P", it goes through and it indicates the

24

property taxes.

25

setting forth the apportionment of the method we are

It does it on a square footage basis,

22

1

arguing for now.

2

it's added up the property taxes, "May we please have

3

your check for $8,174.34 made payable to Franz C.

4

Stangl, III, at the above letterhead and within thirty

5

days in order to correct your existing default and

6

conclude your obligation as per the purchase

7

agreement."

8
9

Then the final paragraph goes, after

Each of the letters has language effectively
like that.

Each of the letters is in the early time

10

frame, and is eventually marked "Paid" on the property

11

taxes, and we have -- part of our stipulation is that

12

the fact that it is marked paid, that if called to

13

testify, Mr. Stangl or someone else from Mr. Stangl's

14

office would indicate under their normal business

15

record keeping system that meant that Mr. Wade actually

16

paid that amount and sent it to Mr. Stangl.

17

Is that our stipulation?

18

MR. NELSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

19

MR. CROCKETT:

All right.

20

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

So where did we get

21

to, then, Mr. Stangl.

22

this agreement Mr. Wade did pay as per the

23

apportionment; is that correct?

For the first four years after

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

During that four year period did Mr.
23

1

Wade ever tell you anything such as, "This is not part

2

of the agreement," or, "I have no agreement to pay

3

that."

4

A

No, he did not.

5

Q

Now, during that 1978 through 1981 time

6

period, you first paid the taxes, then Mr. Wade

7

reimbursed you; is that correct?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

All right.

10

Mr. Wade quit paying you

after 1981; is that correct?

On the taxes?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Now, did you continue to pay the taxes?

13

A

Yes, sir.

14

Q

Have you paid the taxes every year

15
16
17

except 1990?
A

That's correct.
MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, one of the

18

deficiencies of the stipulation which we noticed is

19

that as per the stipulation, upon being awarded a

20

judgment, Mr. Stangl would pay the 1990 taxes, because

21

those figures are included in there, and since it

22

wasn't broken out.

23

I have talked to Mr. Nelson, and he

24

understood the relevance of it is that if Mr. Stangl is

25

awarded a judgment and collects the money, he will pay
24

1

the taxes.

2

I want to put that money portion in there.

3

MR. NELSON:

That's correct, Your Honor.

4

MR. CROCKETT:

Okay.

And besides paying

5

the taxes, I want to call your attention to paragraph

6

13 of the stipulation, the last sentence, Judge. You

7

will see that the last sentence is stricken out. That

8

was one portion we were not able to agree on, so I want

9

to put some evidence on.

10

It's on page 7.

And it's the

last sentence of paragraph 13.

11

Now, that sentence says, "This amount should

12

properly be considered a tax-related expense inuring to

13

the benefit of both parties, and therefore, added to

14

the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between the

15

parties, along with the taxes for that year."

16

That's the Strategis.

17

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Let me show you what

18

has been marked as the exhibit next in order, Exhibit

19

"RM.

20
21

THE COURT:

that this Exhibit "R" is not part of the stipulation.

22
23
24
25

The record should indicate

MR. CROCKETT:

That's correct, Your

Honor.
Q

(By Mr. Crockett) Mr. Stangl, I've

handed you what's been marked as Exhibit "R",

Can you
25

1

identify that document for the court.

2

A

At the top of Exhibit "R" it indicates

3

"Strategis, asset valuation and management."

4

listed as a client, has the location of a property as

5

775 East 9300 South, and then has on it calculations

6

where they have calculated what the original value of

7

the land was, what the adjusted value is after they

8

appeal the value of the land to Salt Lake County, had

9

the adjusted amount, had the amount of the original tax

10

and the amount of the adjusted taxes after they refined

11

it.

12

Q

It has me

You're going a little too far right now.

13

What I would like you to do is to explain to the court

14

what happened with regard to Strategis.

15

A

Strategis is a professional tax

16

protesting company, and they will, for a percentage of

17

the amount they get the property tax reduced, take to

18

the County taxing authority your position and attempt

19

to get those taxes reduced for you.

20

They did that for us on this combination of

21

Wade and Stangl property, for this year in question,

22

and did get a reduction for us.

23

the amount they saved us.

24

they charged us $5,087 for doing it.

25

Q

They charged us 1/3 of

They saved us $15,000, and

And that $5,087 they charged you for
26

1

saving that $15,000 in taxes, did you add that to the

2

money you deem Mr. Wade owes you.

3

A

His prorated share of it, yes.

4

Q

Just his prorated share?

5

A

Yes.

6

MR. CROCKETT:

All right.

Now, I don't

7

believe that the calculation is disputed.

8

question is legally whether or not we are entitled to

9

have that added in; is that correct?

10

MR. NELSON:

11

MR. CROCKETT:

12

The only

That's correct.
We would offer Exhibit

"R" on that basis.

13

MR. CROCKETT:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. CROCKETT:

I have no objection.

"R" is received.
So in the stipulation the

16

figures include the prorated share of the tax reduction

17

to the entire property.

18

the legality of that particular portion right there.

19
20

And if necessary, we can argue

THE COURT:
Q

All right.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Stangl, over the

21

years you have improved various portions of that

22

property; is that correct?

23

A

Yes, sir.

24

Q

And as those portions have been

25

improved, the tax picture changes; is that correct?
27

1

A

2

Yes, sir.
MR. CROCKETT:

Part of our stipulation,

3

I think, is that Mr. Nelson recognizes that as those

4

properties were improved, they were withdrawn from the

5

taxing pool.

6

Is that correct, Mr. Nelson?

So we only compared raw land to raw land.

7

MR. NELSON:

8

MR. CROCKETT:

9
10

If that's clear to the court.

That will save some time.
Okay.

I have no further

questions, Your Honor.

11
12

Yes, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NELSON:

13

Q

Good morning, Mr. Stangl.

14

A

Likewise.

15

Q

If I don't speak loud enough for you,

16

please let me know.

17

A

Thank you.

18

Q

With respect to Exhibit "R", which you

19

just identified, could you tell me if, prior to the

20

hearing today, and as far as the attempt to lower the

21

taxes, did you discuss that situation with Mr. Wade?

22

A

I did not.

23

Q

Did not obtain his approval to hire that

24
25

company to do that job?
A

That's correct.
28

1

Q

Could you tell me why you didn't do it

3

A

Why I didn't do the job myself?

4

Q

Yes.

5

A

In my opinion, Strategis was probably

2

6

yourself?

better qualified to do this job than I was,

7

Q

Why?

8

A

They are in that business.

I still have

9

them do work for me, and I don't do all of my own work.

10

In certain instances, I think they are better qualified

11

because they are once removed from the ownership of the

12

property, and they are representing to the taxing

13

authorities as an independent party what the values

14

are, and they aren't emotionally charged with whether

15

or not you, as the taxing authority, are charging me

16

too much money.

17

I think it's a fair way to establish the

18

value for whatever service they did, because their

19

agency is accepted in the community as a professional

20

in doing this.

21

fair price for that.

22
23
24
25

The price they charge is accepted as a

And because of that, I think it was a fair
approach all the way around.
Q

That's why I did it.

You indicated that you think the price

they charged was a fair price.

What do you base that
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1

upon?

2

A

What charge other people in the industry

3

that do the same thing that they do charge for their

4

work.

5
6
7

Q

Do you believe you could have hired

someone else and done it cheaper?
A

I think I may have hired someone else,

8

but someone else of the same qualifications would have

9

charged the same price.

They have a fairly standard

10

pricing in the industry, and these people follow that

11

fairly standard pricing.

12
13

Q

Have you ever personally filed an appeal

yourself on any property that you own?

14

A

I have.

15

Q

Have you been successful in doing so?

16

A

I have been both.

17
18
19

I have been

unsuccessful, and I have also lost.
Q

So you do have some experience in doing

that yourself?

20

A

I do.

21

Q

Let's go back to the first part of your

22

testimony and work towards the end.

23

this closing that you testified that occurred in 1978

24

at the time you sold the property to Mr. Wade.

25

A

With respect to

Yes, sir.
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1

Q

Do you know where that closing took

3

A

I don't.

4

Q

Do you know that a formal closing in

2

5

place?

fact took place?

6

A

I know a formal closing did take place.

7

I was not there.

8

property closed.

I was out of the country the day the

9

Q

Have you seen a closing statement?

10

A

I'm sure I have.

11

Q

I noticed that none of the exhibits your

12

counsel has introduced consist of any of the closing

13

documents, other than the contract itself.

14

to you, sir:

15

the contract?

16
17
18

A
documents.

My question

Have you seen other documents, other than

I have seen literally hundreds of
I don't know for sure what you mean.

Q

Let me rephrase the question.

With

19

respect to this closing that you testified took place,

20

a formal closing, what other documents, other than the

21

contract, which is Exhibit "A", were executed as part

22

of that closing?

23

A

I don't recall that.

If you want to

24

show me some and have me look at them, I would be glad

25

to do that.

But I don't have a recollection of it.
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1

Q

You testified Mr. Wade took a portion of

2

the taxes at that closing based upon the square footage

3

of the property, as opposed to the fair market value of

4

the respective parties,

5

How do you know he agreed to that?

6

A

I'm not really sure that that's what my

7

testimony was.

8

closing he agreed to do that.

9

I don't know that I said that at

Q

Well, let me -- could you look at

10

paragraph 6 of Exhibit "A".

11

your testimony.

Perhaps I misunderstood

Do you have that, Mr. Stangl?

12

A

I do.

13

Q

That's a paragraph that indicates that

14

the 1978 taxes will be prorated at closing, does it

15

not?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

And I thought I understood your

18

testimony to say that the taxes were prorated based

19

upon square footage, rather than fair market value for

20

purposes of this paragraph.

21

A

I think that's true.

22

Q

How do you know that's true?

23

A

I think I have reviewed some place, some

24

time in the last nine years, that this has been in

25

issue, things that related to the closing of this
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1

property and purchases of property by Stan, I think at

2

the time I determined that the property taxes were

3

apportioned like this contract says.

4

MR. CROCKETT:

The first letter in

5

Exhibit "PM breaks out the closing.

6

the tax notice at the end of the year.

7

MR. NELSON:

You have to get

I appreciate the help, but

8

I guess what I would like to do is ask what documents

9

he has reviewed.

10

certain that was the way it was done.

11
12

Q

(By Mr. Nelson)

Did you not?

Earlier

with Mr. Crockett asking the question?

13
14

I thought I heard him say that he was

A

I said that I thought the tax had been

apportioned the way this contract called for it, yes.

15

Q

Would you tell me where it says in the

16

contract that the property should be assessed on a

17

square footage basis, as opposed to a fair market

18

value?

19

A

I don't think it says in the contract.

20

I think what Steve asked me is whether or not the taxes

21

were apportioned the way this contract says.

22

think I said yes.

23

were apportioned by the year, and by the proportionate

24

amount.

25

think that's what got done.

And I

And he then asked me whether they

And I think I answered yes to that, and I
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1

Q

So not to belabor the point, but did you

2

say you think it was done that way, or you are certain

3

it was done that way,

4

A

I'm relatively certain.

5

Q

Could you tell me when any improvements

6

were made on the property that you retained?

7

A

If you will describe for me what you

8

mean by any improvements.

9

of time, and I'll do the best I can from recollection

10

They were done over a period

to tell you which time which improvement was made.

11

Q

At the time you sold the property to Mr.

12

Wade and retained a portion, was it all vacant

13

property?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

When was the first time any improvement

16
17
18

was made on the property that you retained?
A

If you've got something to prompt my

memory, I'll be glad to use it with you.

19

Q

I don't.

20

A

We did a building for Firestone on a

21

portion of the property toward the front, and I think

22

that building was done in about 1988 or 1989.

23

Q

Were there any other improvements made

24

on the property that you retained as part of this

25

transaction?
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1

A

Yes, sir.

After that I built another

2

building for Hancock Fabrics, and I did that in about

3

1990, I think.

4

that which was also done at the same time.

And there was on-site work relative to

5

Q

6

previously?

7

A

Yes, sir.

8

Q

Were there any other improvements made

9
10

And that's the building you testified to

on the property that you retained as part of this
transaction?

11

A

I don't think so.

12

Q

I want to make sure I understand what

13

your agreement was with Mr. Wade.

Do I understand your

14

testimony correctly to say that prior to the time you

15

signed the contract, Exhibit "A", there had been no

16

agreement between you and Mr. Wade as to how the

17

property taxes would be apportioned?

Is that correct?

18

A

I think that's accurate.

19

Q

And if I understand what you said

20

earlier, you testified that the first time you made

21

such an agreement with Mr. Wade was in 1980 in this

22

conference in your office; is that correct?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Had there been any other discussions

25

I think that's correct.

between you and Mr. Wade wherein he confirmed his
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1
2

alleged agreement to that manner of apportioning taxes?
A

He had taken actions that led me to

3

believe that he had previously agreed to doing the same

4

type of thing, on other property that I sold him at

5

70th South and 23rd East.

6

Q

Subseguent to 1980, Mr. Stangl.

Let's

7

confine it to this property.

8

conversation in your office in 1980, did he have any

9

conversations wherein he agreed that that was the

10
11

And subseguent to the

proper way to apportion the taxes?
A

Stanley and I did not discuss things

12

really between the two of us.

13

to the property tax.

14

taxes. And between Stan and me, Stan and I, we met to

15

determine what things she and he and I would agree to,

16

what we did agree to, and I told my wife what the

17

agreement was, and my wife administered the agreement

18

that Stan and I had with each other.

19

would do so in letters back and forth between Stan and

20

I and Stan and my company.

21

Q

Especially as it related

My wife handled the property

Stan and she

But other than this 1980 conversation

22

that you had with Mr. Wade, did you have any other

23

conversation wherein he allegedly reconfirmed that was

24

the proper arrangement or apportionment?

25

A

Not that I can recall.
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1

Q

Are you aware of any written documents

2

executed by Mr. Wade wherein he agreed that that was

3

the proper way to apportion taxes?

4

A

I think each of the checks that Stan

5

Wade sent back, each of the times that he sent them

6

back, were ratification or written proof that he was

7

agreeing to that.

8
9
10
11

Q

And he did that more than once.

All right.

Are there any other written

documents that you can call to my attention, other than
the checks that were sent to you?
A

12

Not that I recall.
MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, I believe

13

that's all the cross examination I have of Mr. Stangl.

14

I intend to call him as a witness myself, but I'll get

15

into those issues when I do that.

16

THE COURT: All right.

17

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

18

BY MR. CROCKETT:

19

Q

20

Your Honor.

I have just a moment of redirect here,

21

Mr. Stangl, the first page of Exhibit H P M is

22

the actual calculation for the property tax that would

23

apply during 1978, the year that Mr. Wade brought the

24

property; is that correct?

25

A

Yes, sir.
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1
2

Q

And that shows it by square footage,

does it not?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Also by time, does it not?

5

A

It does.

6

MR. CROCKETT:

I would also point out,

7

Your Honor, in paragraph 11 of the stipulation, the

8

stipulation -- and also as evidenced by the documents

9

attached as Exhibit "P", the amount paid by Wade during

10

the above listed years, and that was '78 through '81,

11

and were based on the acreage or square footage of the

12

land owned by Mr. Wade, as compared to the total amount

13

of land in the consolidated transaction.

14

that was a disputed issue in terms of how that was

15

done.

16

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

I don't think

Sir, you say you

17

didn't discuss this very much with Mr. Wade.

18

that?

19

A

Why was

Stan didn't like to return telephone

20

calls, and has some aversion to talking to people over

21

the telephone.

22

touch with him, he wouldn't take the call.

All the time I have tried to get in

23

Q

24

get in touch with him?

25

A

Or didn't.

Were there various times you tried to

Many.
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1

Q

Prior to this meeting you testified

2

about, did you wait on the telephone for an extended

3

period of time for him to come to the phone?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Is that one of the reasons that caused

6

you to remember the meeting so well?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Why don't you describe what happened in

9
10
11

that telephone conversation so that we will understand
why it sticks out in your mind.
A

It's probably one of the more memorable

12

ones I ever had.

13

of Stan, and I finally thought that the best time to

14

get hold of someone who is so difficult to get hold of

15

would be early in the morning.

16

relative, but I tried at 6:30, 7:00 o'clock.

17

last time I called at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning

18

and asked for him, and he was in the shower.

19

said, "Then I'm —

20

phone, and I told her that I was going to continue to

21

hold on that phone until he finally got out of the

22

shower, that it was important that I meet with him and

23

that I talk with him, and that I wasn't going to leave

24

the phone until I finished talking to him.

25

I had tried several times to get hold

Early in the morning is
And one

And I

this was his wife that answered the

And I waited on that phone for well over an
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1

hour, maybe as much as an hour and a half, before that

2

shower was finished and Stan took my call.

3

Stan came to my office and talked to me about it, I

4

told him from that minute forward he and I were going

5

to have to meet and talk face to face, rather than over

6

the phone.

7

in the shower.

8

visit me at my office, instead of that.

9
10

And if he ever called me I was going to be
And that he could come to my office and

It took place -- I remember that as vividly
as I can remember anything.

11
12

And when

Q

Did you in fact ever say you were in the

shower when he called your office?

13

A

He did call the office and I did

14

instruct my office secretary to tell him that I was in

15

the shower, and if he wanted to come to my office and

16

see me, he could.

17
18

MR. CROCKETT:

Nothing further, Your

Honor.

19

MR. NELSON:

Nothing.

20

THE COURT:

All right.

21

down, Mr. Stangl.

22
23

You may step

Thank you for your testimony.

MR. CROCKETT:

We would rest, Your

Honor.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. NELSON:

Mr. Nelson?
Your Honor, I'm going to
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1

call Mr, Stangl now as my witness.

2

that, one of the things I'm going to question him

3

about, or that we might potentially question him about

4

is the refund check of approximately $52,000 that was

5

paid in the fall of 1989.

6
7

I believe that counsel and I can stipulate to
some of the matters and save a few minutes.

8
9

But before we do

THE COURT:

Now, am I correct in

assuming that there are no technical pleadings on this

10

fifty thousand some odd dollar check?

There may be

11

some figures on it, but that by stipulation you are

12

agreeing that that issue is to be resolved?

13

MR. CROCKETT:

The issue being that Mr.

14

Nelson claimed that offset, so we ought to resolve it

15

now.

That's correct.

16

THE COURT:

Is that correct?

17

MR. NELSON:

18

MR. CROCKETT:

19

MR. NELSON:

I do.
I think so, too.
It was money that was paid

20

as a result of a court order that taxes were owing.

21

it's on this exhibit issue, and the question is whether

22

the money was ever refunded and should therefore apply

23

to what is owing.

24
25

So

Is that correct?

MR. CROCKETT:

I think that's correct.

Whether or not the fifty-three thousand some odd
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1

dollars should be credited.

2

MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, I believe

3

counsel can stipulate that pursuant to Check No. 55499,

4

dated November 28, 1989, in the amount of $53,776.00,

5

F. C. Stangl Corporation made this check to Stanley L.

6

Wade.

7

I believe it can be further stipulated that

8

that check was delivered to A. P. Schwenke on the 29th

9

day of November, 1989, who executed a receipt therefor,

10

signed "A. P. Schwenke on behalf of Stanley L. Wade."

11

And I believe it can be further stipulated that Mr.

12

Schwenke subsequently altered the check and placed

13

additional payee information on it after the word

14

"Stanley Wade," and he has apparently typed, "or A.

15

Paul Schwenke, his attorney," and that subsequent to

16

such action the check was deposited and cleared the

17

bank and the deposit was signed on the back of the

18

check, "For deposit only, A. Paul Schwenke."

19

MR. CROCKETT:

I have no objection to

20

its introduction as an exhibit.

21

stipulation, the only difficulty I have is our

22

stipulating that Mr. Schwenke is the one who modified

23

the check.

24

modified.

25

With regard to the

We will stipulate that the check was
Since we weren't there, I can't —
THE COURT:

Otherwise you will stipulate
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1

as represented by Mr. Nelson.

2

MR. CROCKETT:

3

THE COURT:

Yes, I will.

Well, do we furthermore have

4

a stipulation that at the time the check was issued,

5

that as part of this report and in the file, as a

6

practical matter, Mr. Schwenke was a lawyer in this

7

litigation for and on behalf of Mr. Stanley Wade?

8

MR. NELSON:

We do not.

9

MR. CROCKETT:

You're going to hear some

10

testimony on that, Your Honor.

11

I think that part of the stipulation ought to be that

12

the check was given to Mr. Schwenke by our firm at that

13

point in time.

14

THE COURT:

One other thing — but

Let me ask you this, so that

15

I don't have to be poring through these two volumes of

16

pleadings.

17

of the check there had been no withdrawal by Mr.

18

Schwenke from the lawsuit in accordance with Rule 4-506

19

of the Code of Judicial Administration.

20

Is there a stipulation that as of the date

MR. CROCKETT:

A very interesting

21

document has come to light in the last couple of days.

22

There was a notice of withdrawal signed by Mr.

23

Schwenke, dated March 7, 1989, that we would testify

24

and that's what they stipulated to in chambers, that if

25

called to testify he would testify that one was never
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1

delivered to me.

2

I don't know if one is in the court file. I

3

know Mr. Nelson was going to check that.

4

is that none was given to me.

5

days of this purported notice there were other

6

pleadings that were filed by Mr. Schwenke in this case,

7

and in fact, after this date the very pleas that went

8

to the Supreme Court that resulted in the refund are

9

signed by Mr. Schwenke.

10

Our position

Further, that within ten

That ought to be noted because

it's part of the record in this case.

11

MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, I can't

12

stipulate as to what pleadings were subsequently signed

13

by Mr. Schwenke, but obviously the record would reflect

14

that.

15

THE COURT:

I'm going to ask the clerk

16

at this time to call up the docket sheet on this case

17

and to focus on the period of time from the first of

18

March, 1989, forward, and tell me if that sequence or

19

docket sheet indicates at any time there was a

20

withdrawal of counsel filed.

21

whether we can tell from that who was making the

22

withdrawal.

23

she is doing that, will you refresh my memory?

24

was the Notice of Appeal filed?

25

note that the Supreme Court decision is dated — well,

If so, the date. And

That will be a quicker way to see. While
When

Approximately when?

I
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1

I guess technically the Supreme Court is --

2

MR. CROCKETT:

3

June 14, 1989, which postdates the purported

4

withdrawal.

5

THE COURT:

6/14/89.

Okay.

So it would be

And the remittitur

6

issued in this case from the Supreme Court, October 5,

7

1989, it was forwarded to Mr. Schwenke.

8

should also note that for some reason -- it's not

9

something that would even be a part of the file,

I guess I

10

because it is a handwritten note by me, but this is on

11

the remittitur, stating, "Received by hand delivery

12

from Chief Justice law clerk, 10/25/89."

13
14
15
16
17

MR. NELSON:

Are you indicating that the

remittitur is part of the record, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

It is. All right. We will

proceed while she is looking for that.
MR. NELSON:

I think that is all the

18

stipulation, but I would offer Exhibits "S", "T", "U",

19

and "V", which is the purported Notice of Withdrawal.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

Is there any objection to

"S", which appears to be the original check -MR. CROCKETT:

Do you have the original?

23

Could I see the exhibits for a moment?

I pulled them

24

from their exhibit list, but I don't know which one

25

we're talking about.
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1
2

MR. NELSON:

Exhibit "S" is the

photocopy of the check.

3

MR. CROCKETT:

4

MR. NELSON:

5

Exhibit "T" is the receipt

signed by Schwenke.

6

MR. CROCKETT:

7

MR. NELSON:

8

No objection, Your Honor.

No objection.

Exhibit MUM is the check

and endorsement as altered.

9

MR. CROCKETT:

10

MR. NELSON:

No objection.

And Exhibit "V" is the

11

document purportedly signed by Mr. Schwenke and dated

12

March 7, 1989 as his Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel.

13

MR. CROCKETT:

14

THE COURT:

15

S", "T", "U" and "V" are

received.

16
17

U

No objection

MR. NELSON:

Would you like me to

proceed, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Let me just ask this.

I

19

haven't had a lot of success so far, but let me try it

20

again.

21

of Exhibit "V", the withdrawal, that there were filings

22

made by Mr. Schwenke in this case; correct?

23

Counsel will stipulate that following the date

MR. NELSON:

I cannot stipulate. I

24

haven't reviewed the record.

The court can tell me

25

what is in the record, if it is relevant.
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1

THE COURT:

Well, let me just indicate

2

that I'll take judicial notice that there were

3

subsequent filings by Mr. Schwenke.

4
5

MR. NELSON:

Between the date of March

7, 1989 and the date of the check, November 28, 1989.

6

THE COURT:

Yes. And I'm looking at one

7

right now called Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and

8

Authorities in Response to Defendant's Memorandum and

9

Motion for Imposition of Sanctions, dated the 13th of

10

November, 1989.

11

just an example.

12
13

I'm assuming there are more.

MR. CROCKETT:

We'll be putting a couple

of others on as evidence, too, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: All right.

15

THE CLERK:

16

14, 1991.

17

appearance.

18

That's

He filed a Notice on January

That's when the other counsel made his

MR. CROCKETT:

So the record is correct,

19

did I understand that the only record that the court

20

clerk could find was the notice of withdrawal on

21

January 14, 1991.

22

THE CLERK: Right.

23

THE COURT: Well, just while we are

24

doing this, I think some elaboration on that is

25

necessary because my memory is being jogged a little
47

1

bit.

There was an affidavit of plaintiff representing

2

on representation of Mr. Schwenke, isn't there?

3

MR. CROCKETT:

There is, Your Honor.

4

That's part of what I was going to do with Mr. Wade

5

when he testifies about this matter.

6

THE COURT:

That is referenced from this

7

summary decision and order of January 22, 1991. All

8

right.

9

me.

In pieces some of this is going to come back to

All right.

10
11

Go ahead, Mr. Nelson.

MR. NELSON:

I would like to call Mr.

Stangl to the stand.

12

F. C. STANGL

13

having been previously sworn, was examined and

14

testified on his oath as follows:

15
16

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NELSON:

17
18

THE COURT:
under oath, don't you?

19
20

You realize you are still

MR. STANGL: Yes.
Q

(By Mr. Nelson)

Mr. Stangl, you earlier

21

testified that you moved to Utah in 1960, and since

22

that time you have been a real estate developer; is

23

that correct?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

How many properties have you
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1

individually in your name, would you guess, have you

2

bought and sold in the last 31 years?

3

A

More than 100.

4

Q

Would there be additional properties

5

with which you were involved that may be in the names

6

of other parties or corporations?

7

A

Yes, sir.

8

Q

Would it be fair to say that you are

9
10

fairly familiar with the mechanics of buying and
selling real estate in Utah?

11

A

I still get lessons daily, but I'm

12

familiar with it, yes.

13

Q

You are familiar, are you not, with the

14

way in which real estate is taxed within the State of

15

Utah?

16
17

A

I still get lessons on that daily, but

I'm relatively familiar with it, yes.

18

Q

And you are aware, are you not, that

19

property in Utah is taxed based on its fair market

20

value, are you not?

21

A

That's what they say.

I don't

22

necessarily agree with the taxing authorities on

23

whether they say fair market value as fair market

24

value.

25

assessment that I see, that's what they write on it.

That's my position to do that.

I know on the
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1

Q

I'm not asking you whether you agree

2

with their assessment.

3

understand that the way they attempt to assess

4

properties is by an alleged fair market value.

5

correct, is it not?

I'm asking you if you

That's

6

A

That's what they state, yes.

7

Q

In all the properties that you have

8

bought and sold in your individual name, have you

9

personally ever paid taxed based on square footage,

10

other than this parcel we are talking about today?

11

A

I'm sure I have.

12

Q

Would it not be fair to say that in the

13

vast majority of the cases, properties that you have

14

owned you have paid taxes based upon the alleged fair

15

market value, rather than the size of the parcel; is

16

that true?

17

A

What you are doing is separating the

18

normal conditions from an abnormal condition.

19

while it's a fact that most of the properties that I

20

pay taxes on, I pay based on the assessment that I get

21

from the assessor.

22

time that's all based on what the assessor puts on the

23

value, based on the fair market value.

24
25

And

If that's the case, then all of the

But when there is an apportioning of a
property, you have to do it some other way, and the way
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1

we did it on the property we are talking about was

2

apportioning that property based on the square footage,

3

how much is owned by one person and how much is owned

4

by the other.

5

Q

If I understand you correctly, you're

6

telling me that it is normal to pay based upon the

7

alleged assessment, but in this particular case you

8

made a different deal.

9

A

10

have been what I said.

11

Q

Is that what you're telling me?

I said what I said, and I think that may

Thank you, Mr. Stangl.

Could you tell

12

me, if you know, who drafted Exhibit "A", the sales

13

contract, wherein you sold property to Mr. Wade?

14
15

A

I believe Dennis Morrell from the firm

of Prince, Yeates drafted it.

16

Q

Was he your attorney at that time?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

When did you acquire the entire

19

consolidated parcel, and by that I mean the property

20

you retained and the parcel that you sold to Mr. Wade?

21

Do you recall?

22

A

Sometime prior to 1987. Not too very

23

long before that. Maybe as close to it as a year.

24

Maybe less than a year.

25

Q

Mr. Stangl, did you acquire this
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1

consolidated parcel of property from individuals named

2

Ralph Tolman and Betty Tolman?

3

A

That's correct.

4

Q

Did you enter into a purchase agreement

5

with them to purchase that property?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

I would like to show you what we have

8

had marked as Exhibit "A", and ask you if you can tell

9

me if that is the document by which you purchased that

10

property?

11

A

It looks like it is.

12

Q

What's the date of that purchase?

13

A

The date on the front of the agreement

14

is December 29, 1977.

15

Q

16

Is that the approximate date, to the

best of your memory, that you purchased the property?

17

A

I think so.

18

Q

That would be approximately six months

19

before you resold part of it to Mr. Wade, would it not?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And what was the purchase price for

22

which you paid or agreed to pay to the Tolmans?

23

A

The amount stated in the agreement under

24

paragraph 1 is $457,000.

25

remember.

That fits with what I
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1

Q

Do you recall the amount of the purchase

2

price on Exhibit "A" to Mr. Wade?

3

front of you, you are welcome to --

4

A

If you have it in

It's about two hundred three thousand,

5

two hundred six thousand.

6

THE COURT:

It's two hundred sixty one

7
8
9

MR. NELSON:
correct?

10
11

I believe $200,100; is that

THE WITNESS:
Q

It does.

(By Mr. Nelson)

Paragraph 1.

Do you have any

12

knowledge as to whether the property of this

13

consolidated piece had increased in value between the

14

time you purchased it and the time you sold it to Mr.

15

Wade during that six month period?

16
17
18

A

I —

I don't think so.

I think it was

about the same.
Q

All right.

And so if my math is

19

correct, you purchased property in December of 1977 for

20

$457,000 and you sold part of it to Mr. Wade six months

21

later for $206,100; is that correct?

22

A

That's correct.

23

Q

And as a result, differences between the

24

purchase price of the consolidated piece and the piece

25

that you sold to Mr. Wade was $251,000 approximately;
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1

is that correct?

2

A

If your math is correct, yes,

3

Q

Was that, to the best of your knowledge,

4

the approximate fair market value of the parcel you

5

retained?

6

A

I don't know that I -- I must have

7

thought so at the time.

I don't know what fair market

8

value has to do with anything.

9

they will do with each other.

Two people decide what
I decided I would sell

10

Stan property for $206,100.

11

sell me property for $457,000, and we both thought

12

those were correct.

13

Q

Tolman decided he would

At the time you sold the property to Mr.

14

Wade did you still believe that the remainder parcel of

15

property that you retained had a value of at least

16

$251,000?

17

A

Yes, sir.

18

Q

In light of the fact that your property,

19

your retained property, was worth more than the Wade

20

parcel, and in light of the fact that you've testified

21

that you were aware of the way property taxes are

22

assessed in Utah, based upon the alleged fair market

23

value, can you tell me why you want to make an

24

agreement with Mr. Wade to have him pay more than you

25

are in tax, more than you are paying?
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1

A

I don't think I made an agreement so he

2

would pay more taxes than I would pay.

3

I made an agreement that would save us both money, that

4

if we divided those two properties, his was probably

5

worth more than what he was paying for it, and he would

6

have had a new assessment, I would have had a new

7

assessment, and we would have both been charged more

8

money.

9

What I did was

There was no reason to do that. We had

10

assessments that were already established and

11

established what the values of the property were at the

12

time.

13

less than what the purchase price was, which also shows

14

that fair market value doesn't have a heck of a lot to

15

do with it.

16

Q

17

That assessment, if my memory is correct, is

I'm not asking the question —
MR. CROCKETT:

18

responding, Your Honor.

19

chance to finish.

20
21

Objection.

I think he's

You have got to give him a

MR. NELSON:

I would be glad to let him

finish, if he hasn't.

22

THE COURT:

Are you finished?

23

THE WITNESS:

What I was doing was

24

something that was good for Stan and good for me. And

25

that's what we did, and it made sense to do it that
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1

way.

2

Q

(By Mr- Nelson)

I beg your pardon, Mr.

3

Stangl, but when your property is worth more than his,

4

and taking the position with the court that he should

5

pay 70% of the taxes of the consolidated parcel, I

6

agree that is certainly to your benefit.

7

But the question I'm not asking is, did he

8

pay less taxes by doing it that way than he would have

9

if you had split the parcels up.

I'm asking why you

10

felt it was fair to make an agreement at that point in

11

time prior to the split up of the parcels that he

12

should pay 70% of the tax when your property was worth

13

more than his.

14

A

If you want me to go through the

15

mathematics for you more completely than what I did, I

16

will.

17

But his share and my share were less, the way we did

18

it, than they would have been had we gotten a fresh

19

assessment, divided the properties and each paid the

20

assessor the amount the assessor would have wished us

21

to.

I think I have already answered your question.

22

Q

You are, however, taking the position in

23

court that Mr. Wade should be responsible for 70% of

24

the tax —

25

parcel, are you not?

the assessed tax for that consolidated
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1

A

If that's what the county claims, yes.

2

Q

Have you received the 1991 tax notice on

3

the parcel of property?

4
5

A

I don't know whether I have or not. I

don't think I have.

6

Q

It would go without saying, then, that

7

you haven't forwarded a copy of that to Mr. Wade for

8

payment, have you?

9

A

For 1991?

I believe what we did, in 1990, I think

10

we filed -- we requested somehow from the assessor that

11

they separate the assessments, and I think they did.

12

And I think they may have sent that directly to Stan.

13
14

If they didn't, I may have gotten it.

I just

simply don't know for sure what came to me.

15

Q

Let's talk about the dividing up of the

16

property, Mr. Stangl.

17

your attempt to divide the property into two taxing

18

parcels.

Let's talk for a moment about

19

A

Uh huh.

20

Q

You testified that at the time you sold

21

the property it was taxed as one entire piece of

22

property, thus creating this dilemma of how to

23

apportion the taxes; is that correct?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

And did you make any attempt to split up
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1

the property following the purchase by Mr. Wade so that

2

they would be taxed as two separate parcels?

3

A

That's why Stan and I met and talked,

4

was to discuss whether to do that or not.

5

that on my own.

6

Q

I did not do

Have you, subsequent to 1978, ever made

7

an attempt to split up the property into two separate

8

tax parcels?

9

A

Not in two separate tax parcels. What I

10

have done since then is, when I sold the Firestone

11

portion of the part that I owned, and filed a Quit

12

Claim Deed to myself for that piece and a general deed

13

for someone else when I sold it that separated the

14

Firestone parcel from it. When I did the same thing

15

relative to the piece of Hancock Fabric parcel and

16

separated it from the parcel known as the Stan Wade

17

parcel, and it's a remainder parcel now because of the

18

fact the others were separated from it.

19

Q

Is it your testimony that the reason you

20

never requested the properties be separated between

21

yourself and Mr. Wade for taxing purposes was because

22

of your fear that it would raise the property taxes?

23

A

That's one of the reasons.

24

Q

Could you have done so if you had wanted

25

to?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And it is your testimony that every time

3

you sold off a piece of property you filed a Quit Claim

4

Deed with the County Recorder in order to do that on

5

those properties, did you not?

6

A

I don't know that I filed a Quit Claim

7

Deed with the County Recorder.

8

County Recorder required and what the lender required

9

and what the buyer required to properly deed the

10
11

I did whatever the

property.
Q

Showing you Exhibit "X", Mr. Stangl,

12

this purports to be a Quit Claim Deed signed by you on

13

the 21st day of February, 1990. Does that deal with

14

property which is the subject of this lawsuit?

15

A

I can tell that it deals with property

16

that's at the ninety two and seventh east location.

17

Whether it deals with property that's the subject of

18

this lawsuit, I can't tell.

19

like a legal description what it's for.

20

Q

I can't tell.

It looks

Regardless of what property that was,

21

was it filed for the intent of splitting up one parcel

22

into more than one parcel for tax purposes?

23

A

I believe it was.

24

Q

In fact, it states that on the deed,

25

does it not?
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1

A

It does.

2

Q

And that deed is from yourself to

3

yourself, is it not?

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

So at least as of that date you knew how

6

to split up the property into separate taxing parcels,

7

did you not?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Did Mr. Wade make all of his payments

10
11

owing under the contract to you?
A

12

As far as I know.
MR. NELSON:

I believe, Your Honor, the

13

stipulation which we've executed indicates that all

14

those payments were made.

15
16

Q

(By Mr. Nelson)

Mr. Stangl, do you know

whether the payments were all timely made?

17

A

I know they weren't.

18

Q

What payments -- or could you explain to

19

me by that what you mean when you say they weren't

20

timely made?

21

A

Over the course of the contract he made

22

the payments eventually and we got the money, but we

23

never got it on time.

24

Q

25

Let me ask you if the contract was paid

out on the date or paid by the time that it was
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1

anticipated under the contract of 1979.

2
3

A

I don't know that for sure one way or

Q

If my calculations are correct, the last

another.

4
5

payment would have been made either in December of 1984

6

or January of '85; is that correct?

7

with your memory?

8
9

A

I don't know.

Does that square

You could be right. I

have no reason to doubt it.

10

Q

Mr. Stangl, do you hold a real estate

12

A

I do.

13

Q

How long have you held that license?

14

A

Since about 1961.

15

Q

Have you had it continuously since that

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

It's current now?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

With respect to the check that you gave

11

16

21

license?

date?

to Mr. Wade, this refund check of $52,000 —

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did it in fact clear your account?

24
25

MR. CROCKETT:

Objection.

Just so he's

clear, he gave it to us and we gave it to Mr. Schwenke
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1

and he gave it to Mr. Wade.

2
3

Q

(By Mr. Nelson)

Did that check in fact

clear your account?

4

A

I think so.

5

Q

When is the first time you became aware

6

that there might have been an alteration to that

7

document?

8
9
10

A

When Stan Wade called me one day and

asked me to pull the check out and look at it. And I
did that.

11

Q

12

in the fall of 1990?

13

A

It very well could have been.

14

Q

Prior to that time you had no idea that

15

Would that have been about a year ago,

there had been an alteration to that check?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

Have you taken any steps to attempt to

18

determine from the bank if they are willing to take any

19

responsibility for the cashing of that check?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Have you done anything to attempt to

22

determine if someone else should return the funds for

23

that check?

24

A

25

I've had discussions with my attorney.

But other than that, nothing.
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1
2

MR. NELSON:

I think that's all the

questions I have, Your Honor.

3

MR. CROCKETT:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. NELSON:

10

13
14

I would like to call Mr.

STANLEY L. WADE
having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on
his oath as follows:

11
12

Thank

Wade to the stand.

8
9

You may step down.

you, Mr. Stangl.

6
7

I have nothing.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NELSON:
Q

Would you state your full name, please,

for the record.

15

A

Stanley Wade.

16

Q

Mr. Wade, did you execute a document in

17

1978 which is in front of you as Exhibit "A", wherein

18

you agreed to purchase some property from Mr. Stangl

19

located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah?

20

A

I don't see Exhibit "A".

Okay. Yes.

21

Q

Prior to signing that document did you

22

ever have any discussion with Mr. Wade on the method

23

upon which -- with Mr. Stangl —

24

discussions with him as to the method that would be

25

used to prorate taxes on the property?

did you have any
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1

A

No, I did not.

2

Q

Did you ever have a discussion with Mr.

3

Stangl on how the property taxes should be prorated?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Could you tell me very briefly when the

6

first of those three occurred.

7

A

8

after the first year.

9

Q

10

There was approximately three.

Right when I received the tax notice,

Would that have been before or after

this 1980 conversation that Mr. Stangl —

11

A

That would be after.

12

Q

Where did that occur?

13

A

At his office.

14

Q

Who was present?

15

A

Mr. and Mr. Stangl.

16

Q

Tell me briefly what was said by him.

17

A

Basically I said, "I don't quite

18

understand these property taxes."

I says, "You know

19

they are based on square footage."

And I says, "You

20

know this is not acceptable.

21

to be based on, you know, value."

22

—"

23

In other words, you know, I will pay my portion and you

24

pay your portion."

25

I thought it was supposed
And he said, "Well

And I said, "Why don't we break the parcel out.

He said, "Well, I really don't want to do
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1

that because what will happen is that we'll both end up

2

paying more."

3

Q

All right.

4

A

And then basically he said, you know, I

5

figure -- well, on a square foot — we had another

6

reason also.

7

building on it, and I was planning on building and

8

maybe possibly putting a development in the back, too.

9

Q

We were negotiating -- he was planning on

Mr. Wade, let me just ask you to relate

10

the portions of the conversation that related to the

11

method in which he and you wanted to apportion taxes.

12

You just testified that he indicated that you made some

13

objection to that method.

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

The method that he suggested.

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And that he said he wanted to do it the

18

square footage way?

19

A

Yes. He said that's the way he — yes.

20

Q

Did you agree at that time to do it on

21

the square footage assessment?

22

A

No.

23

Q

When was the next conversation or the

24
25

second conversation of the three you mentioned?
A

It was approximately —

it was about
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1

another six or seven months after that,

2

Q

Where did that conversation take place.

3

A

Same place.

4

Q

Who was present?

5

A

Me and Mr. Stangl.

6

Q

And again on this topic, tell me again

7

what was said and by whom.

8
9

A

I basically said that the property taxes

are not -- I won't accept them the way, you know, you

10

are breaking them out.

11

don't like it, get out of the bank."

12
13

Q

And he basically said, "If you

Do you know what he meant by, "Get out

of the bank"?

14

A

I don't know.

And he said, "If you

15

don't like the contract the way I'm doing it, get — "

16

I guess -- discontinue it or whatever.

17

he did.

18

do something about —

19

something like that.

20

Q

And that's what

He sent me some documents saying that to -- to
discontinuing the contract, or

Did you, at that second meeting, which

21

was actually the third meeting if you count the one Mr.

22

Stangl testified to.

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Did you agree to pay taxes based on the

25

square footage basis?
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1

A

No.

2

Q

Describe for me when the third meeting

3
4
5

you just indicated took place.
A

It was approximately about another six

or seven months, I guess. Approximately.

After that.

6

Q

Did it take place in his office?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

You and he were present?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And again, tell me what was said by

11
12

either you or Mr. Stangl.
A

Basically the same thing.

We talked

13

about the property taxes again, because he said, "Well,

14

the payments on the property taxes have not been

15

adjusted correctly," and he said that his wife was

16

handling that, and handling it in a certain way, and

17

that he was -- there was a possibility of him

18

separating it for tax purposes.

19
20

Q

At that meeting did you agree to pay

taxes based upon square footage?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Mr. Wade, have you ever agreed with Mr.

23

Stangl to apportion taxes on these properties based on

24

a square foot tax apportionment?

25

A

No.

1

Q

Can you tell me then why the first year

2

when he sent you a request based upon a square footage

3

tax you paid it to him?

4

A

The reason I paid the taxes at that time

5

is to eliminate the hassles.

Because we were talking

6

about developing the ground.

And at that time I

7

figured that it wouldn't be —

8

would happen in the next year, whatever, and I didn't

9

want to argue with him anymore.

10

Q

you know, that something

Did you also believe that the property

11

the next year could be split off into two separate

12

taxing parcels?

13

A

Yes, I did.

14

Q

So then are you telling me that the

15

reason you paid the amount he asked was just to avoid

16

the hassle for that one year?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And then you said it was paid the same

19

way for the next two years. Why did you do that?

20

A

Same reasons.

21

Q

Did you ask him to separate it into two

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Tell me when you asked him to do that.

25

A

I asked him the second time I talked to

22

parcels?
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1

him about the taxes.

2

Q

What did he say about that?

3

A

He said, "It wouldn't do you any good,

4

because all they are going to do is raise the taxes and

5

we are both going to end up paying more."

6

"You don't want to do that."

And he says,

7

Q

Did you agree with that?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Did you again ask him to split them off?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Did there ever come a time when you got

12

a tax assessment and you asked him if he would please

13

appeal the taxes?

14
15
16

A

No.

I never received a tax assessment

on the property.
Q

Did there ever come a time during the

17

period they were asking for taxes that you asked him to

18

appeal the taxes?

19

A

The assessment, yes.

20

Q

When did that occur?

21

A

Well, approximately the third

22

conversation that I had with Mr. Stangl.

23

Q

Was that in 1980, '81 era?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

What did he say?
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1

A

He said he wasn't interested.

He said

2

that the taxes were figured about what he figured them

3

to be, and if they got involved in any type of appeal

4

they would probably just end up raising them.

5

Q

You entered into this transaction with

6

Mr. Stangl, and at that time did he comment to you

7

about the value of the property that he had remaining.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

What did he tell you?

10

A

He told me and gave me a contract for

11

the Tolman property that he was paying $50,000 an acre,

12

and that he had no use for the back piece of property,

13

and that I bought another piece of property from him

14

and would I be interested in buying, you know, that

15

piece.

16

it to you for $30,000 an acre."

17

that's a good price, but you said $50,000 an acre."

18

said, "Well, all 1 am interested in is the front

19

footage.

20

commercial piece and it's worth that much more to me."

21

And I said yes, and he said, "Well, I'll sell
And I says, "Geez,
He

I'll put commercial buildings on the front

Q

On Exhibit "C" in front of you, Mr.

22

Wade, if you will turn to that, that's the map showing

23

the general relationship of the properties to each

24

other.

25

A

Yes.
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1

Q

Do you see that?

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

And at the top there is this

4

right-of-way piece of approximately half an acre?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Is it your understanding that you were

7

purchasing the fee ownership of that parcel?

8

A

No.

9

Q

What is your understanding?

10

A

My understanding was that I would buy

11

the back portion of the property based on $30,000 an

12

acre, and that Stangl would provide a 50 foot

13

right-of-way for me for that particular piece.

14

Q

This morning you and I calculated what

15

$40,00 an acre would be for the 6.87 acre parcel in the

16

back, and it turned that it comes out to about

17

$206,100, does it not?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Was it your understanding that you were

20

to receive a right-of-way only across this half acre

21

parcel at the top of Exhibit "C", or fee ownership?

22

A

Only a right-of-way.

23

Q

I notice that the exhibits in front of

24

you, which are listed as Exhibits M B M and "D", purport

25

to be legal descriptions prepared by Bush & Gudgell in,
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1

I think, November of 1986.

2

the document.

At least that's the date on

Do you see those?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Did you participate in hiring Bush &

5

Gudgell to do that?

6

A

No.

7

Q

To the best of your knowledge did the

8

legal descriptions attached on Exhibit "BM and "D"

9

accurately reflect the arrangement between yourself and

10

Mr. Stangl?

11

A

I think so.

12

Q

And I note that on Exhibit "B", which is

13

the property on the 6.87 acres, it then says, "subject

14

to a 50 foot right-of-way."

15

drafting of that language?

Were you involved in the

16

A

No.

17

Q

Again, just for the court, what was your

18

understanding about the right-of-way?

Did you own a

19

right-of-way, or fee simple title to it?

20

A

I owned a right-of-way.

21

Q

Who owns fee title to that, in your

23

A

Stangl.

24

Q

Mr. Wade, you have heard testimony

22

25

opinion?

regarding this check of $52,000 that was given by Mr.
72

1

Stangl to Mr. Schwenke*

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

Did you ever receive any of that money?

4

A

No.

5

Q

When was the first time you knew that

6

the check had been tendered to Mr, Schwenke?

7
8

A

It was approximately, I think, in

January of 1990 —

or '91.

9

Q

This year?

10

A

Yes, I think so.

11

Q

So more than a year after the check had

Or December.

12

been tendered and allegedly cashed, you found out about

13

it.

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And is it your testimony that you have

16

received none of that money?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

That is your testimony?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Did you receive a credit with Mr.

21

Schwenke for his receipt of that money?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Did you owe Mr. Schwenke any money on

24
25

November 28, 1989?
A

No.
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1
2

MR. NELSON:
have.

3
4

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROCKETT;

5
6

That's all the questions I

Q

Mr. Wade, I'll hand you what has been

marked as Exhibit "Y" to this case.

7

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, I would

8

request the court to take judicial notice that we

9

checked on Exhibit "Y" before, and Mr. Wade —

there is

10

a signed copy in the file by Mr. Wade as of that date.

11

This was a copy Mr. Schwenke delivered to us

12

with the Exhibit "S". We had an argument before Judge

13

Rokich, Mr. Nelson and I both looked at the original, I

14

showed him there was a signed copy in the file of this.

15

Do you recall that?

16

MR. NELSON:

17

don't recall that.

18

for itself.

19

I'm sorry, Your Honor, I

But I'm sure the file will speak

Mr. Wade can testify whether he signed it.
THE COURT:

I'm going to take judicial

20

notice of that based on the representation of Mr.

21

Crockett.

22

have to bring it to my attention.

And so if that is incorrect, you're going to

23

MR. NELSON:

24

MR. CROCKETT:

25

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.
Okay.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Sir, did you sign
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1

Exhibit HYM?

2

A

I don't recall.

I could have done.

3

Q

That's an affidavit to the court, and an

4

affidavit is something, you know, where you put your

5

credibility on the line; is that correct?

6
7

A
don't recall.

8
9
10

15

Okay.

Your Honor, given

the representation and subject to someone proving me
wrong about signing, we'll offer Exhibit "Y",
MR. NELSON:

Based on what's been said,

I have no objection, Your Honor.

13
14

Like I say, I

This is too long ago.
MR. CROCKETT:

11
12

I probably did sign it.

THE COURT:

All right.

Exhibit M Y M is

received.
Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Sir, Exhibit "Y" is

16

an affidavit that you signed, which in paragraph -- or

17

which was signed on or about March 25, 1990. In

18

paragraph 8 you state that you have paid costs as

19

itemized by your attorney in his affidavit in support

20

of this motion for summary judgment.

21

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, I would offer

22

-- I would ask the court to mark Mr. Schwenke's

23

affidavit.

24
25

(Marked for identification)
MR. CROCKETT:

Which was submitted with
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1

the same motion, Exhibit "S". This has now been marked

2

as Exhibit "Z".

3
4

THE COURT:

Let's just make sure this is

clear.

5

MR. CROCKETT:

6

Q

All right,

(By Mr. Crockett)

Let me show you the

7

original from the file, Mr. Wade, of Exhibit "Y". Tell

8

me whether or not this is your signature.

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Maybe that would be best.

11

signature?

12
13

Is that your

(Indicating)

A

That is my signature.

It looks like it.

I —

14

THE COURT:

The record should indicate

15

that I have just shown Mr. Wade the original from the

16

official court file of Exhibit "Y".

17
18

MR. CROCKETT:
Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Sir, in your

19

affidavit you indicate, as I pointed out, in paragraph

20

8, that "I have also paid costs as itemized by my

21

attorney in his affidavit in support of this motion for

22

summary judgment, ExhibitH Z"."

23

Is the affidavit of Mr. Schwenke which is

24

submitted with the same motion that has attached to it

25

attorney's fees and costs, and you have before you
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1

Exhibit "Z", do you not?

2

A

This one here.

3

Q

Yes.

4

A

Okay.

5

Q

Is that the document you were referring

6

to that you had reviewed, that you were swearing to the

7

court you had reviewed?

8
9

A
—

No.

I'm not —

I don't —

like I say, I

I don't remember this document.

10

Q

Is your testimony such that you did not

12

A

No, I'm not denying it, or whatever.

13

don't know.

14

Q

You just don't remember either way; is

A

Correct.

11

15

review it?
I

I don't remember this document.

that fair?

16
17

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, I would argue

18

from this, but let me point out something to you, Mr.

19

Wade.

20

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

If you look at the

21

document that your affidavit says that you read, it

22

includes services performed by Mr. Schwenke on your

23

behalf that postdate the March date wherein he

24

purportedly filed the Notice of Withdrawal, the one

25

that we said we didn't get.
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1

There are services postdating that which go

2

through the end of 1990. Do you see that list of

3

services there?

4

A

Okay.

5

Q

Let me —

6

MR. CROCKETT:

7

to him, Your Honor?

8

this.

9
10

You've lost me.

I want to get his testimony on

MR. NELSON:
Q

May I just point them out

Do you want a stipulation?

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Schwenke

11

indicated -- or in this Notice of Withdrawal which was

12

filed there is an indication it was mailed in March of

13

1989, or served in March of 1989.

14

After March of 1989 there are a number of

15

services that Mr. Schwenke performed on your behalf; is

16

that correct?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Didn't you authorize Mr. Schwenke to

19

bring the appeal to the Supreme Court?

20

A

No, I did not.

21

Q

Did you know the appeal was going on in

22

the Supreme Court?

23

A

I don't recall that I did.

24

Q

Would you like to change the result?

25

A

Pardon?

Maybe.

I don't know.

I —
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1

Q

You're saying you didn't even know the

2

appeal was going on?

3

A

That's correct.

4

Q

You knew as of March of 1989 that you

5

had paid over $50,000 just on the one garnishment

6

alone, didn't you?

7

A

No.

8

Q

You didn't know we had garnished your

9

funds at the bank?

10

A

No.

When was that?

11

Q

As of — Mr. Wade, we garnished your

12

funds sometime prior to the appeal.

13

resulted in Stangl being required to return to you the

14

garnished funds.

15
16

Are you testifying now that you didn't even
know the funds were garnished?

17
18
19

The appeal

A

I'm saying I don't recall that.

That's

Q

If you look at your — well, look at Mr.

correct.

20

Schwenke's affidavit, which in your affidavit you say

21

you read, and look at the last item in paragraph 9

22

which says, "Lost interest from seizing funds, $5,750."

23

What does that refer to that you verified?

24

A

I don't know.

25

Q

Why did you verify this document, if
79

1

you --

2

A

I don't know if I verified that

3

document.

4

seen that document.

5

signature, because Mr. Paul Schwenke has forged my

6

signature on several documents, and approximately

7

$3,000 checks.

8
9

I cannot say that —

I don't know that I've

I can't even say that's my

Mr. Schwenke has committed fraud in several
things, and I have no knowledge.

10

MR. CROCKETT:

Would you mark these as

11

the next exhibit in order, please.

12

affidavit filed.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CROCKETT:

15

The date of that affidavit.
The date of that

affidavit is January 15, 1990.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR,. CROCKETT:

18

This is the later

1990?
Excuse me.

January 15,

1991.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

MR. CROCKETT:

That is Mr. Wade and, you

21

have Mr. Udall's. We would offer Exhibit "Z", by the

22

way, Your Honor, which is Mr. Schwenke —

23

think the court can take judicial notice of it.

24

a pleading in the file. Mr. Schwenke filed Exhibit

25

"Z". But since we are referring to it, we would offer

actually, I
It is
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1

it to make it easier should there be subsequent

2

hearings on this matter.

3

MR. NELSON:

I have no objection to it

4

being introduced as an exhibit.

5

court file would reflect that's been filed, since the

6

exhibit is a conformed copy.

7

purports to be a conformed copy, I have no objection to

8

its entry.

9
10

THE COURT:

And only to the extent it

This is "Z" you are talking

about?
That is "Z M .

11

MR. NELSON:

12

MR. CROCKETT:

13

I assume that the

The affidavit of Mr.

Schwenke.

14

THE COURT:

"Z" is received.

Judicial

15

notice is also taken of "Z" as a copy of the original

16

document.

17

document appearing in the court file, then you can

18

bring that to my attention again.

And if there is not such an original

19

MR. CROCKETT:

20

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Wade, let me show

21

you Exhibit "AA", and ask you if that is your

22

signature.

23
24
25

THE COURT: Now, this is a copy of the
original?
MR. CROCKETT: Yes.
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1
2

THE WITNESS:
probably not my signature.

3
4

I would say that is

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

A

That's correct.

This is not your

signature?

5
6

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, this is the

7

affidavit upon which Judge Rokich granted relief from

8

the judgment that had previously been entered.

9

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Do you have any

10

information as to how this document purportedly ended

11

up bearing your signature?

12

A

I have no idea.

I'm not saying that's

13

not my signature.

14

ever seeing this affidavit.

15

saying that doesn't look like my signature.

16

I'm saying it's -- I don't recall

MR. NELSON:

And I'm also recalling

To the extent counsel has

17

indicated that this was the document that Judge Rokich

18

relied upon, I will object.

19

correct statement.

20

submitted, but I don't know that Mr. Crockett is aware

21

of the reasons why Judge Rokich ruled.

22

comment, Your Honor.

24

extent.

25

It may have been a document

MR. CROCKETT:

23

Q

I don't think that's a

I think that's a fair

I would so modify it to that

(By Mr. Crockett)

So it's your position
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1

you don't recall ever even seeing Exhibit "AAM; is that

2

correct?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Who did you retain to represent you in

5

That's correct.

Absolutely.

this initially against Mr. Stangl?

6

A

Initially it was Paul Schwenke.

7

Q

Do you believe in March of 1989 Mr.

8

Schwenke withdrew as your counsel?

9

A

Pardon?

10

Q

Did you believe in March of 1989 that

11

Mr. Schwenke withdrew as your counsel?

12

A

Absolutely.

14

Q

Who did you get to replace him?

15

A

I didn't have any attorney.

16

Q

What did you do in order to protect your

13

a copy

He told me he did.

Sent me

—

17

position in this case when you thought Mr. Schwenke had

18

withdrawn?

19

A

I tried to talk to Mr. Stangl directly.

20

Q

Did you do anything other than try to

21

talk to Mr. Stangl?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Did you do anything to keep track of

24
25

what was going on with this case in this court?
A

No.
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1

Q

Are you telling us that the bank didn't

2

even notify you when your funds were garnished?

3

that correct?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Who is Rosemary Moffat?

6

A

(No response)

7

MR. CROCKETT:

8

MR. NELSON:

9

THE WITNESS:

10

Is

Is that the name?
Robin Moffat.
I do not know who that

is.

11

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

How did it come about

12

that you decided you needed a lawyer in this case after

13

March of 1989, as of the point in time that —

14

the first time that you knew you had actually hired

15

somebody else is when you would have hired Mr. Nelson;

16

is that correct?

I guess

17

A

That's correct.

18

Q

What event brought this to your

A

What this event was, I had called and

19
20

attention?

21

went down and met with Mr. Stangl again about these

22

property taxes.

23

interested in buying the ground.

24

there was —

25

get a deed to clear it up, and I wanted to get some

Because I had someone that was
And the ground down

I needed a Warranty Deed and I wanted to
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1

problems resolved.

2

So I talked to Mr. Stangl about getting this

3

property tax resolved, and he said, basically, "If you

4

don't like the situation, get out of the bank."

5

I mean, that's the way he treated me.

So I

6

sent another gentleman to talk to him, Enoch Valdista,

7

and I asked him to talk to Mr. Stangl.

8

Q

Why didn't you just hire --

9

A

That's what I'm trying to explain to

11

Q

Sure.

12

A

And so after I —

10

you.

first of all, I don't

13

care for attorneys.

I try to handle everything myself.

14

And that's exactly what I was trying to do.

15

Enoch Valdista came back to me and said, "Stangl isn't

16

going to budge, you know, and you've got a problem."

17

At that time I never sent Stangl any more checks on

18

paying the property taxes, because they were in

19

dispute.

20

attorney through Enoch Valdista, and his name was Paul

21

Schwenke.

And at that time —

And after

so then I found an

22

Q

You are missing my question.

23

A

I'm sorry.

24

Q

We know Mr. Schwenke represented you

25

from the beginning of this lawsuit up until when you

1

contend was March of 1989, when he gave you this notice

2

of withdrawal.

3

A

Okay.

4

Q

Then subsequent, at some point in time,

5

Mr. Nelson was retained because he was sitting in the

6

courtroom.

7

A

That's right.

8

Q

You had no knowledge of any lawyer

9

representing you in between March of 19 — March of

10

1989 and the time that Mr. Nelson came in to represent

11

you in this case.

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

What occurred when you finally

14

hired Mr. Nelson, what occurred that made you decide

15

maybe you had better get representation again?

16

A

Because I received a notice in the mail

17

-- or I'm not sure.

18

well, I'm not sure.

I just don't know.

I think --

19

Oh, I think I know what the problem was.

20

Q

If you can answer my question, please do

22

A

I think my answer is because I became

23

aware of the $52,000.

24

Q

How did you become aware of that?

25

A

What happened was that the bank — we

21

so.
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1

had a CD in Deseret Federal Savings, and it was a five

2

year CD.

3

another bank.

4

time when they took it over they sent us a notice that

5

we had a balance of about $2,500 in that account.

And Deseret Federal Savings was bought out by
I'm not sure who it was.

And at that

6

So we notified the bank and told them that

7

there must be a mistake here, "We have a CD in there

8

that's over fifty some odd thousand dollars."

9

And they said, well, I'm sorry, you know,

10

it's missing.

11

and they traced it back and said that there was a

12

garnishment made back at that time.

13

So we went back and talked to the bank

That's how we found out about it.

And when

14

the garnishment was made we found the check, and that's

15

when I called Stangl up on the phone and asked him

16

about the check.

17

back."

18

And when I found out that Stangl had paid that back,

19

then I contacted an attorney, which was Mr. Bruce

20

Nelson.

21

And he said, "Well, I paid that

Because we thought it was the IRS garnishment.

MR. CROCKETT:

22

minute.

23

comes as a complete surprise.

24

documents here.

25

Your Honor, may I take a

I have to admit that some of this testimony

THE COURT:

I want to look at some

All right.

Do you want to
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1

take a recess?

2

MR. CROCKETT:

Yes.

It will not take

3

more than 15 minutes to complete the examination, I

4

don't think.

5

minutes, I think that will do it.

If you will give me just a couple of

6
7

THE COURT:
minutes, or so.

8
9

We'll be in recess for five

(Whereupon, court in recess from 11:55 a.m.
to 12:10 p.m.)

10

MR. CROCKETT:

I have a suggestion that

11

may save some time.

Our position would be that it

12

doesn't matter whether or not he signed the affidavit.

13

Our position would be that as a litigant he had a

14

responsibility beyond March of 1989 when Mr. Schwenke

15

withdrew to do something.

16

or unless he proves that we had notice of withdrawal,

17

agency would still apply.

And unless he does something

18

If the court deems we are wrong in that, what

19

I would suggest is that we go ahead and get hold of the

20

notary public that signed on his signature on the

21

affidavit, and various things like that, and see what

22

evidence there is about his subsequent knowledge of the

23

case.

24

surprise to both Mr. Nelson and me, but I really think

25

it does not go to the issue that's involved here.

I think the testimony has come as a complete
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1

But that's something the court has to decide.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. NELSON:

Mr. Nelson.
If that's offered by way of

4

stipulation, I don't think that I agree with his legal

5

arguments.

6
7

But I have no problem handling it that way.
THE COURT:

All right.

We'll handle it

that way.

8

MR. CROCKETT:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm assuming, though, that

10

there is going to be more elaborate argument on those

11

legal theories when we get to that point.

12
13
14

MR. CROCKETT:

I think that's fair, Your

Honor.
Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Mr. Wade, you paid

15

your share of the taxes on the property for 1978, '79,

16

'80 and '81; is that correct?

17

A

I think I paid more than my share.

18

Q

Well, I understand that's your position,

19

but you paid property taxes for those years.

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

In each of those four years your

22

property taxes were calculated on an allocated basis,

23

based on the square footage; is that correct?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

All right.

And in fact you paid it on
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1

that basis?

You knew you were paying it on that basis,

2

didn't you?

3

A

Yes,

4

Q

And the letters your received from the

5

Stangls or Mrs. Stangl indicated that you were paying

6

on that allocated square foot basis, did they not?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

So there was never a time that you

9
10

believed you were being charged on anything other than
a square footage basis; is that also correct?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Sir, did you ever object in writing to

13

paying on anything other than a square foot basis?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And what is that writing?

16

A

My wife wrote -- I think there were two

17

or three years to let Mr. Stangl know.

18

Q

Do you have those letters?

19

A

I think so.

20

Q

Why didn't you produce them?

21

A

I didn't know it was necessary.

22

Q

Well, we served a request for production

23

early on in this case.

24

you had to your lawyer?

25

A

Did you give all the documents

No, I did not.
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1

Q

Why not?

2

A

Because I got some other problems.

3

Q

Your IRS problems?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

You were convicted of fraud; is that

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Is that conviction currently existing?

9

A

What do you mean?

10

Q

Well, was that upheld on appeal?

6

11

correct?

What

is the status?

12

A

It's on appeal.

13

Q

And that was in the federal court; is

14

that correct?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

But did you intentionally withhold,

17

then, some of the documents from your lawyer?

18

A

Absolutely not.

19

Q

You just didn't give them these letters

20

you think your wife may have written contesting this.

21
22

A
—

First of all, I haven 't been here. So

there are some other problems.

23

Q

I'm not sure I understand you.

24

A

Well, I'm saying, I've given the

25

documents that I thought —

I'm sure there are other
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1
2
3

documents that I've not given to the attorney.
Q

Okay.

Okay.

You say you asked Mr. Stangl to

split the property?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Do you have before you anything in

6
7

writing where you made such a request?
A

I think in one of the letters, yes.

8

of the letters that my wife wrote —

9

Elizabeth Stangl, yes.

10
11

Q

well, wrote to

Would this be one of the letters that

you don't currently have and haven't provided?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Thank you.

14

One

You bought another property

from Mr. Stangl, didn't you?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

That other property had the same

17

situation where it was rear footage and you had a

18

right-of-way; is that correct?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Excuse me.

The other property had rear

21

footage and you had a strip of land over which Mr.

22

Stangl had a right-of-way; is that correct?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Did you have any frontage on the other

25

piece of property?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Was the footage that you took the rear?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

So whether it was a right-of-way or

5

something else, you obtained a corridor to get to your

6

property in the rear; correct?

7

A

No.

8

Q

How did you get to your property?

9

A

Through the front.

10

the street.

11

Q

The whole property was frontage?

12

A

Yes.

13
14

It fronted right on

6895 South 2300 East.

It was on

23rd East.
Q

Sir, in this case you had previously

15

taken the position that you need pay no taxes

16

whatsoever, have you not?

17

A

No.

18

Q

You have always contended you owed

19

taxes, but you just disagreed with how it was done?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Mr. Wade, I'm almost afraid to ask this,

22

but I'm going to hand you some answers to

23

interrogatories which you purportedly verified, which

24

have been marked as Exhibit "BB".

25

to Your Honor.

I will give a copy
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Which is Exhibit MBB". Now, this is during

1
2

the period of time that you admit that Mr. Schwenke was

3

acting as your attorney, and that is in 1988; is that

4

correct?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

Does that bear your signature on the

8

A

It looks like it, kind of.

9

Q

Sir, would you look at the response to

7

10

last page?

interrogatory number 1, and to interrogatory number 2.

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

"Do you contend that you are responsible

13

to pay any of the taxes for the years 1978 through 1987

14

on the property that is the subject matter of the

15

lawsuit?"

16

Your response.

Answer:

"Plaintiff contends

17

he's not responsible for property taxes during the

18

contract period.

19

taxes after the contract period, which taxes cannot be

20

discerned as long as the defendant continues to

21

wrongfully withhold delivering of a warranty deed to

22

the plaintiff."

Plaintiff might be responsible for

23

Do you see that answer?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Well, that's your signature, or you said
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1

it kind of looks like it.

Do you recall verifying that

2

answer as setting forth your position?

3

A

I do not.

4

Q

You deny that was your position?

5

A

I'm not denying that, no.

6

Q

You just don't know if it was your

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

So you don't recall if the position you

7

position?

10

originally took in this case is that you don't owe any

11

taxes, or that you owe some?

12

A

13
14

That's correct.
MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, we would

offer Exhibits MAAM and "BB" .

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. NELSON: No.

17

THE COURT:

18

Q

Objections?

"AA" and "BB" are received.

(By Mr. Crockett)

Sir, you testified on

19

direct that you believe you have fee ownership of the

20

right-of-way.

21

How is it —

Well, strike that.

Have you bought other

22

properties?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

You are aware of the fact that rights-

25

of-way don't just spring into existence, that it takes
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1

a document to do that, are you not?

2

A

No, I'm not aware of that.

3

Q

Do you think they just come into

4

existence --

5
6

They are apparently —

they are just put

Q

They are put on there with a deed or

on there.

7
8

A

something, aren't they?

9

A

I'm not aware of that.

10

Q

I take it, then, if I asked you why you

11

didn't get some sort of a document, if you contend the

12

right-of-way was separate from the parcel you were

13

buying, your answer is going to be that you just didn't

14

think about it.

15

A

No.

I probably —

I may have asked

16

Stangl about it.

Stangl was handling this.

17

up the contract.

He's the one that did everything on

18

it.

19

was on the left —

on the right, and Stangl told me

20

everything to do.

He told me what to do, when to do

21

it, how to do it.

I believed in him 100%.

22
23

He wrote

He's the one that put the right-of-way where it

Q

You bought that property to put an

apartment building on it, didn't you?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Well, those were your plans, to put some
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1

apartment dwellings there?

2

A

Maybe, eventually.

3

Q

You were aware, were you not, that you

4

had to have frontage to put an apartment building

5

there?

6

A

No.

7

Q

Did that ever come to your attention?

8

A

Sure.

9

Q

To put an apartment building up you had

10

to have frontage, did you not?

11

A

No.

12

Q

I see.

13

You are arguing that you don't

need frontage to put up an apartment building.

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

Have you done anything with the County

16

to determine whether you need frontage?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

What?

19

A

Built a couple of buildings in the

21

Q

Where?

22

A

4388 Highland Drive, 4370 Highland

20

23

County.

Drive, 2250 East 33rd South, and 6895 South 23rd East.

24
25

Q

Don't each of those properties have

frontage?
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1

A

No. Well, it depends on what you call

2

frontage.

The one at 6895 South has relatively no

3

frontage.

It has -- when I say relatively no frontage,

4

it kind of has a right-of-way that goes to the back.

5

Is that what you mean?

6

talking about.

I don't understand what you are

7

Q

Do you own the frontage on that one?

8

A

Do I own -- pardon.

9

Q

Do you own the frontage?

10

MR. NELSON:

Objection.

Mr. Crockett

11

should define frontage.

12

whether he's talking about access or frontage.

13

MR. CROCKETT:

14

that one, Your Honor.

15

some time.

16

I'm personally confused as to

Q

I'll call Mr. Stangl on

That way we'll be able to save

(By Mr. Crockett) After Mr. Schwenke

17

purportedly told you he had withdrawn in March of 1989,

18

did you make any efforts to get in touch with me or

19

anyone else representing Mr. Stangl?

20

A

21

I always talked to —

22

his name was Dee Long on 33rd South.

23

he had to do a little checking into it.

24
25

I tried to get in touch with Mr. Stangl.
contacted another attorney, and
And he said that

And then he contacted me later and said

it

was too complicated for him.
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1

Q

That wasn't my question.

My question

2

was, did you do anything to get in touch with me or Mr.

3

Stangl?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Did you in fact talk to Mr. Stangl?

6

A

Yes, I did.

7

Q

Did you ever tell me or Mr. Stangl that

8

Mr. Schwenke was no longer representing you?

9

A

Yes, I did.

10

Q

When was that, sir?

11

A

That was —

12

Q

Of 1989?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

So it was before the time you received

15

I think it was before March.

the notice of withdrawal?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

How would you know that Mr. Schwenke was

18

no longer representing you if it was prior to the time

19

of your receipt of the notice of withdrawal?

20

A

Because he told me -- I requested that

21

he withdraw because of the problems that we were

22

starting to have.

23

him.

24
25

Q

That I was starting to have with

You're telling us that you told Mr.

Schwenke in the first part of '89 that Mr. Schwenke no
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1

longer represented you?

2

A

I didn't tell Mr. Schwenke.

4

Q

You told Stangl that?

5

A

Yes.

3

Stangl.

6

MR. CROCKETT:

7

questions of this witness.

8

MR. NELSON:

9

MR. CROCKETT:

10

I have no further

I have none.
I call Mr. -- I'm sorry,

it's still your case.

11
12

I told

THE COURT:

You may step down.

Thank

you for your testimony.

13

MR. NELSON:

At this point I guess we

14

either need a stipulation of counsel or some direction

15

from the court.

16

court as to how the property was to be valued for tax

17

purposes.

18

We have presented an issue to the

If the court rules that the parties had an

19

agreement as to dividing that property tax assessment

20

by square footage, then we don't need to get into the

21

value of the property.

22

If you rule that no such agreement existed,

23

then you need to determine the values of the property

24

for purposes of assessment, and I have to put on some

25

evidence as to that.
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1

I would suggest that we handle that by

2

finishing this phase of the case, having you make a

3

ruling before we determine whether the other evidence

4

is necessary,

5

MR. CROCKETT:

6

THE COURT:

7

All right.

We will proceed

in accordance with your suggestion.

8
9

I agree, Your Honor.

MR. CROCKETT:

I call Mr. Stangl as a

rebuttal witness.

10

THE COURT:

11

you are still under oath?

12

MR. STANGL:

13

Mr. Stangl, do you realize

Yes.

F. C. STANGL,

14

having been previously sworn, was examined and

15

testified on his oath as follows:

16
17
18

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CROCKETT:
Q

Mr. Stangl, did Mr. Wade, in 1989, or

19

any time prior thereto, ever tell you that Mr. Schwenke

20

did not represent him?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Did you have any kind of conversation or

23

anything remotely like that?

24

A

No, sir.

25

Q

Thank you, sir.

Is there any kind of a
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1

requirement — you build a lot of apartment buildings;

2

is that correct?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Sir, is there any kind of a requirement

5

for frontage when building an apartment building?

6

A

Yes.

Especially in Sandy City.

They

7

have a requirement that you have to have frontage on a

8

dedicated street or a permit for any type of dwelling

9

of any kind.

And Stan and I talked about that, and

10

Stan knew that.

11

frontage on 700 East as it related to this property.

12

That was the reason for the tongue, the 50 foot wide

13

tongue that went onto 7th East.

14

retain a right-of-way for me over that property that I

15

was selling him so that I could access the building and

16

the property that I had left after I sold to him.

17

Q

And Stan knew that he had to have

And we needed to

To your knowledge, did you ever receive

18

any kind of a writing from Mr. Wade objecting to a

19

square footage apportionment of these property taxes?

20
21
22
23

A

I never did receive a notice.

I never

Q

Had you received that kind of thing,

did.

would that have come to your attention?

24

A

It would have.

25

Q

The other property that you sold to Mr.
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1

Wade, would you describe that property.

2

A

Yes, sir.

I purchased a 20 acre parcel

3

on the corner of 70th South and 23rd East.

4

less than 20 acres, from a person by the name of Smith.

5

Something

I sold the smaller piece to Utah Power &

6

Light.

I kept some frontage on 70th South, and I

7

created a right-of-way between me and the property that

8

I sold to Stan Wade.

9

That was contiguous, though, that

10

right-of-way, and the part that I sold to him was on

11

the north side of the right of way.

12

frontage —

13

frontage on 23rd East.

14

Salt Lake County created a right-of-way across his

15

property, of his own, to his apartment in the back.

16

But also had the right-of-way that was a right-of-way

17

between his property and my property that accesses both

18

his and mine.

19

Q

That property had

the property that I sold to Stan had

Okay.

Stan kept a piece of property.

Sir, would you pull up the

20

stipulation and look at Exhibit "F". Do you have that

21

in front of you?

22

A

I do.

23

Q

Exhibit "F" is a property tax

24

evaluation.

25

A

It is.
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1

Q

For what year?

2

A

For 1982.

3

Q

What does that put as the value of the

A

It puts the value at 9.63 acres, which

4

property?

5
6

was the total parcel that I originally purchased from

7

Tolman.

8

The total value, market value, $212,350.00.

9

Q

10
11
12

paid Tolman for the same property?
A

MR. CROCKETT:

17

No further questions,

Your Honor.

15
16

That's less than half of what I paid

Tolman for the same property.

13
14

And was that substantially less than you

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NELSON:
Q

Could you define what you mean by

18

frontage when you were discussing the answer to Mr.

19

Crockett's question.

20

A

Yes.

It's where the ownership in a

21

person's possession is contiguous with a property

22

that's a dedicated street.

23

as frontage for real property.

24
25

Q

That's normally referred to

And hypothetically, if you own the

parcel that Mr. Wade owns and you own the right-of-way
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1

property so that there's access to go over and cross

2

that right-of-way, under your definition do you own

3

frontage?

4

A

It's not necessarily what my definition

5

is, as much as it is Sandy's definition.

6

defines it such that unless your ownership to the fee

7

of your property is contiguous with the dedicated

8

street, they will not issue a permit to you.

9

Q

And Sandy

I asked you to define what you meant by

10

frontage.

Are you telling me you define it the same

11

way that Sandy City does?

12

A

13

you that definition.

14

what I said.

15

the fee to property and that fee is consistent with a

16

dedicated —

17

referred to as frontage property.

18

Q

I define it the way I just did.

I gave

Read it back to me and tell me

Basically it's consistent that if you own

contiguous to a dedicated street, it's

Is it your understanding that a fee

19

ownership to this parcel we have called a right-of-way

20

property is to be transferred to Mr. Wade when you give

21

him a Warranty Deed?

22

A

That's correct.

23

Q

Is that the way you've always understood

A

Yes.

24
25

it?
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1

Q

Doesn't the agreement that you signed,

2

Exhibit "A", indicate that he's paying $30,000 an acre

3

for the property?

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

And I guess I'll represent to you, Mr.

6

Stangl, that if you times the 6.87 acres times $30,000

7

you come up with $206,100.00.

8

A

I think that's accurate.

9

Q

How do you account for the fact that

10

there is additional acreage in there and the purchase

11

price is still $206,100.00?

12
13
14

A
acreage.

I don't know what you mean by additional

I don't think there is any.
Q

The right-of-way property, if you add

15

that in, he's actually paying less than $30,000 an

16

acre, isn't he?

17

A

I don't think so.

18

Q

Well, if 6.87 acres times $30,000 equals

19

$206,100.00, that's the back parcel.

20

telling us that in addition you think you should deed

21

him the fee ownership to the right-of-way property.

22

Doesn't that mean that he's actually paying less than

23

$30,000 an acre?

24
25

A
telling you.

Now you're

You're telling me what you think I'm
I'm telling you what I think I'm telling
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1

you.

I think I sold him 6.87 acres at $30,000 an acre,

2

which extends to $206,100.00. And that's 6.87 acres

3

plus a parcel that is to the extreme east end of the

4

original parcel that I purchased from Tolman, and the

5

access by way of a 50 foot wide tongue.

6

in that tongue, together with the property in the area

7

totals 6.87 acres.

8
9
10

Q

And that area

Would you please open to Exhibit "C" so

I can make sure I understand what you are telling me.
Do you have that document, Mr. Stangl?

11

A

I do.

12

Q

Is it your testimony that the rear

13

parcel that Mr. Wade acknowledges he's purchased,

14

together with and added to the acreage of the

15

right-of-way equals 6.87 acres?

16

A

17

That's correct.
MR. NELSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

18

That's all the questions I have.

19

explaining that.

20
21

MR. CROCKETT:

Nothing further, Your

Honor.

22

THE COURT:

23

testimony.

24

further?

25

Thank you for

Thank you for your

You may step down.

MR. NELSON:

Mr. Nelson, anything

No, Your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Oh, excuse me.

2

Mr. Crockett, anything further in rebuttal?

3

MR. CROCKETT:

4

THE COURT:

You rested.

No, Your Honor.

Are you ready for argument

5

now, or do you need a few minutes to assemble your

6

notes and papers?

7
8

MR. CROCKETT:

I'm ready for argument

now, Your Honor.

9

MR. NELSON:

I'd be glad to do it now.

10

I don't know how long it will take or whether you want

11

to do it after lunch, but —

12

MR. CROCKETT:

13

very long.

I don't expect it to take

I think I can do mine in ten minutes.

14

MR. NELSON:

Why don't we do it.

15

MR. CROCKETT:

16

really a fairly simple case.

17

court is —

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. CROCKETT:

Your Honor, this is
The issue before the

It used to be.
It used to be.

The issue

20

before the court is what did the parties agree to

21

regarding taxes?

22

position than previously taken by Mr. Wade, he admitted

23

an obligation to paying taxes.

24

it's absolutely clear from the testimony of Mr. Wade

25

that for the first four years he paid taxes.

In this trial, albeit a different

Further, Your Honor,
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1

Now, you have a dispute of testimony at this

2

point in time.

3

no such protest occurred.

4

between them that's the first dispute that took place.

5

And the court has to decide.

6

He said he protested.

Mr. Stangl said

There is an agreement

If the court determines —

well, frankly,

7

I've got to tell the court that even if it's under

8

protest, I don't think it makes any difference.

9

the ambiguities in the original contract is what

One of

10

happens if taxes aren't taken care of in the following

11

years.

12

to that.

13

if we go back in time we take the gloss that lawyers

14

and clients put on it now, we take that out of the

15

case, and you look back at what the parties did back

16

then.

17

what they actually intend.

18

Now, what is going to happen?

It is silent as

It gives a proration for the first year.

Because I think that's the best indication of

It's been agreed by Mr. Wade, and it's been

19

stipulated to in the stipulation that they paid on a

20

prorated basis of the acreage that was bought.

21

just did it.

22

And

They

They did that for four straight years.

After that Mr. Wade stopped paying his taxes,

23

after those four straight years, and Mr. Stangl

24

continued paying the taxes and paid them on the portion

25

charged him.

We are here, and that's the reason we are
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1

here today.

2

that they agreed to the prorata, and you have an

3

ambiguity.

4

parties to define what really occurred, then the court

5

should find that it's prorata.

6

It's a very simple thing.

If we are right

And as you look at the actions of the

If you look at the other side of that and we

7

actually have an express agreement here, Mr. Stangl

8

testified about the agreement with Mr. Wade.

9

again, we have directly opposite testimony.

Now, once
Mr. Wade

10

says, "No, I didn't agree to it."

11

states, "Well, I paid the property taxes anyway because

12

I didn't want to create waves with Mr. Stangl.

13

didn't want to get into a fight with him, so I paid

14

them."

15

But then he also

I

Mr. Stangl said they agreed to it on that

16

kind of a basis.

On this raw land that was out there.

17

And frankly, I think under either the actual express

18

agreement or the doctrine where you look and see what

19

they actually did in terms of defining the limits of

20

the contract, I think it's fairly clear that there was

21

agreement reached and it was based on a prorata square

22

footage situation.

23

Let me switch gears here for just a moment,

24

because one of the things that will come into play is

25

credibility.

We have also got this second situation
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1

regarding the credibility of representations about the

2

$50,000. We have perhaps the most bizarre situation

3

that I've encountered practicing law.

4

litigant who is contending that he believes his

5

attorney was out of the loop before March of '89, did

6

nothing until 1991 on this case, didn't try —

7

he says he tried to talk to Mr. Stangl, which Mr.

8

Stangl denies.

9

took place, and says he didn't sign affidavits that

10

We have a

except

Says he didn't know the garnishment

were prepared by Mr. Schwenke, and then by Mr. Udall.

11

A separate lawyer with a new notary public

12

signed the second affidavit.

He said that he didn't

13

know about either of those, and denied them, because if

14

he looks at them it's pretty clear that services were

15

being performed.

16

believe that Mr. Wade has any credibility at all, given

17

his testimony.

18

But even if he were telling the truth, even if in fact

19

he believed in March of 1989 he was no longer

20

represented in this case, then he had a responsibility

21

to come forward and do something with regard to this

22

court.

23

proceed.

24

care of the problems that were created in this case.

25

He simply didn't do that.

The truth of the matter, I just don't

His story just doesn't make any sense.

He can't just sit back and let this action
He has a responsibility to step in and take

He should have done that.
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1

There is -- ethically we could not have done

2

anything different than what we did, and it was Mr.

3

Wade that put us in that position,

4

required by the Supreme Court, gave to us the check for

5

delivery.

6

contact the client without going through the lawyer.

7

So we gave it to the lawyer that actually represented

8

him in the Supreme Court.

9

lies there, it is with Mr. Wade.

Mr. Stangl, as was

It would be absolutely improper for us to

If there is any fault that
It is not with Mr.

10

Stangl or with us in giving the check to Mr. Schwenke.

11

And then not only that, but a long period of

12

time goes by, no inquiry is made, nothing is followed

13

up on, and they want us to bear the burden of that

14

$50,000 expenditure.

15

make any sense whatsoever.

16

Your Honor, that simply doesn't

I would submit, Your Honor, that under the

17

facts of this case, given the testimony, given the

18

credibility issues that are there, given the fact that

19

if you look at the document's practical construction

20

wherein the courts say that the best indicator of what

21

the parties intended is not what they say they intend,

22

but what they actually did.

23

year period where he paid on a prorata basis on the

24

acreage, that being to both of their advantages, and

25

when you look at what happened in 1991 when the

If you look at that four
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1

property tax almost doubled once it was split out, then

2

we would submit that we are entitled to the relief that

3

we are seeking in this case.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. NELSON:

Mr. Nelson?
Thank you, Your Honor.

6

Utah law under Section 59-2-101 requires that the

7

various Counties in the State assess property based

8

upon its fair market value.

9

Mr. Stangl acknowledged that that's the way

10

it is done, even though he doesn't agree with the

11

assessment, as we all don't on occasion.

12

attorneys drafted the document, which was somewhat

13

ambiguous, or didn't even cover the situation on taxes.

14

He testified he made a subsequent verbal agreement to

15

solve that problem.

16

he who created the problem by his draftsman not

17

addressing it in the document, and I also submit to the

18

court that he could have solved that problem any time

19

he wanted by simply deeding the property to himself in

20

two parcels, as he did in 1991 —

21

to get an assessment split off.

22

Mr. Stangl's

I submit to the court that it was

or in 1990, in order

He created the problem; he refused to solve

23

it.

He also benefitted by it.

The testimony is that

24

at least at the time the contract was signed his front

25

parcel was worth approximately $50,000 more than the
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1

parcel they gave to Mr. Wade, and yet he is taking the

2

position that Mr. Wade ought to pay 70% of the tax

3

assessment because they want to do it on a square

4

footage basis.

5

Now, certainly that -- I guess he indicated

6

the reason to do that was for the benefit of both

7

parties.

8

Stangl, because he was receiving that subsidy from Mr.

9

Wade.

I can certainly see how it benefitted Mr.

Now, with respect to the agreement, neither Mr.

10

Stangl nor Mr. Wade have come up with any written

11

document that they can show that there was any

12

agreement.

13

wherein that was the agreement.

14

had a conversation wherein that was the agreement.

15

Mr. Stangl says he had a conversation
Mr. Wade says he never

In asking Mr. Wade questions, then, regarding

16

the taxes, his testimony under oath —

17

was that, one, he didn't want to create any waves.

18

number two, he believed that it was a one year problem

19

on each year, because Mr. Stangl was going to split the

20

property off.

21

his testimony
And

If the court finds that there was an

22

agreement, I submit to the court that that agreement

23

should not extend beyond the time when the contract was

24

paid off, which was the end of '84 or the first of '85.

25

It makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to have Mr.
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1

Wade subsidize Mr. Stangl's property after the contract

2

had been completed between the parties.

3

the court that there never was an agreement proven that

4

they should divide the property that way.

5

court finds there are, it certainly shouldn't extend

6

that beyond the time of the contract.

7

Stangl just received a subsidy from Mr. Wade.

8
9

So I submit to

But if the

Otherwise Mr.

Your Honor, with respect to the $50,000 check
and the credit situation, I have not had access to the

10

file, and you have taken judicial notice of documents

11

in the file.

12

credited with that payment.

13

far as he knew, his counsel was not representing him.

14

He's testified that he believed he was unrepresented.

15

And just because a gentleman goes and tells someone

16

else he is representing him without that authority,

17

it's our position that that shouldn't create an agency

18

relationship.

19

It is our belief that Mr. Wade should be
He never received it.

As

Mr. Wade never got the funds and should be

20

entitled to a credit on it.

Further, we submit, Your

21

Honor, that with respect to the attorney's fees matter,

22

in order for Mr. Stangl to be entitled to attorney's

23

fees, the contract requires that some notice be given

24

of default, and I would submit that not only was there

25

no evidence that such notice was given subsequent to
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1

the time of the taxes being paid, but that no notice

2

was given.

3
4

And finally, Your Honor, I would like to
refer to one document that is in Exhibit "BB".

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CROCKETT:

7

stipulation.

8
9

The counterclaim notice.
It's also in the

We covered that.
MR. NELSON:

Your Honor, if the

stipulation solves that problem, then obviously I'll

10

retract that argument.

11

today.

12

evidence today was presented that there was a notice to

13

start that time period.

14

I simply observed no evidence

I don't have it in the stipulation.

No

The document will reflect whatever that

15

stipulation was.

Your Honor, I would like you to refer

16

to one of the letters in Exhibit "PM, written by

17

Elizabeth Stangl, and —

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. NELSON:

Which one?
It is -- let me find it.

20

It is toward the back of those letters.

21

January 4, 1982 letter, and it is about four pages from

22

the back of Exhibit "B".

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. NELSON:

25

THE COURT:

It is the

January 4?
January 4, 1982.
Okay, I have it.
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1

MR. NELSON:

Do you find that?

I'm

2

looking at the third full paragraph, approximately in

3

the middle of the page. And I don't know why she

4

raises that issue, but she indicates that, "Apparently

5

you did not understand how the 1981 property tax

6

proration was achieved."

7

evidence that Mr. Stangl —

8

objection expressed, and then this writing to explain

9

it.

I assume that, but there's no
there must have been an

It seems to me, Your Honor, that that would show

10

there was some confusion in everyone's mind as to

11

exactly how the prorations had been figured for those

12

prior three years.

13

I remind you the date of this letter is

14

January 4, 1982.

I submit to the Court that without

15

some writing or other evidence that there's an

16

agreement, the only —

17

requires the property assessed based on fair market

18

value and not square footage, and absent some agreement

19

to the contrary, that's the way it should be done.

the law and custom of our State

20

Thank you, Your Honor.

21

MR. CROCKETT:

22

I have the last few minutes.

23

counterclaim constitutes notice that the Court deems

24

that we need to do that.

25

covered it.

Since we have the burden,
Your Honor, the

I thought the stipulation

I haven't read it to see*

We have a
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1

letter dated November 24, 1986, informing him that he

2

was in default.

3

disputed fact because --

4
5

I don't think that that ought to be a

THE COURT:

Was there a letter that's an

exhibit?

6

MR. CROCKETT:

That's number 3.

7

one of those that was not stipulated.

8

The testimony would be that it was sent to him.

9
10

THE COURT:

Where do you find that

MR. CROCKETT:

THE COURT:

14

MR. CROCKETT:

THE COURT:

22

Who's the author of that

MR. CROCKETT:

It is Mr. Stangl, F. C.

Stangl, to Mr. Wade.

20
21

Not introduced today.

letter?

18
19

But not introduced today?

What I'm saying is that that becomes —

16
17

In our exhibit list

number 3.

13

15

But it was sent.

letter in the documents?

11
12

It's

THE COURT:

Are you offering that at

this time?
MR. CROCKETT:

I would if there's any

23

question about putting him on notice.

I would offer it

24

because I think that Mr. Stangl, if called to testify,

25

would recall that he did send that.
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1
2

THE COURT:

I think there's a question

because the question has been raised.

3

MR. CROCKETT:

4

THE COURT:

5

May I reopen, then.

Do you have any objection to

reopening?

6

MR. NELSON:

Well, I do.

This is a

7

pretty technical argument, but I guess I need to make

8

it.

9

default, then I'm just raising that issue, Your Honor.

If they haven't put on their evidence on notice of

10

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, the

11

potential in this case is that it could be a

12

trifurcated procedure with the potential for subsequent

13

hearings on attorney's fees, the potential for

14

MR. NELSON:

—

I agree we did make that

15

indication today that my party feels that they are

16

entitled to it, and we feel a subsequent hearing is

17

necessary.

18

that point I have no problem with him submitting that

19

evidence.

I submit to the court that if we get to

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. NELSON:

Okay.
I probably -- Your Honor, I

22

probably shouldn't have even raised it since we

23

stipulated that attorney's fees matters would be

24

handled separately.

25

handle that separately.

And I guess I would suggest we do
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1

MR. CROCKETT:

Okay.

Then I don't know

2

what that means, but I would offer it as the next

3

exhibit.

4

letter he sent to Mr. Wade.

5
6
7
8

If called, Mr. Stangl would testify it's a

THE COURT:
is noted.

The date is
November 26.

—
Your objection

That is exhibit number what?
MR. CROCKETT:

That will be Exhibit

"CC", Your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

10

That exhibit is received.

11

for the following reasons, number one, there is

12

potential that this case could be tried, if not in two

13

sections, perhaps in three, because there may be a

14

necessity to take evidence as to market values for each

15

year since 1977 or 1978 forward.

16

potential for further evidence on the amount of

17

attorney's fees.

18

of the party that they rest has all that much

19

importance or significance.

20

law from the Supreme Court indicating that if you are

21

in the midst of a bench trial and if the evidence

22

that's the subject of a motion to reopen is in the

23

courtroom and ready to be presented, it's an abuse of

24

discretion not to allow counsel to reopen.

25

The objection is overruled.
The objection is overruled

Furthermore, there is

And so it's not as if the statement

MR. NELSON:

Furthermore, there is case

Thank you, Your Honor.
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1

MR. CROCKETT:

Okay.

2

final comment.

3

contract for attorney's fees.

4

that for when we go down the road.

5
6

We simply rely on the provisions of the

THE COURT:

We reserve the rest of

All right.

Anything else,

Mr. Nelson?

7

MR. NELSON:

8

THE COURT:

9

Your Honor, one

"CC"?

No, Your Honor.
Can I see that exhibit,

I am prepared to rule at this time, counsel, and

10

let me just indicate to you that the case is composed

11

of two volumes of pleadings.

12

probably I have had more involvement in as a judge,

13

proportionately, than any —

14

cases that come along.

15

It is a case that

well, than most other

And as a result I was acquainted with the

16

case beforehand.

17

the case as the issues were presented today.

18

take this under advisement would be misleading to you,

19

and that is, that it would mislead you into at least

20

perhaps believing that I was not able to make up my

21

mind at this time, and I think I have heard the

22

argument of counsel and all the evidence that I can.

23

I have become better acquainted with
For me to

And I think the appropriate result is fairly

24

straightforward here.

Before I get into reciting

25

specific findings, let me just indicate this:

It is
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1

true that taxing authorities generally in the State of

2

Utah, which are the Counties, tax based upon market

3

value.

4

taxation, but allocation of taxation, which does not

5

necessarily follow that one allocates a tax based upon

6

the same theory that the taxing authorities tax.

But the question before the court is not

7

With respect to construing the contract

8

against the drafter, that is absolutely true.

However,

9

it does not apply in this case because we are not

10

construing the contract.

11

ambiguous.

12

the court to construe the contract against the drafter

13

means that you do an allocation of fault, and because

14

the drafter may have caused an ambiguity, then on all

15

subsequent issues that you somehow make an assessment

16

of fault and creation in the ambiguity in the

17

determination of issues outside the construction of the

18

agreement.

19

The contract on its face is

I don't think the standard that requires

Because those two issues were presented to

20

me, I thought I needed to address them specifically

21

before I go forward.

22

that that letter within Exhibit "PM, dated January,

23

1982, references a possible or apparent

24

misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Wade.

It's not

25

determinative for the following reasons:

Number one,

Additionally, it's been suggested
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1

if it references a misunderstanding, it is talking

2

about a unilateral misunderstanding rather than a

3

mutual understanding.

4

is appears to make a reference to what is likely an

5

oral statement made by either Mr. Wade or someone on

6

his behalf, and in explaining exactly what the

7

calculations were, assuming that there was such an

8

understanding.

9

Furthermore, what it only does

Now, I find that there was an agreement, an

10

oral agreement in 1980 which resolved the issue finally

11

and prospectively that the taxes would be allocated in

12

proportion to the square footage holdings.

13

agreement reflected the conduct of the parties before

14

and after 1978.

15

That that

I furthermore find that the letters
M

P M were sent.

16

referenced in Exhibit

It is

17

unreasonable for me to believe that they were not

18

received either by Mr. Wade or someone with the right

19

to act on his behalf.

20

agreement in 1980, that these letters reflect the

21

conduct of the parties, and that that conduct reflects

22

the intent of the parties at the time of the execution

23

of the agreement and at all times after that.

24

guess what I'm saying is that there are two alternative

25

bases, and that is, number one, that there was an

That even if there was not an

So I
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1

amendment of the contract, or a further contract, in

2

1980, an oral one, which is not subject to the statute

3

of frauds because it does not transfer real property.

4

Failing that, that the letters in Exhibit MP"

5

reflect the intent of the parties at and after the

6

execution of the agreement in question.

7

important in a case where there is an ambiguity which

8

does exist in the agreement in question.

9

That intent is

I did not in any way rely on the evidence

10

that there was an increase in the taxes on the smaller

11

separate parcels in either 1990 or 1991 as a result of

12

the severance of the two.

13

parcels as a result of the tax work done from

14

Strategis, the billing for which is reflected in

15

Exhibit "RM.

16

accordance with the same prorata allocation on a square

17

footage basis as the taxes should be calculated from

18

1978 to the date of the completion of the contract.

19

And from the date of the completion of the contract to

20

the date when the tracts were severed for tax purposes.

21

It doesn't make sense to me that the agreement ends

22

just when all the payments have been completed under

23

the contract in question.

24
25

There was a benefit to both

And that billing should be absorbed in

What exists throughout this case is Mr. Wade
speaking when he wishes, in the manner in which he
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1

wishes, and instead of coming forward and meeting his

2

responsibilities, such as to provide the court and

3

provide counsel all documents which relate in any way

4

to this.

5

There is nothing before me to create a belief

6

by me that there are documents that somehow object to

7

the allocation of the taxes.

8

Wade's testimony is that there are perhaps some

9

response to those letters, Exhibit "P".

I'm assuming that Mr.

I can hardly

10

credit any of those when I don't have those in front of

11

me.

12

manner and by the appropriate evidence in this case

13

continued even after all the payments were made under

14

the contract in question.

This failure to be involved in the appropriate

15

I believe that was completed some time in

16

1982.

17

not be at that date, but instead should be at the later

18

date, and that is the date when they were severed for

19

tax purposes.

20

And so that the cutoff on this allocation should

One thing that I was affected by in choosing

21

to credit the testimony of Mr. Stangl and discredit the

22

testimony of Mr. Wade is the interplay of two items:

23

Number one, it is very clear that Mr. Wade has gone

24

through a proceeding involving fraud.

25

testified that he did everything in strict accordance

Mr. Wade also
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1

with whatever Mr. Stangl said.

2

Mr. Stangl ran this ship, even though he only

3

owned about a third of it. And the words that Mr. Wade

4

used on the stand in talking about the control by Mr.

5

Stangl are the types of words that judges frequently

6

hear in fraud cases. And it could very well be that

7

Mr. Wade heard those types of words or testimony in the

8

fraud proceedings that he has testified about, and now

9

seeks to use that same type of theory and the same type

10

of words to change what appears to me was an agreement

11

between the parties here.

12

That is some part of my thinking, and I was

13

listening to the testimony in determining who should be

14

credited and who should not be credited in this case

15

concerning testimony.

16

Now, I'm not suggesting that what I've just

17

stated constitutes the totality of the Findings of Fact

18

and Conclusions of Law.

19

I'm going to ask Mr. Crockett if he would add some

20

flesh to those bones and prepare formal Findings of

21

Fact and Conclusions of Law.

22

obviously that the allocation is in accordance with

23

acreage.

24

check, or $52,000 check and some change, it appears to

25

me from Exhibit "Y" that -- and when I say Exhibit MY",

It's merely a skeleton, and

Conclusion of Law is

Now, as to the issue concerning this $50,000
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1

I'm actually talking about a corresponding original of

2

Exhibit

3

was in fact signed by Mr. Wade, and the signature is in

4

fact his signature.

5

signature or substantially the same signature as

6

appears in the answer, in answering interrogatories,

7

which he did accept as being his own.

8

Exhibit

9

M M

Y

M

as it exists in the files.

This document

It does appear to be the same

That being

BB".
Exhibit

M

YM acknowledges information as of,

10

what, the 23rd of March, 1990, and indicates that Mr.

11

Wade was allowing or acknowledging things that occurred

12

after the purported date of withdrawal of Mr. Schwenke

13

twelve months previously.

14

credit the unfiled withdrawal of counsel as

15

constituting withdrawal, thereby relieving Mr. Wade of

16

the agency relationship with Mr. Schwenke.

17

relationship abided and continued to abide until 1991,

18

when Mr. Schwenke formally withdrew.

19

that was in January of 1991.

20

And as a result I do not

That agency

And I believe

Alternatively, even if you assume what Mr.

21

Wade has testified to, Mr. Wade has done in this

22

litigation exactly what he did in his business

23

transaction, and that is, he failed to adhere to his

24

obligations, did not communicate with people who needed

25

to be communicated with in the manner in which they
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1

should have been communicated with.

2

letting the court and counsel know that he was no

3

longer being represented by Mr, Schwenke, or attending

4

in any way to a pending proceeding.

5

conclude that Mr. Schwenke was the agent of Mr. Wade

6

both in default and by appearances such that Mr.

7

Schwenke's changing of the check in question, altering

8

the check in question, is deemed to be an act of Mr.

9

Wade.

10

13
14
15

And therefore, I

Therefore, there should be no offset or credit

for the amount of that check.

11
12

And that is, by

Now, are there any issues I have not
addressed?
MR. CROCKETT:

I assume we'll submit

affidavits of attorney's fees.
THE COURT:

Right.

I mean, the evidence

16

here on notice, if that is an issue, is before me.

17

haven't had time to read that letter, and I have these

18

other documents, and I'm not about to resolve whether

19

that constitutes notice or notice is adequate or

20

whether the counterclaim constitutes notice, or whether

21

that notice was adequate.

22

be deferred, if it remains an issue, until a subsequent

23

proceeding, if a subsequent proceeding is necessary.

24
25

I

I think that issue ought to

MR. CROCKETT:

Okay.

I take it that

means, Judge, -- well, I'm not sure that notice bears
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1

on the attorney's fees in this case.

2

the contract

If you look at

—

3

THE COURT:

I don't either.

4

MR. CROCKETT:

If it doesn't bear, then

5

all I think we will need to do is file an affidavit.

6

If there's an objection, we will need to have a

7

hearing.

8
9

THE COURT:

You need to prepare for me

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the issues

10

that I've resolved today.

11

forward and either settle or present in appropriate

12

fashion the further issues that remain.

13

on for further hearing, if necessary.

14

Both of you need to go

MR. CROCKETT:

And get those

We'll prepare that, Your

15

Honor, and submit it to counsel for approval as to

16

form.

17
18

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Nelson,

did I address all the issues that need to be addressed?

19

MR. NELSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

All right.

I believe so, Your Honor.
All right.

Then we will be

in recess.

22

(Whereupon, court was in recess at 1:00

23

o'clock p.m. and the proceedings were concluded.)

24
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Re:

Wade v. Stanql, Case No. 920221-CA
Supplemental Authorities

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I am writing to set forth two recently decided
supplemental authorities that are directly relevant to the
arguments made in Appellee's brief (which was filed with the Court
on December 18, 1992).
Sukin v. Sukin, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 49 (Utah Ct. App. Nov.
27, 1992), reaffirms that before a claim of bias or prejudice will
be considered on appeal it must have first been raised with the
trial court in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b).
This
authority applies to Point II, p. 16 of Appellee's brief.
Custick v. Englesath, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 77, 78 (Utah Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 1992), states: "If a court relies on extrinsic evidence,
including other documents, to interpret an ambiguous document, its
interpretation becomes a factual matter and we 'will not disturb
the findings unless they are clearly erroneous.' Schmidt, 775 P.2d
at 430.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a)" (emphasis added).
This
authority applies to Point IV, p. 30 of Appellee's brief and to
Point II.B, pp. 22-23 of Appellant's brief.
Copies of these two decisions are attached for the Court's
convenience.
These supplemental authorities are raised at this point
because they were only recently decided and reported in the
December 15, 1992 edition of Utah Advance Reports.
Appellee
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Mary T. Noonan
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respectfully asks that the Court consider these supplemental
authorities as part of Appellee's brief.
Very truly yours,
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN
& GEE,
^
B

y

,
.
. .,
Daniel A. JqjaseK
Attorneys for Hf^fendaht/Appellee
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Enclosures

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 24th day of December, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, including
enclosures, was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
James I. Watts, Esq.
124 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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j ....., 6 .v, 5am, uy seeiung review at the
appellate level. Not only is this unfair to the
party prevailing below, it is unfair to others
seeking appeals. By increasing our caseload with
close "judgment call" cases, we necessarily
delay consideration of other important cases. In
my view, this court must be more disciplined in
its standard of review analysis and resist the
temptation to second guess the trial court's
decisions by asserting that we, in our wisdom,
may review the trial court's findings of ultimate
fact under a correction-of-error standard.
Otherwise, we are inviting an onslaught of
questionable appeals.
It is not our task in this appeal to revisit the
evidence and to redetermine whether there was
entrapment. The trial court has already
performed that task. Our inquiry is simply
whether, in light of the governing law, the trial
court's finding of no entrapment is permissible.
I believe it is.^
Conclusion
Defendant has not shown that the trial court
has committed any legal error. He has not
challenged the trial court's identification or
interpretation of the governing law. Nor has he
challenged any of the trial court's subordinate
facts. Defendant does not claim that the trial
court's application of the law to the facts is
unreasonable or irrational. All that remains is
defendant's disagreement with the trial court's
considered judgment that the facts, when viewed
in light of the governing law, do not constitute
entrapment. To this factual judgment we must
defer.
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge

1. It is not enough to simply rehearse the differing
standards for factual and legal questions as the main
opinion does in this case Each issue raised must be
explicitly characterized as either a factual challenge or
a legal challenge so it is clear which standard is being
applied and why. Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires the parties to brief "the
standard of review for each issue." We cannot be
expected to do less in our opinions.
2. A similar analysis applies when the question is
whether the trial court has abused its judicial
discretion. In Tolinan v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), we recognized that a
trial court's discretion is like an arena within which it
may freely operate as it deems best. Its borders are
established by the law. So long as the trial court
remains within the arena defined by law, we defer to
its judgment. But, if the trial court steps out of the
arena, it is "exceeding" or "abusing" its discretion as
a matter of law, and we will correct its error. Id. at
26-27.
3. An example may be helpful in understanding this
concept. When a factfinder must determine whether a
person has committed a crime, it is not allowed to
decide arbitrarily what constitutes the offense. Rather,
the factfinder must consider the elements of the crime
as defined by the law. Furthermore, the factfinder is
not allowed to base its decision on irrelevant factors

wnicn me factfinder must function. The ultimate
factual finding that the defendant did, or did not,
commit the crime charged is a factual determination,
"guided" by the law. To such findings we defer, so
long as the factfinder remained within a properly
defined Field of inquiry.
4. In the negligence setting, for example, whether a
person acted reasonably is a question of fact unless
"fixed by law" by legislation or prior judicial
decision. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d
821. 825-26 (Utah App. 1989) cert, denied, 789 P.2d
33 (1990).
5. The main opinion overstates the scope of our
review by concluding that "[tlhe trial court correctly
held that the government conduct in this case did not
constitute entrapment." (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch
as our sole duty is to determine whether the trial
court's finding was permissible, not whether it was
"correct," our conclusion should be: "Since the trial
court was not required to find that the use of Hall
constituted entrapment as a matter of taw, it was
permissible for the trial court to find that there was no
entrapment in this case. We therefore do not disturb
its ruling." Anything more is an unwarranted and
unjustifiable intrusion into the province of the trial
court.
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IN T H E
UTAH C O U R T O F APPEALS
Elaine Rubin S U K 1 N ,
Plaintiff a n d Appellee,
v.
D e a n Carey S U K J N ,
Defendant a n d Appellant.
N o . 920028-CA
F I L E D : N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
ATTORNEYS:
Ray G. Martineau, Salt Lake City, and Leslie
W. Slaugh, Provo, for Appellant
John T. Anderson and James H. Woodall, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, GartT, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Dean Carey Sukin appeals from the t n a l
court's order awarding custody of the parties'
minor child to Elaine Rubin Sukin. We vacate
the custody award and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

ANALYSIS
Inadequate Findings
Dean argues that the trial court's findings d<
not adequately explain the basis for the tria
court's decision to award custody of Gabrielle t<
Elaine. We agree.
Both the supreme court and this court hav<
continually instructed our trial courts to provid«
adequate and detailed findings of fact in makin;
custody determinations.
T o ensure that the trial court's custody
determination, discretionary as it is, is
raitonally based, it is essential that the court
set forth in its findings of fact not only that
it finds one parent to be the better person to
care for the child, but also the basic facts
which show why that ultimate conclusion is
justified. There must be "a logical and legal
basis for the ultimate conclusions." Milne
Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm 'n., 720
P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). As we stated
in Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338
(Utah 1979):
T h e importance of complete, accurate
and consistent findings of fact in a case
tried by a judge is essential to the
resolution of dispute under the proper
ISSUES
rule of law. T o that end the findings
On appeal, Dean claims (1) that the trial court
should be sufficiently detailed and
abused its discretion, in light of the evidence, in
include enough subsidiary facts to
awarding custody of Gabrielle to Elaine; (2) that
disclose the steps by which the ultimate
the findings of fact are insufficient to explain the
conclusion on each factual issue was
basis for awarding custody of Gabrielle to
Elaine; (3) that the trial court abused its
reached.
discretion when it misinterpreted the law and
Proper findings of fact ensure that the
refused to consider Dr. Stewart's custody
ultimate custody award follows logically
evaluation; (4) that the trial court abused its
from, and is supported by, the evidence and
discretion when it improperly considered
the controlling legal principles. Adequate
gender-based preferences in awarding custody;
findings are also necessary for this Court to
and (5) that on remand this case should be
perform its assigned review function.
assigned to a different trial judge.
Smith, 726 P.2d at 426 (citations omitted);
accord Roberts, 835 P.2d at 195; Jensen v.
Jensen, 775 P.2d 4 3 6 , 438 (Utah App. 1989);
S T A N D A R D O F REVIEW
Trial courts are given broad discretion in
Painter, 752 P.2d at 909.
making child custody awards. Maughan
v.
There is no definitive checklist of factors to be
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989).
used for determining custody since such "factors
The trial court's decision regarding custody will
are highly personal and individual, and do not
not be upset "absent a showing of an abuse of
lend themselves to the means of generalization
discretion or manifest injustice." Id. at 159. employed in other areas of the law . . . ." Moon
"However, to ensure the court acted within its
v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990).
broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the The trial court must, however, make adequate
court's decision must be set forth fully in
findings regarding the "best interests of the child
appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v.
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral
Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988).
standards of each of the parties." Utah Code
The findings must be sufficiently detailed "to Ann. §30-3-10(1) (1989). The court must also
ensure that the trial court's discretionary consider which parent is "most likely to act in
determination was rationally based." Martinez v.
the best interests of the child, including allowing
Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986). I the child frequent and continuing contact with
"Specificity of findings is particularly important
the noncustodial parent as the court finds
in custody determinations. This is so because the
appropriate." Utah Code Ann. §30-3 10(2)
issues involved are highly fact sensitive."
(1989). In order to determine the best interests
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah
of the child the court should also consider and,
App. 1992).
where applicable, make appropriate findings on
the following factors:
[Tlhe preference of the child; keeping
siblings together; the relative strength of the
I child's bond with one or both of the
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

The parties were married in Chicago, Illinois, ]
in November 1986. At the time of their
marriage, Dean was in his third year of medical
school. In 1988, the parties moved to Salt Lake j
City in order for Dean to participate in a
medical residency program at the University of
Utah. The parties' only child, Gabrielle Lyana
Sukin, was born on August 22, 1989, in Salt
Lake City.
Elaine filed for divorce in M a r c h , 1991. A
hearing was held in April, wherein custody was
awarded to Elaine during the pendency of the
proceedings, subject to Dean's reasonable
visitation. Another hearing was held in May,
wherein Dean was ordered to pay temporary
child support, alimony, and attorney fees. By
stipulation of the parties, the trial court
appointed Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart to perform
a child custody evaluation.
The case was tried in September, 1991. At the
end of the trial, the court awarded custody of
Gabrielle to Elaine, with reasonable visitation to
Dean. Dean appeals the trial court's award of
custody.

..v, T„vmc me c o u r t s custody award and
w^«z wcici unoea custody arrangements
I
f
where the child is happy and well adjusted.
I remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Having so
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
concluded, we do not reach Dean's claim that
1982). The court should also consider, where
applicable, the following factors relating to the I the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
prospective custodians:
I custody to Elaine.
IMJoral character and emotional stability;
I
Dr. Stewart's Evaluation
duration and depth of desire for custody;
Dean argues that the trial court abused its
ability to provide personal rather than
discretion when it refused to consider Dr.
surrogate care; significant impairment of
Stewart's evaluation because she recommended
ability to function as a parent through drug
abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause;
I that any sole custody award to Elaine be
reasons for having relinquished custody in
I predicated upon her living in a close
the past; religious compatibility with the
I geographical proximity to Dean. The trial court
child; kinship, including, in extraordinary
I made the following statement with regard to Dr.
circumstances,
stepparent
status;
and
Stewart's recommendation: "I'm not going to
financial condition.
i tell these people where they can live. I don't
hi. (footnotes omitted). Whenever "custody is | think I can do that." Dean claims that this
indicates that the trial
court
contested and evidence presents several possible ' statement
interpretations, a bare conclusory recitation of I misunderstood Dr. Stewart's recommendation as
factors and statutory terms will not suffice. We I requiring a restriction to be placed directly on
must have the necessary supporting factual I Elaine's right to choose a place to live. He
findings linking those factors to the children's | claims that because of this misunderstanding the
court
rejected
Dr.
Stewart's
best interests and each parent's abilities to meet \ t r i a l
recommendations. Dean argues, however, that
the children's needs." Roberts, 835 P.2d at 194.
The trial court's entire written findings, with . I Dr. Stewart did not suggest that a restriction be
I placed on Elaine's right to choose a place to
regard to custody, state as follows:
live, but instead that Elaine not be granted
11. Both parties are competent, loving
custody if she does not live close to Dean.
parents and are equally fit and capable of
providing Gabrielle with a stable and caring
I
We recognize that an award of custody can be
environment.
I predicated upon requiring the custodial parent to
keep the children within this jurisdiction. See
12. Gabrielle's interests would best be
Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 204, 321 P.2d
served if plaintiff were awarded her sole
physical and legal custody subject to
939, 943 (1958) ("plaintiff should be required to
defendant's reasonable rights of
I retain the children in this jurisdiction until the
visitation . . . .
further order of this court so that the defendant
may enjoy the full privileges of visiting and
These conclusory findings clearly do not provide
the
best
possible
paternal
an adequate explanation of the basis for I ! maintaining
relationship with them."). However, it is
awarding custody to Elaine. Furthermore, the
trial court did not make any additional ' entirely unclear from the findings as to what
subsidiary findings in open court to support its i prompted the trial court to reject Dr. Stewart's
ultimate finding that it would be in the best I evaluation. "|Ajlthough the trial court is not
interests of the child for custody to be granted to
bound to accept the evaluation (of a court
Elaine.
I appointed evaJuatorJ, we think some reason for
The trial court's inadequate findings in this I rejecting the recommendation . . . is in order."
Turkey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1982).
case constitute reversible error unless the facts
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of
Improper Gender-Based Preference
the judgment." Kinkclla v. Baugh, 660 P.2d J Dean argues that the trial court abused its
233, 236 (Utah 1983). Elaine agrees that the I d i s c r e t i o n
by
improperly
considering
findings "do not fully detail the many
gender-based preferences. In particular, he
evidentiary predicates supporting a custody j claims that when issuing its decision from the
award to wife." She argues, however, that the I bench, the trial court made several statements
award of custody is overwhelmingly supported I against fathers that indicate an impermissible
by the factual record. We disagree. The record I gender-based preference. Dean points to the
in this case is almost 1300 pages long. It I court's statement that it is normal for men to
contains abundant testimony from various
show less emotion than women--"it's the nature
witnesses supporting the claims of both parties. I of the beast." He also points to the following
The facts simply are not clear, uncontroverted, I statements of the trial court:
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor I
I think there is no question, no question,
of the judgment.
I that | a | woman is going to spend more time
We therefore conclude that the trial court's I with the child, if (DeanJ remarries or if the
subsidiary findings are inadequate to support its I plaintiff remarries.
The plaintiff is still going to spend more
ultimate finding that it would be in the best I
I time with the child, and the defendant's new
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

child. So that is not something that is
controlling as far as the court is concerned.
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court did away
with gender-based preferences in custody
determinations. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117,
119 (Utah 1986). The supreme court stated that
" | w | e believe the time has come to discontinue
our support, even in dictum, for the notion of
gender-based preferences in child custody
cases." Id. The court held that the maternal
preference has the effect of denying custody to
a father who is equally as capable of parenting
as the mother, solely because of his gender. Id.
at 120. The court stated that:
the rule lacks validity because it is
unnecessary and
perpetuates
outdated
stereotypes. The development of the tender
years doctrine was perhaps useful in a
society in which fathers traditionally worked
outside the home and mothers did not;
however, since that pattern is no longer
prevalent, particularly in post-separation
single-parent households, the tender years
doctrine is equally anachronistic.
Id. The court stated that "we disavow today
those cases that continue to approve, even
indirectly, an arbitrary maternal preference,
thereby encouraging arguments such as those
made by the cross-appellant in this case." Id.
Therefore, on remand, the custody award in this
case cannot be based, directly or indirectly, on
gender-based preferences or stereotypes.

win noi oe considered on appeal); see also
Ha slam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P. 2d
520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice
is a matter to be determined by the trial court
"in the first instance," subject to appellate
review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon
3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds
for disqualification). We will not therefore
address the issue of bias or prejudice when it is
raised for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court's findings are
inadequate to support its award of custody to
Elaine. We therefore vacate the trial court's
order and remand for appropriate proceedings.
On remand, the trial court must include findings
addressing the statutory factors listed in Utah
Code Ann. §30-3-10 (1989), as well as any
other factors it finds relevant. Furthermore, if it
is not otherwise clear from the findings, the trial
court should include an explanation of its
decision to accept or reject Dr. Stewart's
recommendations. The trial court must also
avoid any reliance on gender-based preferences
or stereotypes. Finally, we do not address the
issue of bias or prejudice because it has been
raised for the first time on appeal.
We vacate the custody award and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
WE C O N C U R :
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Reassignment on Remand
Dean argues that it would be prejudicial to
remand this case to the same trial court that has
already made a custody determination and may
Cite as
be biased against his position. He therefore
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
requests that any remand of this case be made
with directions that the case be assigned to a
IN THE
different trial judge.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Dean has not, however, raised the issue of
bias or prejudice in the trial court. We are
governed by the general principle that matters SUPERIOR SOFT WATER COMPANY,
not put in issue before the trial court may not be
Petitioner,
raised for the first time on appeal. James v.
v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987).
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
This principle applies where the bias or
Respondent.
prejudice of a trial judge is alleged. Rule 63(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
No. 920337-CA
Whenever a party to any action or
FILED: November 30, 1992
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney
shall make and file an affidavit that the
Original Proceeding in this Court
judge before whom such action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias
ATTORNEYS:
or prejudice, either against such party or his
Lynn P. Howard and Del win T. Pond, Salt
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to
Lake City, for Petitioner
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further
R. Paul Van Dam and Susan L. Barnum, Salt
therein, except to call in another judge to
Lake City, for Respondent
hear and determine the matter.
This rule requires that a party alleging bias or
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and O r m e .
prejudice must first file an affidavit in the trial
court. See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019,
This opinion is subject to revision before
1023 (Utah App. 1987) (affidavits regarding bias
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
or prejudice not admitted before the trial court
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Cite as

I comment to make clear mv position on the
standard of review for reasonable suspicion In
State v Carter, 812 P 2d 460 (Utah App
1991), cert denied, 836 P 2d 1383 (Utah 1992),
I concurred with Judge Orme in the opinion
written by Judge Billings on this same standard
of review We said
we are puzzled by what standard of review
we should apply in reviewing a trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion The
Utah Supreme Court has previously treated
a determination of reasonable suspicion as a
factual
finding,
indicating
that
determinations of reasonable suspicion are
properly reviewed by appellate courts under
a clearly erroneous standard See State v
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987)
( In determining whether the facts support a
reasonable suspicion
a trial court must
consider the totality of the circumstances
facing the officers The reviewing court
should not overturn the trial court's
determination
unless
it
is
clearly
erroneous ')
Analytically, however, we are inclined to
agree with
the
trial court that
a
determination of reasonable suspicion more
logically falls into the conclusion of law
category
See also Hayes v State, 785
P 2d 1 3 , 36 (Alaska Ct App
1990)
(reasonable suspicion is mixed question,
factual
findings
upheld unless clearly
erroneous, but ultimate conclusion is subject
to de novo review)
Id at 4 6 6 , n 6
In State v Munsen, 821 P 2d 13 (Utah App
1991), I authored an opinion, with Judge Russon
concurring and Judge Jackson concurring in
result only, 1 where we said
Munsen does not challenge the court's
findings Rather she challenges the court s
application of the law to the findings We
"review the ultimate conclusions drawn
from those findings as a matter of law,
under a correction of error standard,
affording no deference to the trial court
State v Taylor, 818 P 2d 5 6 1 , 565 (Utah
App 1991) See State v Mendoza,
748
P 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), State v Carter,
812 P 2d 460 466 n 6 (Utah App 1991)
See
also
United
States
v
Hernandez Aharado,
891 F 2d 1414, 1416
(9th O r 1989) (setting forth the generally
held view that whether reasonable suspicion
exists is a mixed question of fact and law,
and the trial court's u In mute conclusion
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal
conclusion which is reviewed de novo)
Id at 14 15
I am still of the opinion that in a mixed
question of law and fact, the final conclusion as
to whether theie is reasonable suspicion is a
conclusion of law, and therefore the standard of
review should be correction of error

201 Utah Adv Rep. 77
1 In his concurring opinion Judge Jackson agreed
with the trial court that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to justify detention but thought the length
and scope of the detention was not justified by the
circumstances
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
I concur with the result reached by my
colleagues but disagree with the standard of
review for reasonable suspicion which they have
selected Although Judge O r m e , writing for the
panel in State v Vigil, 815 P 2d 1296,
1299 1 3 0 0 ( U t a h A p p 1991), expressed concern
for consistent application of the law as
manifested in the doctnne of stare decisis, his
opinion here ignores the important concept of
stare decisis Judge GarfFs concurring opinion
does likewise Rather, both prefer to rely upon
court of appeals opinions such as State v Vigil,
815 P 2 d 1296 (Utah App 1991), State v
Carter, 812 P 2d 460 (Utah App 1991), cert
denied, 836 P 2d 1381 (1992), and ignore the
rule of law declared by the Utah Supreme
Court The Utah Supreme Court has consistently
applied the clearly erroneous standard of review
to the issue of reasonable suspicion State v
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 1 8 1 , 183 (Utah 1987) (the
reviewing court should not overturn the trial
court's determination of reasonable suspicion
unless it is clearly erroneous) To date, no
supreme court holding subsequent to Mendoza
has modified, disavowed, or overruled this
standard
Today's decision should be controlled
(bjy the important doctnne of stare decisis,
the means by which we ensure that the law
will not merely change erratically, but will
develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion That doctnne permits society to
presume that bedrock principles are founded
m the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals, and thereby contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of
government, both in appearance and in fact
Vasquez v Hillery, 474 U S 254, 265-66, 106
S Ct 617, 624 (1986) (quoting Burnet v
Coronado Oil <k Gas Co , 285 U S 3 9 3 , 4 1 2 ,
52 S Ct 4 4 3 , 449 (1932) (Brandeis, J ,
dissenting))
Pursuant
to
this
doctrine,
reasonable suspicion is to be reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard of review
The
principle of stare decisis requires that we
'continue the journey until our supreme court
chooses to change course " Cannefax
v
Clement, 786 P 2d 1377, 1383 (Utah App
1990) (Jackson, J , concurring), ajf'd, 818 P 2d
546 (Utah 1991)
Norman H Jackson, Judge

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

IN THE
VI AH COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate of Vida
CUSTICK, deceased
Carolann Bass,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
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Angela ENGLESATH; and Tina Andrade,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 920040-CA
FILED: December 4, 1992
Third District Salt Lake County
The Honorable Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS
Richard K Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellants
Matthew B Durrant, Salt Lake City, and
Steven R Parry, Idaho Falls, Idaho, for
Appellee
Before Judges Bench Billings and Orme
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in t h e Pacific R e p o r t e r .
ORME, Judge:
Appellants
challenge the
trial
court's
determination that a holographic will validly
revoked the decedent's p n o r will We affirm
FACTS
The decedent, Vida Custick, by way of a will
made in 1976, bequeathed her estate to a
pour over trust to be administered by First
Secunty Bank The trust agreement directed that
the trust estate be divided into four equal shares,
with one share for the appellee, the decedent's
only child, and one share for each of the
decedent's three grandchildren, two of whom
are appellants in this action, to be distributed
upon reaching their majonty
On or about March 30, 1985, the decedent
jotted some notes concerning, among other
matters, a visit to the bank and a discussion with
her attorney Other comments appear on the
same paper in the form of a numbered list of
things to be done The last lines of handwntten
text consist of a sentence by which she appears
to revoke her prior will That sentence contains
the date and her full name written in a style she
used when signing her name All of the writing
on this single sheet of paper, including the
apparent testamentary sentence, are in her own
handwriting albeit in a grammatically confusing
style
Ms Custick wrote "Void" on the signature
line of an unsigned copy of the 1976 will, across

her signature on a copy of the 1976 will, and
across her original signature on an original of
the 1976 trust agreement Upon her death, all of
the voided documents, along with the paper
containing the 1985 holographic will, were
discovered inside a plastic document holder, tied
closed with a pink ribbon Also found with these
documents was an envelope with the words "W
papers in here," written in Ms
Custick's
handwriting
All of these papers
were
discovered in a metal box locked inside a metal
cabinet
Appellee petitioned to set aside an informal
probate undertaken by First Security Bank as
trustee under the pour over trust agreement The
trial court granted the relief requested by
appellee, ruling that the 1985 holographic will
was valid and legally revoked the 1976 will and
that Ms Custick therefore died intestate The
central issues at trial were whether the signature
in the 1985 holographic will reflected signatory
intent to authenticate the document 1 and whether
that
document
contained
the
required
testamentary intent
On appeal, appellants contend that as a matter
of law the 1985 holographic will should be
construed to lack testamentary intent and that the
1976 will and trust agreement govern the
disposition of Ms
Custick's estate
The
appellee, on the other hand, argues the 1985
holographic will should be upheld because it
revokes a p n o r will and meets the statutory
requirements for a valid holographic will 2
ANALYSIS
According to Utah law, "|aj will which does
not comply with section 75 2 502 (outlining the
requirements of a formal will) is valid as a
holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if
the signature and the material provisions are in
the handwriting of the testator " Utah Code
Ann
§75-2 503 (1978)
Furthermore, the
definition of a will "includes any
testamentary instrument which merely
revokes
another will " Utah Code Ann
§75 1 201(48)(1978)
In cases where a will is unambiguous and can
be accurately interpreted by considering the
document within its foui corners alone, the
interpretation presents a question of law which
we review without any particular deference to
the trial court Burgess v Paulsen, 190 Utah
Adv Rep 4 9 , 51 (Utah App 1992) See also
Estate of Schmidt v Downs, 775 P 2d 4 2 7 , 430
(Utah App 1989) This, however, is not such a
case
The provision in question here is one sentence
in a document which contains a list of random
comments and reminders and which contains
unusual language and incorrect, confusing
terminology Q In re Ingram's Estate, 307
P 2d 9 0 3 , 906 (Utah
1957) (fact that
testamentary provision is a small part of a
document does not preclude provision from
constituting a will) Read in the context of the
entire document but otherwise in isolation, the
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~ ,v.^ uvi pnui win or u may mean
that she has in mind to do so at some future
time We therefore conclude that the provision
is ambiguous as concerns Ms
Custick s
testamentary intent See Larson v
Overland
Thrift & Loan 818 P 2d 1316 1319 (Utah App
1^91) ( Language is ambiguous if the words
used
ma> be understood to reach two or
more plausible meanings ) See also Faulkner
\ FamwKorth
665 P 2d 1292 1293 (Utah
1983) (deteimination of whether document is
ambiguous presents question of law) We thus
reject appellants' contention that the key
provision can be interpreted as a matter of law, 3
much less their contention that properly
construed, the instrument is not a valid
testamentary instrument
In In re Estate of Enikson,
806 P 2d 1186
(Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court noted that
in order to resolve the question of intent when
confronted with a possible holographic will,
courts typically consider intrinsic evidence that
is the document itself, and extrinsic evidence in
the form of both documentary evidence and the
testimony of witnesses Id at 1189 See Ingram
307 P 2d at 905 06 (trial court correctly relied
upon facts outside the document to strengthen its
conclusion that the crude documents manifested
testamentary
intent)
These
interpretive
principles apply in the present case and the trial
court correctly considered intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence to evaluate the will
Among the extrinsic evidence the court
considered were the voided documents stored
with the 1985 holographic will and the manner
in which that will was stored in a locked cabinet
and document folder This extrinsic evidence
was dispositive in the view of the trial court See
note 3 supra
If a court relies on extrinsic evidence
including other documents to interpret an
ambiguous document its interpretation becomes
a factual matter and we "will not disturb the
findings unless they are clearly erroneous "
Schmidt 775 P 2d at 430 See Utah R Civ P
52(a) Here the appellant failed to provide this
court with a transcript of the trial proceedings
Considering only the documentary and physical
evidence primarily relied on by the trial court,
however, its findings concerning the decedent s
intent are not clearly erroneous
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1 " Signature includes any name mark or sign
written with the intent to authenticate any instrument
or writing " Utah Code Ann §68 1 12(l)(r) (Sunn
1992)
2 Appellee also argues that we should dismiss
appellants case because they failed to provide a
written transcript of the trial proceedings as required
by Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and because they did not timely file their
appeal under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure These arguments are without merit No
transcript is necessary because appellants sole
argument on appeal is that the key document should
be construed as a matter of law making recourse to
other evidence unnecessary the appeal was timely
because the court granted albeit only in one
particular appellants motion to amend the court s
findings
3 Appellants argue that the trial court did not utilize
extrinsic evidence but instead relied exclusively upon
the four corners of the document Contrary to
appellants assertion the trial court s findings make
clear it based its interpretation of the 1985 holographic
will upon extrinsic evidence in the form of substantial
documentary and physical evidence This evidence
included the fact that Ms Custick voided various
copies and originals of the 1976 vs ill and trust
agreement and that she carefully stored these
documents along with the holographic will in a
document holder tied with a pmk ribbon in a metal
box locked within a metal cabinet 1 hese latter actions
are typical of someone who is dealing with a
document regarded as important such lengths are not
ordinarily undertaken to preserve a mere list of things
to do
In addition to the documentary evidence the
court also heard testimony at trial After considering
the extrinsic documentary evidence the court noted in
its findings that "having heard the parol evidence
offered by the parties at trial the Court finds none of
the parol evidence alters its interpretation of the 1985
uill " The appellants mistakenly focus upon this
sentence while ignoring the court s explicit reliance on
documentary evidence We therefore disagree with the
assertion that the trial court interpreted the 1985 will
solely on the basis of a reading of the text within the
document s four corners, although it is clear the court
found the extrinsic documentary and physical evidence
of more help than the oral testimony

CONCLUSION
The sentence claimed by appellee to be a
holographic will is ambiguous The court
properly considered extrinsic evidence to
interpret the provision Its findings based on that
extrinsic evidence, principally concerning other
documents and the careful manner in which the
holographic will was stored, are not clearly
erroneous It follows that the judgment appealed
from must be affirmed
Gregory K O r m e Judge
WE C O N C U R
Russell W Bench, Judge
_ _
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BONDED BICYCLE COURIERS,
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DEPARTMF NI
OF EMPI OYMENT
SECURITY; and John P Schoenfeld,
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No 920621-C A
FIl ED December 4, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS
Brenda L Flanders and Dena ( Sarandos
Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
R Paul Van Dam and K Allan Zabel, Salt
I ake C ity, for Respondent Department of
I mplo>ment Security
Before Judges Jackson Bench and GarfT (Law
& Motion)
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in t h e Pacific R e p o r t e r .
PER CURIAM
This matter is before the court on its own
notice of consideration for summary disposition
We summarily dismiss the petition for review
Petitioner seeks appellate review of a decision
by the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission awarding unemployment benefits
to respondent Schoenfeld The decision at issue
bears a date of August 18 1992, but was not
mailed to the parties until August 2 5 , 1992 The
petition for review was filed with the clerk of
this court on September 2 8 , 1992
The timely filing of a petition for review from
final agency action is jurisdictional Silva v
Department of Emp Sec , 786 P 2d 246, 247
(Utah App 1990) (per curiam) Since this case
was commenced after January 1, 1988, it is
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann §63 46b 1 to
§63-46b 2 2 ( 1 9 8 9 & S u p p 1992) Section 14 of
UAPA provides that "A party shall file a
petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued
" Utah Code Ann § 6 3 ^ 6 b 14(3)(a) (1989)
(emphasis added)
The term issued" is not defined in UAPA
and this court and the Utah Supreme Court have
recently defined it in different ways In Wiggins
v Board of Reuen
824 P 2d 1199 (Utah App
1992) (per curiam) this court held that "issue,"
in this context
means the date the agency
action is properly mailed
In the present

^«ow, me UIUCI libeu provided that it was final
on the date of mailing and that petitioner had 30
days from the date of mailing to seek judi ial
review However, the Utah Supreme Court
recently reached a different conclusion, stating,
"for the guidance of all those who petition for
judicial review from agency action, we hold that
the date the order constituting final agency
action issues is the date the order beais on its
face, and not the date it is mailed Dusty s Inc
v Utah State Tax tommn
199 Utah Adv Rep
7 9 (Utah 1992) (per curiam)
Although it does not expressly say so Dusty s
clearly overrules Wiggins Therefore despite
this court s inclination to find that issued
means mailed, we are bound to follow the rule
of law as it has been pronounced by the Utah
Supreme Court Applying the rule of Dusty s to
this case, the order was issued" on August 18,
1992, the date it bears on its face Since the
petition for review was not filed within 30 days
of the date of issue it is untimely and this court
lacks jurisdiction over the appeal !
The petition is dismissed
Norman H Jackson, Judge
Russell W Bench Judge
Regnal W Garff Judge

1 The fact that the order specified that petitioner had
30 days from the date of mailing to file a petition does
not change this result for two reasons First the
agency has no authority to enlarge the appellate
jurisdiction of this court Second petitioner did not
file a petition within "*0 days of the date of mailing
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